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Abstract of Thesis 
 
This thesis examines the part played by Christian churches in the communal 
stabilisation of three refugee settings and in the national resolution of the second 
Sudanese civil war.  Based on extensive field research in Sudan and in Sudanese 
refugee camps in Kenya and Uganda, the thesis is further underpinned by current 
theories on displacement, social identity and conflict resolution.  Ranging from 
grassroots pastors to Presidential Cabinet Ministers, altogether more than one 
hundred fifty church and political leaders were consulted through individual 
interviews and focus groups with more than seventy-five recorded hours.  Archives 
at The Centre for Documentation and Advocacy in Nairobi, Kenya, the New Sudan 
Council of Churches’ Archive in Kampala, Uganda, the Sudan Archive at the 
University of Durham, United Kingdom and the Hudson Institute in Washington 
D.C., United States were also utilised.   
The thesis commences with an examination of three grassroots communities 
in refuge, Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya, the internally displaced of Hajj Yusuf, 
Khartoum and Oliji Refugee Camp in Uganda.  In establishing the social impact and 
influence of the churches on the respective displaced community, each of the three 
local manifestations function as a case study detailing endeavours by Episcopalian, 
Presbyterian, Catholic and Pentecostal churches to respond to arisen needs, resolve 
political instabilities and reconcile ethnic tensions.  Though the exact influence of the 
churches differs in each context one overarching theme that emerges is greatly 
enhanced communal stabilisation.  Alongside the numerical growth and social impact 
of the churches at the local level, the ecumenical New Sudan Council of Churches 
(NSCC) employed a three-tiered strategy to facilitate national resolution of the 
second civil war as is delineated in the second half of the thesis.  First, through ‘the 
people-to-people peace process’ the NSCC directly mediated grassroots reunification 
throughout southern Sudan.  Second, the NSCC functioned as the primary channel of 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) criticism and utilised its 
growing clout to pressure the SPLM/A to adopt measures of good governance and 
pursue in good faith negotiated settlement with the Government of Sudan.  Third, the 
NSCC stood behind a successful international campaign that lobbied and secured 
engagement from regional and European and American governments critical to the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.   
   iv
 
By paralleling three local communities and the NSCC national resolution 
initiatives the thesis proffers several important conclusions about Christianity and the 
civil war in south Sudan including enumerating rationales related to the explosive 
growth of Christianity, demarcating several nascent indicators of a Christian-
influenced civil religion, highlighting the growing social and political impact of the 
churches throughout south Sudan and finally, delineating several general conflict 
mediatory keys relevant to the churches’ endeavours.  The thesis furthermore clearly 
demonstrates that in the midst of civil war the southern Sudanese indigenous 
churches bolstered communal stabilisation at a grassroots level, substantively 
impacted the emergence of national political resolution and thereby directly 
facilitated the road to Sudanese peace.   
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Chapter One  
 Introduction and Historical Overview 
 
‘If you are suffering you know you just remember that you are dead if you don’t 




‘We are victorious with this cross… In our desperate situation we are victorious, 
disappointed but victorious.’   




 Strung out on the frayed edges of Juba, capital of southern Sudan, lies a field 
on the cusp of the Nile River embodying a stunning menagerie of lost dreams, tragic 
lives and a tenuous future.  Hunkered down are the charred remains of tanks casually 
abandoned and quickly forgotten – or at least ignored – in a field sown with twisted 
pieces of useless metal.  It is an image not quickly forgotten: war machines 
dispassionately tossed aside, their usefulness outlived with stories of contested 
identity, ambiguous motives and empowered voices struggling to overcome.  It is an 
image of individuals, communities, and even a nation seeking to rebuild a tattered 
land with the beckoning ghosts of war still whispering in their midst.  It is an image 
repeated in virtually every corner and region: Darfur to the west, Beja to the east, and 
most poignantly, south Sudan.  
 Since independence 1 January 1956 Sudan has almost constantly been locked 
in the horns of war, particularly in the south where fighting concentrated until 2005.  
Since 1983 southern Sudan witnessed two million southern deaths,
3
 the internal 
                                                 
1
 Daniel Aketch, member of Episcopal Church of Sudan, interview with author, 12 February 2006, 
Kakuma Refugee Camp.   
2
 Stephen Ter Nyuon Yier, Assistant Director of Presbyterian Relief and Development Agency and 
former Vice Chairman of the NSCC, interview with author, 24 July 2005, Edinburgh.    
3
 United Nations High Commission for Refugees, “2004 Supplementary Appeal for Sudan: 
Preparatory Activities for the Repatriation and Reintegration of Sudanese Refugees,” UNHCR 
(November 2003), 3; available from www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/partners/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PARTNERS&id=40d301854; Internet; accessed on 16 June 
2005.  Given the difficulty procuring accurate statistical information, only official numbers as 
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displacement of three to four million individuals
4
 and the forced migration of over 
six hundred thousand Sudanese into the refugee camps of neighbouring nations.
5
  
Rape, amputation, slavery, forced child soldiering, complete razing of entire villages, 
unjustified imprisonment and starvation inflicted on entire communities as a tool of 
military might was frequent and numerous.  In listing such litanies of travesty it is 
easy to categorise 








each statistic and 
figure.  The voiceless many could perhaps echo the words of fellow southerner 
James Bouth Cadech, ‘people are somehow affected mentally by this long war.  
There is hardly a family that has not lost somebody they value and this causes trauma 
here.  There is hardly a family that have not lost valuables in this conflict…  Some 
people are dying out of debt.  Others are becoming mentally ill.’
6
  The effects of war 
will ripple in Sudanese history and consciousness for generations to come.  Some 
will never recover.  But this is only half the story.  Southerners have frequently 
endeavoured to rebuild their society, reconcile their conflicts, stimulate economic 
development, generate democratic governance and live as an empowered 
community.   
Hope, closely guarded and cautious at best, stems from a long-awaited peace 
process. On 9 January 2005 amidst great fanfare and ceremony in the packed Kenyan 
Nyayo Stadium the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), a 
                                                                                                                                          
reported by the UN will be quoted throughout the thesis.  Proposed statistical information reflects a 
limited process of consensus between multiple sources, a median within a range of possible figures.   
4
 UNHCR, “2004 Supplementary Appeal for Sudan,” 4.   
5
 United Nations High Commission for Refugees, “2003 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook Country Data 
Sheet – Sudan,” UNHCR (January 2005), 325; available from www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/country?iso=sdn; Internet; accessed on 16 June 2005.     
6
James Bouth Cadech, Community Development Officer of PACT Kenya, interview with author, 17 
January 2006, Nairobi.   
Figure 1 - Field of Tanks in Juba 
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Sudanese resistance movement under the command of late Colonel John Garang de 
Mabior,
7
 formally signed a peace agreement with the Government of Sudan ending a 
civil war that wracked the divided nation for twenty-two years.
8
  Though the silent 
testimonies of travesty must be recounted, they are balanced with the understanding 
that in the midst of anonymous systems and faceless forces numerous individuals 
dared to defy death with courage, wisdom and perseverance. Formal resolution 
symbolised in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) capped a long road to 
peace involving unprecedented southern identity transformation, south-south 
reconciliation and national negotiation.   
 Throughout this period of destabilisation a growing undercurrent steadily 
crested to surface as a primary interlocutor: the Sudanese church.
9
  Moving from 
marginalised periphery to central axis, Christianity as purveyed through the Sudanese 
church emerged as a principal mediator with individual, communal and national 
permutations.  For many the churches carried a crucial element, hope.  Although 
frequently minimised by external perceptions Christianity within southern Sudan 
procured communal stabilisation and initiated impulses leading to national 
                                                 
7
 The SPLM is the political wing that augments the military forces of the SPLA.  While technically 
distinct, in practice both were overseen by a single National Executive Council chaired and controlled 
by John Garang.  Although the SPLM/A is generally caricatured as a ‘rebel’ movement, the term 
‘resistance movement’ is preferential in order to highlight the legitimacy of the SPLM/A’s self-
proclaimed programme of national prerogatives without diminishing the SPLM/A of its own political 
and military overtures and degradations. 
8
 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement enacted on 9 January 2005 reflects a peace initiative at only 
one layer in a multi-layer conflict.  The agreement, negotiated through the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process, created an autonomous and democratic ‘South 
Sudan’ that for an interim period of six years shares oil revenue with the central government in 
Khartoum until a mandated referendum on full southern independence in 2011.  A peace agreement 
between the Government and the National Democratic Alliance, a broad coalition opposing the 
government of which the SPLM/A is a member, was reached in Egypt on 19 June 2005.  War 
continued in the east between the Government and the Beja Congress until 14 October 2006 and 
remains active to the west in Darfur though there have been intermittent attempts at negotiation.  
9
 The term ‘church’ refers to a loose ecumenical affiliation incorporating the predominant 
denominations in Sudan including Catholic, Episcopal, Presbyterian, Pentecostal, African Inland, 
Sudan Interior Church, and Sudan Church of Christ among others as embodied in the Sudan Council 
of Churches and the New Sudan Council of Churches.  While the churches do not constitute a 
monolithic block, retaining their doctrinal distinctiveness and in recent years even engaging in direct 
denominational competition, to a large extent the churches have collaborated in a unified manner 
through the ecumenical bodies at a social and political level.  The thesis will explore this development 
and utilises the term ‘church’ to refer to social and political affiliation rather than doctrinal or 
denominational unity.  Similarly the thesis follows Philip Jenkins definition of a Christian: ‘someone 
who describes himself or herself as Christian, who believes that Jesus is not merely a prophet or an 
exalted moral teacher, but in some unique sense the Son of God, and the messiah.’  Philip Jenkins, The 
Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 88.   
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resolution.  The thesis analyses the interconnected and multi-tiered process the 
Sudanese church pursued in facilitating the road to peace during the timeframe of 
1989 – 2005 through an examination of three select local refugee settings and 
through national resolution initiatives undertaken by the New Sudan Council of 
Churches.   
The thesis commences with an examination of select manifestations of 
Christianity particularly as it relates to its impact and influence upon those 
communities.  The primary focus is on local indigenous southern Sudanese churches 
within refugee camps in Kenya and Uganda and among the internally displaced in 
Khartoum.  Within the refugee context the thesis surveys how the local Sudanese 
church, underpinned by a growing re-identification with a Christian spirituality and 
delineation carrying numerous social and political ramifications, produced communal 
stabilisation through social relationship networking, integration, cohesion, 
reconciliation and hope-infused interpretations regarding suffering and the war.  
Understanding this shift in communal identification at the grassroots level forms a 
lens through which national endeavours can be interpreted.   
Analysing local contexts, the divergent forms of Christianity expressed 
therein and an emerging broader Christian consciousness allows a deeper 
examination of the impact of Christian-influenced political initiation in the realm of 
southern reconciliation and national resolution.  In this regard, the denominational 
organisation the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) has been paramount in 
both public activation and private diplomatic negotiation.  Particularly at the level of 
national resolution the NSCC, as the thesis demonstrates, facilitated the road to peace 
by encouraging southern reconciliation, initiating efforts to influence the SPLA and 
generating effective international engagement campaigns.     
Finally, the conclusion highlights several conflict mediatory keys that 
originate within the thesis.  Specifically, the thesis demonstrates the necessity of 
multiple agencies internal and external, national and international working in tandem 
to increase the potentiality of sustainable peace.  The NSCC clearly perceived the 
desirability of this arrangement and laboured accordingly.  A shift in communal 
identification by many southern Sudanese at the local level to a vague ‘Christian’ 
demarcation allowed the NSCC to consolidate and further its influence and impact 
upon grassroots constituents, the policies of governance enacted by the SPLM and 
the legitimacy of the NSCC as a prime source for relevant information and capable 
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implementation at the international level.  With its position thus strengthened and 
reinforced within the multiple segments of southern Sudanese society, Christianity 




Detailing the road to peace through an analysis of the influence of 
Christianity within three refugee communities and an examination of the connected 
regional reconciliation efforts and international awareness campaigns by the NSCC 
rests upon four justifications.  First, following the coup d'état of Omar al-Bashir 
overthrowing the democratically elected government of Sadiq al-Mahdi in 1989 and 
the subsequent implementation of a militant Islamic ideology, a dynamic 
multiplication of Christianity ensued among southern Sudanese.
 10
  The rapidity of 
this growth led some scholars to claim that the Sudanese church is the fastest 
growing church in Africa
11
 and that a ‘majority of southerners and Nuba now call 
themselves Christian.’
12
   This development encompasses a broad spectrum of 
demographics, denominations and geographies fundamentally altering analysis of 
Sudan.  Although intimations and several limited examinations of this development 
exist, a systematic overview examining the growth of Christianity is not available, 
particularly in relation to the growth of Christianity within the refugee camps and 
                                                 
10
 Ironically, ‘a government which owes its legitimacy to its commitment to an Islamic revival is 
presiding over a Christian revival the like of which the country had not seen since the last Christian 
kingdom in Sudan dissolved into oblivion close to five centuries ago.’  Abdelwahab El-Affendi, “The 
Paradoxes of War and Peace,” in Their Brothers’ Keepers: Regional Initiative for Peace in Sudan, ed. 
Francis M. Deng (Addis Ababa: Inter Africa Group, 1997), 44.  Chapter Four will explore rationales 
related to the recent growth of Christianity.   
11
 Bishop Zac Niringiye, Assistant Bishop of Kampala, interview with author, 23 February 2005, 
Edinburgh.   
12
 Andrew Wheeler, “Church Growth in Southern Sudan 1983-1996: A Survey of Present 
Understanding,” in Land of Promise: Church Growth in a Sudan at War, ed. Andrew Wheeler 
(Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 1997), 36.  Though statistics offered are soft accumulations, 
out of an approximate 10 million southerners potentially as many as 7 million now claim Christianity.  
Prior to 1989 assuming only a limited Christian growth, indicated by all currently available resources, 
perhaps only 1 – 2 million southerners would have claimed Christianity.  Growth primarily hewed to 
already established denominations resulting in demographic multiplication rather than denominational 
fragmentation though the advent of peace has already seen the introduction of new principally 
Pentecostal denominations that will challenge and alter the Sudanese Christian landscape.  Further 
research is needed to elucidate more accurate numerical representation.   
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among internally displaced persons (IDPs).
13
  The thesis will address this 
development in part and suggest rationales for this explosive growth. 
A second justification stemming from the alacrity of Christian growth 
concerns the subsequent importance that Christianity and the Sudanese church 
developed at communal and national levels.  As an underlying ideological 
framework and filter Christianity helps individuals synthesise meaning, 
empowerment and regeneration in the midst of fragmentation and disintegration.  
Current social and political literature however frequently continues to undervalue the 
influence of Christianity relegating its importance to the realm of southern elite 
disassociated with the majority of the populace.  However, as Marc Nikkel notes, 
southern Sudanese ‘Christians engage in a continual process of reinterpreting their 
painful experiences and [seek] to construct a positive vision of the future through a 
rich blend of biblical symbols, prayer, worship, dance, music and drama.’
 14
  In 
addition to initiating international solidarity campaigns, Sudanese churches have also 
instigated important communal stabilisation endeavours particularly relevant in 
situations of displacement and refuge.  As Sudanese refugee pastor Stephen Yier 
describes, the job of the church is to ‘pick up the human pieces that are traumatised 
and put them together.’
15
   
A third justification concerns the proposed focus on refugee and IDP 
encampments.  First, refugee camps exhibit a fundamental role in the contemporary 
political context.  Refugee camps are not static but function as an interconnecting 
hub of information, personnel, movement and development.  This is particularly true 
for the Sudanese church.  For example, church leaders among IDPs in Khartoum 
commissioned and facilitated Sudanese IDPs as missionaries within southern 
Sudan.
16
  With almost perpetual instability throughout south Sudan the refugee and 
internal displacement camps potentially function with a degree of unparalleled 
                                                 
13
 The principle example is Marc R. Nikkel, “The Origins and Development of Christianity among the 
Dinka of Sudan with Special Reference to the Songs of Dinka Christians” (PhD thesis, University of 
Edinburgh, 1993).  Nikkel and most other scholars emphasise developments within the Sudan, 
neglecting the central role refugee camps currently enjoin.   
14
 Marc Nikkel, “The Cross as a Symbol of Regeneration in Jieng Bor Society,” in Land of Promise: 
Church Growth in a Sudan at War, ed. Andrew Wheeler (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 
1997), 111. 
15
 Stephen Ter Nyuon Yier, interview with author, 24 July 2005.   
16
 Andrew Wheeler, “Church Growth in Southern Sudan,” 18.    
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stability and educational and employment development opportunity.  Though 
geographically peripheral, areas of refuge constitute a centrality to cultural and 
political development seldom acknowledged.  Even within the broad literature 
constituting refugee studies, a majority employ a western dichotomy polarising 
religion into an internal element disengaged from external political and social 
functions inconsistent with a more holistic Sudanese cosmology.  Furthermore, in 
relation to Sudanese refugees there is a particular dearth of analysis.  In a 
comprehensive overview of available literature Desiree Nilsson notes only two 
limited studies in relation to Sudanese refugees in Uganda and none directly 
pertaining to Sudanese in Kenya.
17
  Nilsson concludes, ‘religion is of immense 
importance in the Sudan and consequently also in the integration of refugees but not 
many studies are concerned with religion in relation to the displaced.’
18
   
A second justification for focusing on refugee camps relates to logistical 
rationales.  South Sudan encompasses a vast and diversified territory severely 
underdeveloped, difficult to access and potentially extremely hazardous.  The 
refugee camps in contrast are relatively physically safer and bounded within 
concentrated areas.  Thus the feasibility of a more detailed analysis concerning 
Christianity and the role of the indigenous church within the camp is greatly 
enhanced.  Furthermore, with the recent signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is 
predicting a rapid repatriation of refugees originally anticipated to last two to three 
years culminating in 2008.
19
  As the refugee camps exhibited an important and 
unique force within the development of Sudanese Christianity, a detailed analysis is 
warranted during the interim period between refuge and reintegration.  A broad 
                                                 
17
 Desiree Nilsson, Internally Displaced, Refugees and Returnees from and in the Sudan (Uppsala: 
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2000), 14-15. 
18
 Ibid., 26.   
19
 United Nations High Commission for Refugees, “Operational Briefing on South Sudan, April 
2005,” UNHCR (April 2005) available from www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl-
PROTECTION&id=41d2c19a0&page=home; Internet; accessed on 16 June 2005.  Although laudable, 
actualising this time frame remains an optimistic goal subject to further stabilisation in southern Sudan 
and dependant moreover, on a voluntary willingness by southern Sudanese.  Gaim Kibreab, African 
Refugees: Reflections on the African Refugee Problem (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1985), 103.  
Kenyan refugees, for example, have expressed little desire to repatriate until further development 
occurs within southern Sudan.  “Sudanese Refugees in Kenya Fear Returning Home,” DPA, 28 June 
2005, available from www.sudan.net; Internet; accessed on 29 June 2005.   See also, “Southern 
Sudanese Still Flee to Uganda Despite Peace Deal: UN,” Associated Free Press, 16 June 2005, 
available from www.sudan.net; Internet; accessed on 28 June 2005.   
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analysis of the southern Sudanese church would be determinative only after open 
access and detailed information pertaining to development in currently inaccessible 
areas within the south is granted.   
Third, the thesis focuses primarily upon the refugee camps in Kenya and 
Uganda and the displacement camps surrounding Khartoum as they adequately 
represent an ethnic and geographical diversity typifying the south.  Major groups of 
refugees from the Sudan currently reside in Kenya, Uganda, Chad, Central African 
Republic, Ethiopia, Egypt and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  Refugees in Chad 
and the Central African Republic are beyond the present scope of study as they 
primarily originate from the Darfur region, an Islamic background and migrated due 
to relevant but distinctly separate political instabilities. The geographical and ethnic 
diversification of refugees within the Democratic Republic of Congo similarly 
constitutes part of the Ugandan composition.  Although unique the cultural and 
political context of the refugees in Egypt is mirrored by the internally displaced 
surrounding Khartoum.  Finally, although Christianity has played a significant role in 
the refugee camps in Ethiopia, many of the refugees originate from the Blue Nile 
province and other areas traditionally considered to be outside of southern Sudan and 
the camps themselves lost much of their political importance following the 1991 split 
of the SPLM/A.
20
  Further rationales for focusing on Kenya, Uganda and Khartoum 
will be delineated in the relevant chapters.  
A fourth justification for the thesis concerns the limitation of the proposed 
timeframe of study to 1989 – 2005.  In 1989 under the political leadership of Omar 
al-Bashir and the religious leadership of Hassan al-Turabi the democratically elected 
government of Sadiq al-Mahdi was overthrown.  The National Islamic Front (NIF) 
formulated an ideology of Islamic fundamentalism and since 1989 elements of 
                                                 
20
 One of the principle non-southern Sudanese ethnicities that sought refuge in Ethiopia were the 
Uduk, among whom several scholars have demonstrated the recent growth and importance of 
Christianity.  See Wendy James, “War & ‘Ethnic Visibility’: The Uduk of the Sudan-Ethiopian 
Border,” in Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa, eds. Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis 
(London: James Currey, 1994), 140-64; Wendy James, The Listening Ebony: Moral Knowledge, 
Religion, and Power Among the Uduk of Sudan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); and Jonathan E. 
Arensen, “Conversion among the Uduk: Continuity Versus Discontinuity,” in Land of Promise: 
Church Growth in a Sudan at War, ed. Andrew Wheeler (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 
1997), 79-85.  For a general introduction to the Sudanese refugee camps in Ethiopia see Assefaw 
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Islamic latency have activated into militancy.  From inducing forced conversion
21
 to 
declaration of jihad, elements of religion in recent development are particularly 
salient.
 22
  The growth of Islamic fundamentalism has seen a corresponding 
strengthening of Christianity.  Christian growth has markedly accelerated since 1989 
although the roots stretch back to the late nineteenth century and were significantly 
strengthened during the first civil war, dubbed Anya-Nya I, and the decade of 
relative peace from 1972 – 1983.  As the governmental centre of power increasingly 
fortified itself through Islamic ideology, peripheral disintegration correspondingly 
accelerated.  That is, ‘paradoxically, while the “regional” movements are demanding 
a united Sudan free of any kind of discrimination among its citizens, successive 
“national” regimes have been pursuing policies that divided its people.’
23
  This is 
particularly true of the current government in power since 1989.  2005 serves as a 
functional though intentionally soft end bracket corresponding with the signing of the 




Utilising five main sources of information for research the thesis is qualitative 
rather than quantitative.  Throughout the process attention was given to establishing 
credibility by focusing on three interrelated concepts – validity, generalisability and 
reliability.
24
  That is, the thesis is concerned with ensuring that the data presented is 
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valid and towards this end sought to reconfirm and triangulate information as much 
as possible.  Furthermore, conducting research in multiple countries and distinctly 
different refugee settings increases the potentiality for extending theories across 
southern Sudan and developing research with greater stability and repeatability.   
The first utilised research component was consultation of written resources, 
published and unpublished.  Inclusive of journal articles, academic books and 
unpublished theses, emphasis was placed upon primary sources although secondary 
sources were utilised in the constructing of an ethnological and historical framework.  
In garnering current governmental and refugee actions and decisions a limited 
utilisation of newspaper articles also transpired.   
The second and most substantial source of developed material was field 
research conducted during three separate time periods.  The first occurred January – 
April 2006 including time in Nairobi and Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya; 
Khartoum, Yambio and Juba in Sudan; and Kampala and Oliji Refugee Camp in 
Uganda.
25
  From December 2006 – January 2007 relevant individuals in Midland, 
Texas and Washington D.C were also consulted.
26
  A third and final weeklong trip 
was taken to Khartoum during March 2007.   
Research involved consulting four distinct groups of individuals.  First, 
attention was given to church officials and ministers with a particular focus on the 
Catholic, Episcopal, Presbyterian and Pentecostal denominations.
27
  Numerous 
individuals from a variety of positions were approached.  Interviews, for example, 
were completed with lay readers, evangelists, pastors, deacons, bishops, the former 
Executive Secretary of the New Sudan Council of Churches, the Associate 
Moderator of the Presbyterian Church of Sudan-Akobo, the Archbishop of the 
Episcopal Church of Sudan and numerous other individuals employed by the Sudan 
Council of Churches (SCC), the NSCC and other denominational bodies.   
                                                 
25
 The University of Edinburgh Development Trust through the Small Projects Grant programme 
generously contributed funding towards the cost of the first research trip.   
26
 For the rationale behind the inclusion of this component see pages 12 and 226.   
27
 Historically the Catholic Church has been the largest in Sudan though recent development has seen 
the Episcopal Church of Sudan challenging this position.  The Presbyterian Church of Sudan remains 
the largest church among the Nuer, and though still fairly small, Pentecostalism appears to be growing 
throughout southern Sudan.  Perhaps resulting from early expulsion of missionaries African 
Independent Churches (AICs) appear to be almost non-existent.  Generalisations comparing and 
contrasting said denominations will be more thoroughly addressed in Chapter Four.   
   11
A second group of individuals consulted were political leaders with the aim 
of establishing research among the multiple segments of society and political 
hierarchies.  For example interviews were undertaken with grassroots refugee zone 
leaders, chairmen of different ethnic refugee populations, judges, members of the 
Southern Sudanese Parliament, members of the Government of National Unity, the 
Acting-Governor of the State of Western Equatoria, the Speaker of the Parliament for 
the Government of South Sudan, and the Minister of State for Presidential Affairs.  
This group of informants helped establish more clearly the exact impact and 
influence of the Sudanese church upon both the relevant communities and the 
national peace process.  Attempts were made to establish the accuracy of data and 
theories presented by church leaders and thereby more fully develop the subtleties of 
actual influence.   
Third, members of the refugee and displaced communities were consulted 
primarily through the use of focus groups in each setting.  As a method, while focus 
groups are not conducive to generating statistical analysis they increase the 
potentiality of generalisability important for the research undertaken in the thesis.  In 
convening the focus groups attention was given to incorporating a broad spectrum of 
ethnic, geographical and age diversification.  Prior to the beginning of each focus 
group time was given to explain the purpose, the nature and the intended use of the 
research.  The format was semi-structured.
28
  In order to help overcome the potential 
for repressing or constricting views, after formally concluding either a focus group or 
interview, time was allotted for participants to reflect upon or address any issue they 
deemed important whether it was raised or not and to ask the researcher any 
question.  This frequently extended the conversation and offered numerous 
insights.
29
   
A final group consulted were individuals who were observers but not direct 
participants in either church or political realms.  In some instances this proved 
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difficult.  Nonetheless individuals with Sudanese and international Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), faculty at the University of Juba, faculty at the 
University of Khartoum and the paramount practitioner of the Sudanese indigenous 
religion in Oliji Refugee Camp were interviewed.  Altogether there were over one 
hundred fifty participants, including more than seventy-five conducted individual 
interviews and focus groups and more than seventy-five recorded hours.   This 
second source of research information formed the core foundation of the thesis 
connecting and interpreting other methodological sources.
30
   
Developing alongside the interviews and focus groups was an important third 
source of research information, personal fieldnotes.
31
  Most days time was given to 
recording actions, descriptions, settings and impressions.  To help with recall 
throughout the day key words and ideas were jotted down until they could be fully 
developed.  During the field research the fieldnotes served as an important venue for 
limited and initial analysis that enabled the development of general constructs that 
could be tested and refined.  They later became an important source of reconfirming 
contexts and settings and recreating the immediacy of the field research.   
A fourth source of research information stems from interviews conducted 
with knowledgeable individuals outside of the immediate Sudanese context.  
Midland, Texas clergy and laity such as Deborah Fikes, who significantly 
contributed to a national and international solidarity campaign directly resulting in 
the engagement of the United States in the peace process, were interviewed.  United 
States Congressional staff and other Washington based activists specifically involved 
with Sudan were also consulted.  This group of individuals triangulated information 
presented by the leadership of the New Sudan Council of Churches and more fully 
elucidated the effectiveness of the NSCC’s international approach and strategy.   
A fifth and final source of research was information garnered through 
archival review.  Archival work was undertaken at the Centre for Documentation and 
Advocacy, an independent Sudanese NGO based in Nairobi, Kenya and the publisher 
of a leading southern Sudanese political magazine.  The official NSCC archive 
currently held at the office of the Resource Centre for Civil Leadership 
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headquartered in Kampala, Uganda was also consulted.  Archival work at these two 
locations helped elucidate official policy positions and the role of the NSCC in 
mediating various peace agreements through the people-to-people peace initiatives.  
The Sudanese archive at the University of Durham, the paramount Sudanese archival 
centre in the United Kingdom, was also reviewed as was material housed at the 
Hudson Institute in Washington D.C.  A fifth and final archival source were several 
official websites.  Particularly relevant is the UNHCR website hosting official 
statistical information, reports and guidelines.
32
   
A final methodological note concerns the inclusion of the three refugee 
camps in the thesis.  Each of the three camps – Kakuma in Kenya, the displaced in 
Khartoum and Oliji in Uganda – are unique and distinct with the context, security 
situation and ethnic diversification greatly varying.  Furthermore the role of the 
churches and their impact is remarkably different among the three camps.  The thesis 
therefore approaches each camp as a unique case study significant and relevant in 
and of itself.  This approach fostered divergent and contrasting cases forcing analysis 
beyond initial impressions.  This furthermore enriched the generalisability of the 
thesis specifically in relation to the overarching influence and impact of the church 
on southern Sudanese communal stabilisation and national resolution.  Chapters 
Two, Three and Four therefore serve as the foundational roots representing the 
various levels of influence exerted by churches at the local level and cumulatively 
demonstrate the influence and rationale for the impact of the NSCC at the regional 
and national levels.  Chapters Five and Six directly build upon these three distinct 
strands forming an overarching case study depicting the indigenous Sudanese church 
as the prime facilitator of the road to peace.   
The aforementioned sources of research are underpinned by the social 
identity theory asserting:  
(1) People are motivated to maintain a positive self-concept; (2) the self-concept largely 
 derives from group identification (in addition to personal identification…); and thus (3) 
 people establish positive social identities by comparing the ingroup against outgroups.
33
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Especially relevant during times of rapid disintegration and renegotiation of 
communal identity, new group prototypes are derived and self-applied efficaciously 
‘[transforming] one’s self-representation, perceptions, cognitions, feelings and 
behavior so that they are governed by the ingroup prototype.  The far-reaching 
consequences of this process include conformity and group influence… cohesion and 
solidarity… and stereotyping.’
34
  Within the Sudanese refugee context, Christianity 
initiated a new ‘ingroup’ with powerful individual and communal prototypes uniting 
a multiplicity of overlapping identities.   The church became a new basis for social 
organisation and coherence imbuing individual refugees with opportunities of choice, 
control and empowerment through task-oriented dynamics.  Initially a numerical 
minority, and currently a perceived minority, Sudanese refugee Christians ‘saw 
themselves more in terms of group membership’ than would majority group 
members and patterned themselves accordingly.
35
  Approaching the church from the 
vantage point of a social organisation encompassing personal piety and civic 
functions further enhances the potentiality of meaningful communal and national 
mediation while offering secular NGOs a relevant venue through which religious 
impulses and institutions can be incorporated.  The underlying social identity theory 
will therefore validate the overarching conceptualisation of Christianity, parlayed 
through the southern Sudanese church, as efficaciously procuring communal 
stabilisation and national resolution. 
 
Historical Overview  
 
 Analysing the recent development of Christianity as a powerful social 
undercurrent influencing cultural and social developments that substantially 
facilitated the road to peace requires an understanding of the recent political and 
religious history of south Sudan.  Importantly, British contact with Sudan initially 
centred on two individuals symbolically representing two interrelated themes still 
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prevalent in Sudan.  The first is General Charles Gordon.
36
  Gordon accepted the 
‘call’ to come to Sudan and free its people from the institution of slavery.  Following 
a long tradition of British abolitionists, Gordon sent home disquieting reports of 
slavery and his attempts to overthrow the slave traders.  These reports stirred British 
consciousness generating awareness and interest in Sudan where little existed before.  
When General Gordon cordoned in Khartoum was ‘martyred’ by the army of the 
Mahdi a surging public outcry demanded British retaliation.  Eventually the reluctant 
government responded to this popular grassroots movement and decided to intervene 
in remembrance of the downtrodden ‘slaves’ of Sudan and their ‘hero’ Gordon.
37
  
International intervention extending conflict and European and American interest in 
‘redeeming Sudanese slaves’ also played a key role in the recent southern conflict.
38
 
 Intersecting with the life of General Gordon was a second larger than life 
figure known as the Mahdi.  In 1881 Mohammed Ahmed took on the title Mahdi and 
began raising an army to expel the Turkiyyah administration.
39
  Believing the 
eschatological message of Islamic purity and success proclaimed by the Mahdi, 
Sudanese flocked to his banner successfully dislodging the Turco-Egyptian 
government.  Although the Mahdi died of natural causes shortly after the death of 
General Gordon at Khartoum in 1885, his successor, the Khalifa, continued ruling in 
his name extending a strict Islamic interpretation to governmental policies as the 
answer to the needs of the Sudanese populace.
40
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 Responding to grassroots pressure in 1898 British and Egyptian forces 
invaded the Sudan encountering a northern populace already steeped in an ideology 
of jihad and Islamic government.  On 2 September 1898 the Khalifa attacked the 
invading forces six miles north of Omdurman in a battle breaking the Khalifa: 
‘eleven thousand Ansar lay dead; some sixteen thousand were wounded.  Kitchener 
lost forty-eight killed and 382 wounded.’
41
  British sovereignty was quickly 
established over northern Sudan though small religious rebellions led by individuals 
claiming to be either the Prophet Jesus or the Mahdi himself continued until World 
War I.
42
  Territorial claims over the south were more slowly adjudicated after 
competing claims by King Leopold of Belgium were overcome.
43
  Even as late as 
1926 parts of southern Sudan remained effectively outside of imperial 
administration.
44
   
Even after imposing control, however, the British government demonstrated 
far greater attention to northern Sudan than the south.  Whereas the north was 
consistently developed through a process of devolution, the approach of ‘senior 
officials in Khartoum… was the fantasy that the Southern Sudan did not truly exist.  
They fervently wanted to forget the Southern Sudan – a nasty, insoluble, intractable 
difficulty.’
45
  Espousing a policy of ‘care and maintenance,’ officials attempted to 
isolate southern Sudan from northern influence.  ‘Care and maintenance’ equalled 
benign neglect and despite a hasty attempt at inclusion of southerners in national 
politics and culture following 1945, the south was ill equipped to function as a 
genuine partner with northern politicians in the formation of a national identity and 
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consciousness.
46
   In 1955 as the imperialistic rule of Condomonium waned, Sudan 
teetered on the brink of its first civil war.   
 Since independence on 1 January 1956 Sudan has struggled in the formation 
of a national consensus.
47
  In 1969 General Jaffer Nimeiri entered office through a 
political coup and in 1972 accepted the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement directly 
brokered by a partnership between the Sudan Council of Churches, the All Africa 
Conference of Churches and the World Council of Churches, concluding Anya-Nya 
I, the first civil war.
48
  Nimeiri was vociferously hailed nationally and internationally 
for mediating peace, gaining substantial credibility particularly in the south. 
However political circumstances forced personal and political transformation and by 
1978, ‘a different Nimeiri had emerged: Nimeiri the author on Islam… Only six 
years later we see Nimeiri the author transformed into Nimeiri the Imam, making his 
way to mosque pulpits every Friday and preaching to the faithful on matters of this 
life and the life hereafter.’
49
  In September 1983 he unilaterally abrogated the peace 
agreement plummeting Sudan into its second civil war with the proclamation of 
sharia in the popularly titled ‘September Laws,’ intense persecution enforcing the 
religious penal code and simultaneous freeing of thirteen thousand northern prisoners 
as an act of Islamic forgiveness.
50
  Nimeiri was consequently overthrown in 1985 by 
Sadiq al-Mahdi who oversaw an ineffective democratically elected government until 
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his ouster in 1989 by Omar al-Bashir and the National Islamic Front (NIF).
51
  As the 
1980s ended, ‘religious affiliation was no longer confined to being the major basis of 
political mobilisation, important though that remained; rather it had become a major 
issue.’
52
   
 The second civil war originated out of a multiplicity of complex historical 
factors broadly summarised in three points.
53
  First, northern political leaders 
continued to aggravate inherent tensions and exacerbate southern political identity 
and aspirations.  For example President Nimeiri eroded almost complete southern 
support by consistently attempting to control southern politics through the dismissal 
and replacement of the Regional President at his directive and declaration of sharia 
in 1983.
54
  Second, during the decade of relative peace, 1972 – 1983, the 
underdevelopment of southern Sudan was not rectified.  NGOs largely substituted for 
state administration ‘undermining the state institutions without establishing viable 
alternative structures,’ thereby implicitly contributing to the development of the 
second civil war.
55
  Finally, disintegration of southern unity and inter-southern 
hostilities directly facilitated the recapitulation of conflict.  Numerous southern 
politicians preferring appeasement to Nimeiri’s encroachments roused public 
resentment against their leadership
56
 and were unable to restore internal peace among 
the numerous inter-ethnic feuds fuelled by the ready availability of military arms.
57
  
These three elements stirred strong dissatisfaction among the southerners, many of 
whom remained disappointed that Anya-Nya I had not resulted in secession, shifting 
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popular allegiance and allowing the resistance movement to quickly consolidate their 
support.   
 When battalions 104 at Nasir and 105 at Bor were ordered north in 1983 they 
refused and mutinied.  Quickly joined by numerous soldiers and officers stationed 
around the Sudan, what started as a trickle turned into a flood.  By 1984 fourteen 
southern garrisons and various Anya-Nya II forces had joined the resistance 
movement.
58
  Gathering in Ethiopia under the auspices of Mengistu, leadership of the 
resistance movement consolidated under John Garang into the newly formed Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/Army.
59
  With several quick successes the SPLA 
seemed poised to capitalise and negotiate a national settlement when on the very eve 
of the proposed agreement, Sadiq and the democratic government were forcibly 
swept out of power.     
 Coming to power in 1989 the NIF has maintained control over governmental 
mechanisms only recently allowing cosmetic changes with the inclusion of SPLM 
appointed politicians in the Government of National Unity.  The NIF regime sought 
to initiate an ‘Islamic revolution’ with full implementation of sharia.  This Islamic 
ideology resulted in hardened religious identities in both the north and south.  
However national peace has been intermittently pursued.  In 1997 peace negotiations 
led to a Declaration of Principles between the government and the SPLM.  In 1999 
Turabi was imprisoned for planning a suspected coup and at a governmental level a 
posture of hard-line Islamisation began to slowly thaw.  Formal peace talks were 
again held in October 2000 and finally in Machakos, Kenya in 2002.  The Machakos 
Protocol served as the framework for the formal Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
signed 9 January 2005.
60
  The process and politics leading to the CPA will be more 
fully explored in Chapters Five and Six.   
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 Alongside these recent political developments swept a powerful and 
interrelated undercurrent with a majority of southerners 
adopting Christianity for the first time.
61
  Today 
Christianity powerfully courses through every segment of 
southern society.  Wooden crosses dot the land.  
Congregations gather in bombed-out sanctuaries, flimsy 
tin buildings, homes and under the open sky.  Dozens of 
languages declare Christian praise.  Weary and 
fragmented people are rapidly turning to churches – from 
Catholic, to Episcopal, to Pentecostal and Baptist – 
seeking hope and meaning in the midst of disintegration.  
But this is not the first time Christianity has swept 
through Sudan.     
Echoing faintly is a distant memory of an ancient 
Christianity with Biblical connotations.  Sudan is the land known in the Bible as 
Cush and it is probable that the ‘Ethiopian Eunuch’ was a Sudanese official before 
the year 40 CE.  Consistent Christian contact began initially with the arrival of 
persecuted Christians from Egypt and by the fifth century Christianity served as the 
official state religion remaining so until the fourteenth century.
62
  Paralleling 
Christian expression in the south today, a key strand in Nubian Christianity was a 
public emphasis on the cross, utilised as a ‘symbol of Triumph already secured.’
63
  
While vestiges of this vibrant faith are still displayed in mosaics and paintings at the 
Khartoum National Museum, Islam almost totally supplanted this movement, in part 
because believers were isolated from broader Christian communities.  Although the 
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influence and existence of Nubian Christianity has faded, the memory of this ancient 
Christianity and perceived connections to the Bible continue to exert a powerful and 
creative force in contemporary Christian imagination.   
Catholic missionaries first reached modern Sudan arriving 11 February 1848 
after being commissioned by Pope Gregory XVI following the creation of the 
Vicariate Apostolic of Central Africa in 1846.
64
  The first permanent mission station 
in southern Sudan was established at Gondokoro in January 1853.
65
  Guiding these 
early efforts was Daniel Comboni, who while remaining culturally bound to the mid-
nineteenth century, penned the visionary Plan for the Regeneration of Africa by 
Means of Africans, advocated for further incorporation of women into active ministry 
and participated in Sudanese famine relief.
66
  During the Mahdiyya Catholic 
missionaries were forced to flee to Egypt regrouping as a mission to Sudan in exile 
and ministering among refugees.  This time would prove a pertinent foreshadow for 
future ministry in Sudan.  Following the initiation of Condomonium the Catholic 
mission returned under Bishop Roveggio establishing their first mission station at 
Lul among the Shilluk in 1901.
67
  In 1902 American Presbyterians founded a mission 
station at Doleib Hill on the Sobat,
68
 and in 1906 the first Church Missionary Society 
(CMS) base in the south was opened in Bor.
69
  In 1905 southern Sudan was divided 
into three spheres of influence allocating the Catholics, Presbyterians and CMS each 
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one sphere.
70
  All three of the main mission agencies focused primarily on 
evangelism and education.  Foundational to understanding the rationale behind the 
recent explosion of Christian growth, ‘in 1926 a decision was taken making English 
the lingua franca, [although] missionary schools of various types used vernaculars to 
teach the Bible and other religious subjects, while English was used for secular 
subjects.’
71
  Nonetheless, the respective missions laboured throughout 
Condomonium with only limited success.  In 1956 a commission of enquiry 
estimated that there were approximately one hundred eighty thousand to two hundred 
thousand Catholics and twenty-five to thirty thousand Protestants, representing less 
than ten percent of the total southern population.
72
   
The northern elite had long been suspicious of mission activity believing it 
was the root of the first civil war stemming from faulty British policy preventing the 
spread of Islam in the south during Condominium.
73
  On 27 February 1964 
government officials took the final step in a long process issuing a decree ordering 
immediate expulsion of all missionaries.  Missionaries left behind a small number of 
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Sudanese Christians commissioned and entrusted with leadership positions, 
education opportunities and several translations of the Bible into tribal languages.
74
   
 Inheriting these humble beginnings Sudanese began proclaiming the gospel 
themselves.  Labouring through the demanding conditions of the first southern civil 
war Christianity slowly expanded as evangelists spread the gospel.  In fact the SCC 
helped mediate the watershed Addis Ababa Peace Agreement ending civil war in 
1972.  Growth was perhaps most rapid in the northern church, essentially around 
greater Khartoum, as it received less direct persecution from the government and saw 
its congregations swell with internally displaced.
75
  Christian clubs were established 
targeting southerners living in and around Khartoum throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
and would play a pivotal role in the recent explosion of Christianity.   
Following the end of the civil war the church entered a period of slow and 
steady internal development largely content to leave governmental interaction to 
politicians.  Building upon its role in the civil war the SCC developed into an 
important institution active in developmental work across Sudan.  Institutions 
training a new generation of clergy opened, evangelists continued to spread 
throughout the south and several important youth revivals broke out in southern 
towns.  There were however tensions as churches struggled to transition from 
fledgling communities entrenched in war ministry to trained and sustainable 
congregations involved in mainstream society leading to a time of internal conflict 
and schism.
76
  Nonetheless, in many areas the church ‘was now the most important 
civil organisation, with more influence among the people than the newly-established 
government.’
 77
  The foundations were laid for the rapid conversion of the southern 
population and the continued impact of the church at every level of society.  
This sense of false security shattered in 1983 with the declaration of sharia 
and descent into a long and ruthless war tragically and irrevocably shaking the very 
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foundations of south Sudan.
78
  Isolated and largely forgotten Sudanese Christians 
again shouldered the burden of war ministry carrying a hope-filled gospel infused 
with the message of salvation and a holistic social ministry to their suffering 
communities.  Increasingly displaced camps around Khartoum, refugee camps and 
the southern region as a whole witnessed an acceleration of Christian growth both in 
terms of numerical statistics and in qualitative socio-political importance.  Although 
statistics are tentative at best, since 1989 the southern population moved from around 
ten to twenty percent Christian to approximately sixty to seventy percent Christian in 
less than twenty years, substantially impacting southern Sudan.     
 
Key Terminology  
 
 Before proceeding, however, it is important to delineate several key terms, 
beginning with the term ‘identity.’  The composition of identity results from a 
complex process incorporating a multiplicity of overlapping biological genetics, 
values, social processes and historical contexts.  Although intensely personal, 
identity is never individual.  This is especially true within holistic cosmologies as 
evidenced throughout south Sudan.  In refugee identity construction, ‘attention turns 
backward to gather appropriate threads from ethnic heritages, laterally to take stock 
of their compatriots, and forward to locate possible venues of continuity.’
79
  The 
thesis follows a definition of identity proffered by Francis Deng, a leading Sudanese 
scholar: 
 Identity is seen as a function of how people identify themselves and are identified in race, 
 ethnicity, culture, language, and religion and how such identification determines or 
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Identity is both descriptive and determinative, and plays a pivotal role at individual, 
communal and national levels.   
This definition should not imply that identity is static.  Times of intense 
stress, fluctuation, loss and insecurity, keenly present throughout the refugee 
experience accelerate the process of identity change and transformation.  Loss, 
however, does not presume permanency of a vacuum.  Rather the refugee experience 
is a time of rapid transition and adaptation with the resulting transformation both 
continuous and discontinuous.
81
  It is a time of creativity.  Identity then is 
‘conceptualized less in terms of cultural content per se and more in terms of 
process.’
82
   
Although continuously in a process of reformulation identity development is 
not automatic.  Innovations ‘are usually brought about and through sociopolitical 
forces or the specific actions of particular individuals which seek to organize and 
direct such experience.’
83
  In southern Sudanese refugee and displacement camps 
Christianity parlayed through indigenous Sudanese churches exerted this force.   
In Sudan identity has consistently functioned as an overarching and 
determinative theme and since 1989 has increasingly crystallised around racial and 
religious elements leading to a second term, ‘religio-nationalism.’  Religio-
nationalism is employed to describe the rationale behind the current civil war as both 
elements are equally prevalent and cannot be fully disentangled.  The central 
government with its primary political base in the elitist Riverine area surrounding 
greater Khartoum increasingly utilised fundamentalist Islamic religious ideology as 
the self-described basis of identity.  For many, as the validity of the central 
government deteriorated and periphery regions fragmented into competing segments, 
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legitimacy and national identity became associated with a strict Islamic purity.  
Seeking external support and augmentation, the government allied itself with Iran 
hoping to promulgate an ‘Islamic revolution in Africa.’
84
   Aspiring to implement the 
‘revolution’ first within Sudan, the government increased targeting and persecution 
of Christians and the church on primarily religious grounds, declared jihad and 
pursued ethnic cleansing among Nuba Muslims who rejected the militant ideology.
85
  
That is, the elite official government continued to induce war with the SPLA 
primarily on religious grounds. 
Inverting this emphasis the Baggara Arabic tribes, the principal members 
forming the murharaleen and primarily located in the Kordofan province north of 
Bahr el Ghazal and the Upper Nile provinces, appear to primarily rely on an Arabic 
nationalism in which religious ideology plays an important but secondary role.
86
  
Northern tribes regard themselves as culturally and hereditarily ‘Arabic’ wholly 
distinct from ‘African’ tribes located in the south.
87
  Despite syncretic intermingling 
of familial ties northern identity is self-described as superior to and cleansed of 
southern impurities.  On the basis of an Arabic nationalism historically northern 
tribes have disdained southern counterparts and correspondingly encouraged 
southern enslavement.
88
  Raiding murharaleen are merely continuing to exert a 
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traditional nationalistic identity over scorned southern tribes.  Compounding this 
traditional identity the second civil war produced significant economic and political 
motivations.  The civil war ‘has often taken the form of local wars in which local 
issues were involved rather than being simply a war of two armies with national 
objectives.  For some, such as the murharaleen, the war has become virtually a 
business.’
89
  Furthermore some of the murharaleen directly stem from a specific 
alignment with a political faction such as the Umma or NIF.
90
  Thus, for many 
northern Sudanese the motivation for continued conflict arises out of a complex 
historical process determined principally by a national or ethnic nationalism.
91
   
Religio-nationalism seeks to describe a multifaceted civil war furthered on 
the basis of power identity.  For the central government religious ideology is the 
fundamental element, nationalism secondary, while for Baggara Arab tribes 
nationalism functions as the central motivation further validated by religious 
overtures.  As Francis Deng notes, ‘religion and race relations are intertwined, since 
Islam in the Sudan is closely connected with Arabism as a racial, ethnic, and cultural 
phenomenon.’
92
  For the north religion functions as a fulcrum upon which complex 
issues of history, politics, economics and racial categories rest making delineation 
between religious elements and nationalistic impulses impossible.   
Although equally complex, southern identity has not been as clearly explored 
and appears to function as a mirrored inversion.  SPLM/A leadership consistently 
claimed an ideology based purely on secular grounds.  While the SPLM/A does not 
denigrate the role of religion it seeks legitimacy and validity on the basis of secular 
democratic principles.  Seeking to overturn northern domination the SPLM/A 
attempts to appeal to a third and currently non-existent identity, a secular Sudanese 
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nationalism.  As Sharif Harir notes, ‘In the continuous and relentless pursuit of 
making Sudan an appendage to “something” Arabic, African or Islamic, both elites 
have failed to build “something” Sudanese as its uniqueness expressed in being Arab 
and African at the same, required.’
93
   
Within the SPLA Christian religious identity appears to play a more 
prominent role.  Individual members of the SPLA have clearly incorporated 
Christian elements into their identity as evidenced in the presence of ‘prayer centres’ 
wherever the military moves.
94
  However it is not clear to what extent Christian 
identity drives an ideology of armed militancy or merely accompanies the individual 
throughout the process.  Nonetheless, for separate but inverted rationales, from both 
a northern and southern viewpoint the civil war can be termed as ‘religio-
nationalism.’   
A third and final term meriting examination is the term ‘refugee.’  As a 
political designation the term ‘refugee’ was first coined in France in 1573.  It 
developed as a means to grant asylum to Calvinists escaping from the Low 
Countries.  One hundred years later the term was used for the first time in English 
describing Calvinists forced to flee from France to England in order to avoid 
religious persecution.
95
  Even at its inception two ongoing elements were recognised 
in the creation of refugee legality: freedom to express identity, especially when 
embedded in a minority religious cosmology, and second, the problem of durable 
integration within the host community.  These two elements are especially relevant to 
the southern Sudanese refugee context.   
Today, the designation of refugee status is one of entitlement theoretically 
securing the individual access to basic humanitarian, political and economic rights. 
On the basis of national sovereignty local governments are given the prerogative in 
determining refugee status that is, therefore, in a technical sense necessarily limited 
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in its political and legal applicability.
96
  According to the 1951 United Nations (UN) 
Convention, the internationally recognised basis for refugee legality, two elements 
must be satisfied in the determination of refugee status.  First, refugees must clearly 
demonstrate that they, either as an individual or as a group member, were specifically 
targeted and persecuted by the government.
97
  Second, the individual must cross a 
recognised international border.  Although popular consciousness and mainstream 
media significantly broaden the term ‘refugee’ as inclusive of all individuals forced 
to flee their homes, and although a spirit of humanitarian aid mandates assistance to 
numerous individuals who either do not qualify as a statutory refugee or have not 
registered as such, for the purposes of the thesis, the term ‘refugee’ will apply only to 
those individuals who fully satisfy the internationally recognised 1951 UN 
Convention defining refugees as one who: 
Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
 membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
 nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
 of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
 habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
 return to it.
98
  
Although advantageous the 1951 Definition does not recognise individuals 
who while otherwise satisfying the legal demands of refugee designation remain 
within their original country without crossing an international border. In practice, 
however, the UNHCR extends its mandate to encompass these individuals designated 
as ‘Internally Displaced Persons’ or IDPs.  For the purpose of the thesis IDPs and 
refugees will be treated as fairly synonymous with appropriate differences noted as 
necessitated.   
The term ‘refugee’ is loaded with potent political, psychological and 
sociological meanings extending beyond legal definitions and directly influencing 
aid distribution and refugee development.   Refugees are frequently characterised as 
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helpless and poor needing immediate western expatriate professional assistance.  
Such an outlook frequently causes NGO workers to overlook social bases of 
organisation, such as the church, that give meaning and empowerment to refugees.  
The application of the label refugee can denigrate into a ‘process of stereotyping… a 
vehicle for promoting non-participation and control.’
99
   That is refugees are 
commonly analysed from an outside, exterior position neglecting internal dynamics 
and forces of empowerment and transformation.
100
   The thesis therefore endeavours 
to examine the southern Sudanese refugee context from a grassroots, inside-out 
social identity methodology allowing refugees to delineate their own identity and 
proffer their own conclusions.  In what Jennifer Mason dubs an interpretivist 
approach, the thesis views ‘people as a primary data source, but seeks their 
perceptions… the “insider view,” rather than imposing an “outsider view.”’
101
   
An inside-out methodology should not imply that refugees are monolithic.  
Internal demarcations may be numerous, overlapping and even conflicting.  That the 
refugee experience is widely varied indicates that even within a context of loss and 
disintegration, individual refugee initiative and internally defined authoritative 
communal leadership remains the primary modicum in the process of regeneration.  
Although identity is tied to historical developments and contextual localities the 
refugee experience appreciates the process of identity change and reformulation.  
This process is not automatic or pre-defined.  It results from validated change agents 
that initiate growth and trajectory development in a rediscovery of future 
possibilities, positive self-conceptualisation and group re-identification.  From a 
southern Sudanese refugee perspective the local indigenous church served as an 
empowerment-generating change interlocutor assisting in communal stabilisation and 
national resolution.    
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Chapter Two  
Road through Kenya: Heartland for Sudanese Refugees 
 
‘We don’t have pagans in Kakuma Refugee Camp.  Those who are pagans, those 
who are pagans are not here.  Since 1992 there was a very great migration from idol 




‘In Kakuma here, social life has been enforced by the church….  It is the church that 






Straddling the Sudanese and Kenyan border Lokichogio serves as the initial 
gateway for most Sudanese seeking refuge.  In 1989 when the United Nations chose 
Lokichogio or simply Loki as the site for one of the world’s largest international 
relief programmes, Operation Lifeline Sudan, the fortunes of this quiet town changed 
almost overnight.  Today international relief warehouses from the UN to the Red 
Cross to Voice for the Martyrs stretch along the two roads comprising Loki.  
Entrepreneurs willing to brave the harsh, hot and windy climate flocked to the town 
throwing up tin shack buildings masking as restaurants, hotels, barber shops and any 
number of a variety of sorted goods and accessories.  Though the majority of African 
guides warn the casual traveller to venture nowhere near the outpost, the airport 
bristles with activity.  Daily flights with ALS link Loki to Nairobi and the broader 
world, and relief planes flying into south Sudan are frequent and numerous.
104
   
Alongside the relief operation grew another war related economy – military 
armaments.  Purchasing light arms, AK-47s and grenades remains an open 
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possibility.
105
  Simmering underneath the international goodwill veneer lays 
smouldering ethnic tensions and hostility.  Bandits roam the area.  Toposa from 
southern Sudan steal over the mountainous border launching cattle raids on the 
Turkana armed in part by the Government of Sudan hoping the Toposa would also 
attack the SPLA.
106
  The Turkana, recuperating losses and resentful of the aid 
faithfully doled to the Sudanese, react in force.  It is an area reminiscent of the ‘old 
west,’ a frontier town steeped in quick international cash and ready arms dominated 
by men.  For example, in one Presbyterian Church of Sudan service eighty-five were 
present, nine were women.  UN conveys travelling south to Kakuma caravan only in 
broad daylight and under armed escort.  The majority of Sudanese however do not 
travel in such protected and formal means.   
Trekking south for many entails purchasing a ride in one of several mutatus, 
in this case small cars that travel only when filled with five or six passengers.  
Passing Turkana pastoralists tending their herds of goats and camels the journey 
curves through several small villages with checkpoints obliging the driver to 
distribute small amounts of a local narcotic.  Costing less than 500 Kenya Shillings 
the journey takes approximately an hour and a half ending in Kakuma Town, 
adjacent to the refugee camp, the heartland for Sudanese refugees. 
Kakuma Refugee Camp located in the far northwest corner of Kenya is a dry 
and desolate land in Kenya’s largest district, Turkana District.
107
  It is an area 
receiving less than 500mm of rain a year with a ‘low potential’ for land 
productivity.
108
  In this arid land northwest of Lodwar when rain finally comes 
between March and May, it falls in torrents flooding the area.
109
  Wind whips 
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through unbroken, carrying dust and sand that bites into the skin, and is colloquially 
known as ‘Turkana rains.’
110
  The district maintains ‘one of the highest levels of 
insecurity in the country.’
111
  After trudging across south Sudan and through 
Ethiopian refugee camps, Alephonsion Deng notes the following about his 
introduction to Kakuma, ‘It was the dirtiest place I’d ever been.  When the wind 
blew, which seemed like all the time, very fine dust was lifted from the dry riverbed 
and landed in our cooking pots.  Half of what we ate was sand.’
112
   
Approximately sixty-seven thousand Sudanese refugees reside in Kenya.
113
  
Forty percent of the population is female and fifty-one percent is under the age of 
eighteen.
114
  Although Dinka and Nuer comprise the majority of the refugees 
significant numbers of ethnic minorities originating in eastern Equatoria are also 
present.  One of these minorities, the Pari, supported the SPLA, counterbalancing the 
prevailing sentiment found throughout Equatoria that resisted SPLA ‘liberation.’
115
  
That is, the majority of the refugees in Kakuma actively supported and validated the 
SPLM/A.  In recent years Kakuma has not been the recipient of massive refugee 
inflows allowing a semblance of stability and continuity to develop.
116
  The refugee 
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population primarily derives from areas historically connected with the CMS and the 
Presbyterian Church (USA), today known as the Episcopal Church of Sudan (ECS) 
and the Presbyterian Church of Sudan (PCOS) respectively.   
Founded in 1992 with the sudden influx of thousands of Sudanese ‘lost boys’ 
Kakuma I is constructed along a basic spatial pattern.  The UNHCR compound is 
currently located outside of the immediate camp close to the edge of Kakuma Town 
and on the opposite side of the main north-south tarmac road that divides the area.  
Walking from Kakuma Town to the edge of the refugee camp takes around thirty 
minutes though many prefer to pay the small fee to ride on the back of one of the 
ubiquitous bicycles that form the main mode of transportation.   
At the southern end of the camp lies the large Lutheran World Federation 
(LWF) compound.  LWF is the lead agency distributing food and facilitating security 
and social services.
117
  The World Food Programme (WFP) provides the food itself.  
The majority of the other NGOs involved in Kakuma such as the International 
Rescue Committee and the Jesuit Refugee Service maintain offices and personnel in 
this compound.  It is the hub of administration and social services.   
Proceeding out of the LWF compound and roughly stretching north following 
a dry riverbed to the east is Kakuma I broken into five zones.  One long dirt road 
stretches the length of the camp, though with the high wind parts of the road bog 
down to dense sand, making travel either by foot or bicycle tedious and tiring.  
Travelling from the LWF compound to the farthest northern point in Zone 3 would 
take approximately one hour and a half by foot, forty-five minutes by bicycle. 
Zone 5 is nearest to LWF and is predominately assigned to the Nuer who 
comprise the second largest ethnic group both within southern Sudan and within 
Kakuma.  Moving north from Zone 5 and remaining on the eastern side of the main 
road one first reaches Zone 4 assigned to Ethiopian refugees and then Zone 3 and the 
Dinka, the largest single ethnicity in Sudan and in Kakuma.  Zone 5 and Zone 3 are 
the farthest apart along the north-south corridor.  Proceeding north again from Zone 
5 but situated on the western side of the main road is first Zone 2 allocated to 
Somalis and then Zone 1 containing individuals predominately from eastern 
Equatoria.  These directions are approximate as zones are not clearly defined often 
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bleeding and overlapping into each other.  Furthermore Kakuma was not planned 
along a succinct design but enlarged out of necessity.  When Kakuma I overcrowded, 
Kakuma II was constructed on the outskirts of Kakuma I and eventually a third site 
called Kakuma III was erected.  However, as the majority of the refugees reside in 
Kakuma I and it forms the backbone of the refugee camp economy and society, field 
research focused on this area.  The following is a non-proportional simplistic 














Compounds are fenced with high thorn bushes separating them.  It is the 
responsibility of each family to construct their own home or tukul, though a tin roof 
is supplied.  Numerous small footpaths criss-cross through the zones intersecting and 
forming a network for ease of travel.   The UNHCR provides water boreholes in each 
zone to be shared by the residing population.  Spread throughout the camp are 
educational centres and even a hospital. 
While Kakuma has developed a semblance of permanence and urbanisation, 
life is harsh and difficult for a variety of important reasons.
118
  First, refugees 
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Figure 3 – Kakuma I Refugee Camp Diagram 
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experience a significant lack of basic resources, particularly food and water.  The 
majority of refugees are completely dependent upon rations they receive from WFP.  
Unfortunately, UNHCR and sub-contractors in Kakuma have experienced significant 
financial shortfalls in recent years.
 119
  As one example of difficulties related to food 
provision, a WFP Executive Board Annual Session in 2005 noted that acute 
malnutrition in Kakuma remained at nine percent and that in 2003 the International 
Rescue Committee had reported that ninety-five percent of all children were 
anaemic.
120
  In addition to the problem of food quantity and nutritional value are 
dietary cultural preferences.  Traditional Sudanese diet does not incorporate the 
wheat flour provided by the WFP.  In order to compensate refugees sell a proportion 
of their rations ‘in order to buy millet, sorghum, maize flour and cassava flour’ in 
addition to other basic goods such as sugar or soap.
121
  Writing about his experience 
in Kakuma Refugee Camp, Benson Deng laments: 
We were human beings, not donkeys, and couldn’t chew the damn hard dry corn grains every 
 day.  It made our teeth strong, we needed no dentist, but our stomachs and our intestines 
 became infected.  Many people died of stomach problems.  The corn needed grinding so we 
 collected our ration together and sold some to pay to grind the remaining grain.  Sometimes 
 we stood three days in a line in the local town waiting for the grinding machine.  Other times 
 when people went to the market to sell some of their grain in order to get money to grind the 
 rest, gangs robbed them of it all.  If you were robbed, you went back to the camp weeping for 
 the fact that war in your land had driven you to this arid part of northern Kenya, where the 
 starved local inhabitants were as ravenous as wolves.
122
   
Water is also a source of concern and insecurity.  Turkana District is plagued 
by droughts and there are frequent water shortages in the refugee camp.  The water 
shortage is perhaps most keenly felt among the Nuer in Zone 5.  When visited in 
2006 water was only available an hour and a half to two hours each day where 
previously it had been available three times a day for half an hour to two hours each 
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time.
123
  Hilda, the Women’s Department Leader for the Community Department of 
the LWF explained that the problem with water in Zone 5 directly results from 
overcrowding by the Nuer.  She insisted that new Nuer arrivals refusing settlement in 
Kakuma II or III have pushed the capacity of Zone 5 over the infrastructure limits 
built for that community.  In her opinion the problem therefore was beyond LWF and 
rests solely with the Nuer themselves.
124
  Rev Tut Mai, a Nuer residing in Zone 5, 
agreed that the basic problem was overcrowding but that the responsibility for 
alleviating the situation was not resettlement of Nuer but an increase in security 
arrangements by the LWF.  He noted that during previous ethnic tensions in Kakuma 
the LWF was unable to protect the minority Nuer from the Dinka.  The Nuer decided 
to band together to bolster their numbers and protect themselves.  Though these 
conflicts have since dissipated Nuer are hesitant to leave homes they have already 
built with their own resources.
125
  While both agree that water shortage is 
problematic and relates to overcrowding, the above highlights the disparity that can 
exist between NGO staff and refugees.  Furthermore as NGOs maintain control over 
camp funding and mechanisms it illustrates how the onus of responsibility can be 
shifted to dis-empowered refugees exacerbating already difficult situations.
126
  Nuers 
respond by utilising boreholes in neighbouring zones or by buying or bartering for 
water from host Turkana.  Rather than decreasing insecurity however, this response 
increases conflict by generating friction with nearby refugees, in this case usually 
Somalis, provoking individual fights at the water-tap or further depleting the limited 
economic base for Nuer.  
Economic opportunities do exist however in Kakuma.  There are multiple 
markets spread throughout the camp plying assorted goods and services, the smallest 
being among the Nuer in Zone 5.   The largest and most dynamic are in Zones 2 and 
4 among the Somali and the Ethiopians.  Within these markets are restaurants, hotels, 
businesses focusing on computer training, internet cafes and small movie theatres 
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featuring an assorted mixture of old movies often involving fighting motifs.  The 
Somali market situated on the main Kakuma thoroughfare remains active throughout 
the day contributing to a vibrant atmosphere of intermingling cultures and ethnicites.  
Important football matches from the Africa Cup of Nations to Manchester and 
Arsenal are advertised drawing male-dominated crowds late into the evening.  The 
Dinka market in Zone 3, perhaps because of its distance from the others, has also 
developed into a small but respectable area of commerce.  Contributing to the 
economic buoyancy of Kakuma are the small salaries paid to refugees employed by 
the numerous NGOs and money received from family members living abroad.  
Nonetheless, for the majority of Sudanese refugees, life in Kakuma is equated with 
financial instability and a lack of food and water resources.   
A second difficulty arising out of life in Kakuma is an undercurrent tension 
between refugees and the host Turkana population.  Kenyan policy mandates that 
refugees remain within the camp perimeters unless prior written permission is 
granted.  Such permission is difficult to achieve although Sudanese frequently travel 
to Lokichogio, south Sudan or even Nairobi.  UNHCR policy dictates that Turkana 
remain outside of the camp lest they become recipients of the scarce resources.  As 
already noted however Turkana are among the poorest in Kenya.  For example, fifty-
nine percent of Turkana do not have access to clean water and seventy-five percent 
do not have access to basic healthcare institutions.
127
  Ironically Turkana frequently 
find themselves socio-economically below the refugee population for whom food, 
healthcare and education is provided.  Turkana have in part responded through 
economic initiatives such as gathering and selling the thorn bushes used by Sudanese 
to fence their compounds.  Many simply resort to begging.  The effect is the creation 
of a host population dependent upon the maintenance of the refugee community that 
many Turkana resent.  Subservience has continued to increase as Turkana are 
migrating to Kakuma in large numbers in hope of receiving aid, employment and 
opportunity.   
While major conflict between Turkana and Sudanese, who share no kinship 
links, has thus far been abated, resentment is manifested in attitudes, perceptions, 
judgements, petty theft and an air of tension.
128
  This is particularly true among the 
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Dinka in Zones 1 and 3 who exhibit hostility and suspicion towards Turkana, and at 
night, even fear.  Dinka comment that they must carefully lock their compounds at 
night lest the Turkana come and raid their homes.  Interestingly, Turkana are 
reported to have the same fear of the Dinka.
129
   
Importantly this fear does not exist between Turkana and Nuer who have 
frequent and more open contact with each other.  On occasion Turkana can even be 
found sleeping on the ground in Zone 5.  Furthermore, a small group of Turkana 
daily wait outside of the Mobile Bible School (MBS) at the PCOS compound in 
Zone 5 for foodstuffs and handouts.  However, the underlying resentment of 
preference shown to refugees, begging conditions and fear of theft or bodily harm 
contributes to a sense of insecurity in the camp.   
A third difficulty in Kakuma relates to the internal problems of normal life.  
‘Youths’ were frequently cited as a major source of conflict in the community for a 
variety of different reasons such as disrespect and not honouring the elders.  
Adultery, rape and theft are also present.  Problems regarding employment and 
educational advancement were also frequently cited as was concern about the 
situation in Sudan and other refugee camps.   
Likewise, women in Kakuma experience many of the same difficulties they 
faced in southern Sudan.  Teresa Bul Chan, the Chair Lady for the Nuer community 
explained, ‘the concept of the Sudanese people is to look down on the women… She 
can’t have any authority in the community.  And she cannot contribute in the social 
affairs where the men are contributing the good ideas.’
130
  Another lamented: 
The way we are here as the women we don’t have way to raise up, to come up to comparative 
with others so that is why you see we get the interpreter.  If not we could communicate with 
you by our own.  But because we are beat down, beat down that is why we get the interpreter. 
And especially we the women of southern Sudan and so we are the same as when we came 
[from] back home.  We did not change… It is a big challenge, a big problem for all the 
women to come up.’
131
   
Pili Martin, the LWF Peace, Conflict and Reconciliation Programme Officer noted:  
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We have women who have suffered a lot… You see you have women who might have been 
raped by SPLA soldiers and they had kids in the process and these men are looking for these 
children.  Already this person who has suffered trouble, then they want to take the child away 
but they don’t want the woman, they want the child you see.  Then such a person, the woman 
needs help.  Then we take them to [Jesuit Refugee Service], they come and have a place there 
and they keep the women isolated from the community until they think that they are better 
and they assist them.
132
   
A fourth difficulty facing Sudanese is tension with other nationalities in 
Kakuma.  This is sometimes expressed in religious annoyance.  For example, the 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan begins beating the drum calling people to worship 
very early on Sunday mornings.  When Nuer were asked how they believed the 
nearby Somalis felt about this ritual, they responded with indifference citing the 
nightly call to prayer as a source of irritation and disruption.   
A more substantial source of tension relates to intermarriage.  Pili Martin 
observed: 
Our main aim is to try and create a peaceful existence among the refugee population itself 
and also between the refugees and the host community because there is a lot of interaction 
that takes place.  Even sometimes you will realise there is even some intermarriages.  So it 
brings a lot of, if you want, tension, yeah, especially issues of marriages [and] dowry.
133
    
Issues such as intermarriage raise difficult questions regarding legal and 
cultural jurisdiction.  In Kenya, refugee camps are in general legal anomalies that are 
‘in practice – albeit certainly not in theory – beyond the scope of national law and 
subjected to an informal legal system established by the agencies that run them.’
134
  
In Kakuma, jurisdiction to a large extent has been devolved to community based 
bench courts or peace committees that have a remit related only to their respective 
community.  Intermarriage crosses the common process of deliberation.  In such 
instances pastors and community leaders will consult with their counterparts a 
negotiated settlement to maintain communal peace.  When crossing ethnic and 
religious boundaries, however, this process can be difficult placing further strain on 
cultural values.   
A fifth and final source of insecurity is conflict among Sudanese themselves.  
This provided the greatest threat to stability particularly between Dinka and Nuer.  
Traditionally these two communities viewed each other with hostility resulting in 
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frequent clashes and cattle raids.  This history and attitude was transferred to 
Kakuma.  Enhancing the precarious situation, news of conflict occurring in south 
Sudan would be carried to Kakuma with the encouragement to take revenge.  On 
multiple occasions armed conflict between Sudanese groups or within one group 
erupted.  For example, 1997 saw two major escalations rendering more than one 
hundred forty casualties and over one hundred injuries.  Again, January 1999 
witnessed three hundred injuries and four hundred houses razed.
135
   
Although armed battles have recently decreased, suspicion still remains.  
Returning from a meeting one evening a Dinka companion insisted that we travel on 
a bora-bora, or bicycle, rather than walking because it was ‘dangerous.’  A one-word 
response was given to why he felt it was dangerous to return by foot at night: 
‘Nuer.’
136
   
In this context of urbanisation and ongoing insecurity, instability and 
uncertainty southern Sudanese have engaged in a process of communal group re-
identification and re-formation of normative social values and mores with one 
indigenous agent surfacing as the foremost interlocutor, Sudanese churches.  Though 
a number of churches and denominations exist within the camp, as refugees are given 
the freedom to form spiritual associations in accordance with their resources, there 
are four predominant denominations within Kakuma: the Presbyterian Church of 
Sudan among the Nuer, the Episcopal Church of Sudan among the Dinka, the 
Catholic Church among the Equatorians and several smaller ethnically mixed Sudan 
Pentecostal Churches.  Taken as a whole these churches have communally benefited 
Kakuma Refugee Camp by recreating societal patterns of interaction, building 
bridges of ethnic peace and reconciliation and modelling several progressive social 
initiatives.  The remainder of this chapter will explore these three key areas detailing 
the collective influence of the churches on the communal stabilisation of Kakuma 
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Recreating Society 
 
The first communally stabilising influence the churches collectively exerted 
on Kakuma was a substantiated reconstruction of society thereby adding a sense of 
stability stripped during war and refuge.  Social elements associated with traditional 
Sudanese society have been reconfigured in the church setting.  This is simplistically 
demonstrated in the congregational arrangement of the Presbyterian Church of Sudan 
during a Sunday morning service.  Figure Four depicts the primary PCOS church 
located among the Nuer in Zone 5.  
Although this is a fairly typical 
example of a church building in 
Kakuma, it is important to note that 
the church outgrew this particular 
building and now meet outdoors 
with the aid of a simple but effective 
sound system.  In order to avoid the 
heat and dust service normally 
begins at 7:15 am and is over by 
10:00 am.  This is a large congregation and on this particular morning there were 909 
adults and 655 children for a total of 1,564.   
During a service the worship Chairman sits to the front and the middle with 
the ‘Ruling Elder’ of the church seated by himself behind and to the left of the 
Chairman.  The Choir, composed entirely of youth wearing orange vests, sits on the 
right side of the congregation with the important men of the church situated on the 
first few rows on the left side of the congregation.  Behind these selected men are the 
members of the Women’s Union, all of whom wear a blue vestment.  Only after 
these groups is the rest of the congregation permitted to sit.   
Importantly the Choir is associated with the Children’s Sunday School and on 
Fridays they have a joint meeting.
137
  Notice in Figure Five that the Choir is seated to 
the right and the Sunday School to the left divided into appropriate age groups called 
Groups A, B, C and D with different vests for the different groups.  Group D is three 
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to four years old, C is five to six, B is six to nine and A is ten to fourteen.  The 
teacher or leader for each group 
wears a white vest or crimson 
sash.  From the age of sixteen to 
twenty-five one is considered a 
youth and therefore a choir 
member.  Only after one has 
reached the age of twenty-five 
can one be considered an adult 
and a full member of the 
congregation.  Promotion from 
one group level to the next 
involves a full day celebration 
incorporating games, refreshment and a time of prayer by the pastors for each one 
being promoted.  One final note concerning the choir is their entrance into the 
service.  They process in together and before sitting, or later standing, first kneel to 
the ground in unison in a set way taught to them by the Choir Leader.   
In Kakuma Refugee Camp traditional societal arrangements are not feasible 
and have consequently broken down.  This has enabled significant parallels to 
develop between the church arrangement and age division in traditional Nuer society, 
though important differences exist.  As in traditional society individuals are assigned 
to an age bracket with proscribed behaviours and activities.  In both obedience and 
respect is key.  Traditionally youth were involved in two principal activities: tending 
the cattle and composing public songs.  While refuge has made obsolete tending the 
cattle, the church has continued the significance of set-apart public singing by youth.  
In traditional society and the contemporary church environment both, it is only the 
youth that are set-aside solely for the purpose of public singing.  Furthermore, 
according to a Nuer judge in Kakuma, the traditional initiation process is now 
illegal.
138
  This process involving guidance and commissioning by the community 
elders is recreated in the promotion services though to a lesser degree and without 
physical marking.  While the Sunday School–Choir–Member schema can be viewed 
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as a form of the age-set system, it is certainly a modification and not a direct re-
creation rigidly maintained.  Nonetheless, it is viewed as the ‘normal’ procedure to 
full church membership and in a setting where all other forms of the age-set has been 
removed or even criminalised this arrangement takes on an added value and 
significance that it might not have otherwise been accorded.   
Highlighting the similarity in expectation and the importance of maintaining 
selected elements from traditional society in the Sunday School–Choir composition 
is the following sermon given to the Sunday School and Choir during one weekly 
meeting.  James Bany Daa a lay member of the congregation delivered the sermon, 
which was simultaneously translated by John Riak:  
If you don’t obey the Lord you will be destroyed.  If you don’t obey God then how can we 
 be freed from all these things disturbing us, but the Lord is listening to those who talk to him 
 in faith. 
Wisdom begins with listening to mother and father.  This will teach you how to listen to the 
 Lord.  Children should follow all the traditions of the culture, such as handling the cattle, to 
 prove you are a worthy listener and one who is worthy of service.  This is so when you go to 
 the Lord He will see you are worthy. 
 Since our relatives know we are Christians and taught God’s word what are we proving to 
 them by our actions?  We should prove we are Christians.  We should avoid outside 
 influences, not listen to those who cheat people.  Let us look to the Lord, trust Him and let 
 Him guide us in every situation we are in. 
 Let our patience stand that we may reach the promise at the end.  Let us seek not the wisdom 
 of the world but the wisdom of God who will show us the clear way.  The way of the 
 Christian does not make sense to the non-Christian.  So let us be a wise example of the right 
 way and be recognised by the people.  God loves us.  That is why He gave us His son.  The 
 Christian way is different from the traditional witchcraft way of dealing with problems.  We 
 have left that way.
139
 
Although brief this sermon reinforces respect for elders, maintaining 
traditional values and culture, a theology articulated in lifestyle rather than doctrine 
and the primacy of Christianity over traditional religion.  The Sunday School–Choir 
paradigm, moreover, demonstrates that a collective social identity is considered 
important to the PCOS.  More important than it would perhaps be in other southern 
Sudanese contexts, in Kakuma the church is almost alone in providing a social basis 
for collective identification organised and administrated by the Sudanese themselves.  
Within the refugee camp church participation exposes children to traditional values 
and norms beyond the extended family at a time when at a developmental level, 
‘collective identities may become quite significant to children’s self-concept… 
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particularly in an environment where a social category membership is salient.’
140
  
The overall effect therefore is to reinforce and solidify an emerging group 
categorisation.   
The Sunday School and Choir form only one component to a church service 
seeking to incorporate communal groups and ideals first seen in the physical seating 
arrangements of the service.  The Women’s Union also forms a distinct communal 
identity within the service.  On Wednesdays, the Women’s Union gathers together in 
its own compound which neighbours the PCOS compound.  While all women are 
invited to attend this meeting, and many regularly do, only a handful of women are 
official members of the Women’s Union, identifiable by the blue uniform that they 
wear.  The Women’s Union 
has a variety of responsibilities 
in the broader church 
community often reflecting 
their duties and tasks within 
society.  The Women’s Union 
are to help prepare the church 
for worship on Sunday 
mornings, lead Bible Studies 
and worship at their weekly 
meetings, visit the sick in the 
church and community and 
most visibly, gather the tithes 
during morning worship, as seen in Figure Six.  This group plays a distinct and 
important role in a community seeking inclusion, holism and contribution from a 
variety of groups each assigned specific tasks.   
The PCOS’ efforts to constitute an important and vibrant community that 
recognises a variety of identifiable groups each playing an important role that 
contributes to a broader setting is underlined during group worship.  During worship 
each group is allowed to present a special song to the rest of the congregation.  While 
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this song can be a hymn frequently it is an original composition.  The Chairman of 
the Service will ask the Choir, Women’s Union, men and sometimes children if they 
have a song they would like to present to the congregation.  At the PCOS service in 
Lokichogio this practice is extended in a unique and important way.  Due to working 
conditions women and therefore children are present only in a limited capacity.  
Rather than asking the Choir, Women’s Union or children to present a song 
therefore, the Chairman asks if those of Nuer, Dinka, Anyuak, or Murle would like to 
present a group song.  Congregations are not therefore viewed as a unified block but 
as the commensurate sum of all the various sub-groups each assigned a specific role, 
seating position and task and it is only when each group is actively participating in its 
proper way that worship can be considered conducted.   
Further underscoring this sentiment one pastor noted, ‘without choir the 
church cannot be the church.  Without women’s group the church cannot be the 
church.  Without Sunday School it cannot be the church.  Without all co-operation it 
means that it cannot be the real church.  With participation, they bring together, 
[then] it is where the prayer will be seen.’
141
  Giving space for public participation 
during worship services to each group – male elders, women and youth within the 
proper seating arrangement – allows an assertion of independence by each group 
reflecting a traditional Nuer thought that appropriate collectivity is on the basis of 
composite pieces performing their autonomous function within a holistic framework.   
A final note regarding the service itself and highlighting the importance of 
communal greeting is the 
normal pattern of dismissal.  
Although this practice is 
not carried out following 
the main service due to the 
size of the congregation it 
is maintained in other 
settings and at all of the 
other PCOS congregations 
visited.  As evidenced in 
Figure Seven each member 
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processes through the greeting line and then joins the end so that everyone present is 
acknowledged and communal group identification strengthened.   
Within such an environment leadership hierarchies are demarcated and 
maintained.  This is especially clear in the relationship between the Ruling Elder and 
the Teaching Elder.  John Riak commented on the primary qualification to become a 
Ruling Elder, ‘the congregation proposes the elder.  When the elder should be the 
elder but not a young man like me.  Like I was about to be proposed as the elder but 
the church say, no, John should not be the elder but he should be an evangelist as 
well.  He should teach.  But elder is a high one.  That is why you see, the elder is an 
old man.’
142
  The Ruling Elder therefore, is expected to be a respected older 
gentleman who advises the pastor, offers practical wisdom to communicants and 
guides the activities of the congregation.  The Ruling Elder, furthermore, balances 
the activities of the Teaching Elder, or pastor, who is considered a specialist with a 
primarily spiritual purview and ability to help others navigate their spiritual 
relationship with God.     
The sense of community belonging, necessary group participation and the 
importance of living according to established cultural norms is reflected in local 
theology.  When asked what was central to his congregation’s faith, Rev Peter Kai 
responded, ‘The centre, the central faith is when you pray together as a people.  
When you share together as a 
people.  It is the one thing…  And 
the other thing is when you follow 
the 10 Commandments.’
143
   
Such an understanding of 
the role of the church is not limited 
to the Presbyterian Church alone 
but is comparable to other churches 
in Kakuma.  This view is also 
clearly discernable at the Episcopal 
Church of Sudan (ECS) in Zone 3 
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among the Dinka.  This church is also rather large as demonstrated by Figure Eight.  
As in the Presbyterian Church, the ECS also extends traditional practices into the 
worship service.  A prime example is the use of 
‘crosses’ during worship.  Traditionally Dinka 
spent considerable time carving and crafting 
walking sticks used in a variety of settings.  Today 
this practice has been transferred to the creation of 
ornate crosses carried while walking and waved 
during worship.  Paralleling customary practice, 
the most elderly men and women publicly engage 
in this activity.  When one group of young people 
were asked why only senior men and women 
carried the crosses they looked askance and 
responded most obviously, because that is the way 
it is.  Some young people are pleased with this 
change in practice.  One young man noted that 
formerly old men would carry sticks and hit 
younger individuals when they misbehaved.  Currently however, when some older 
men go to hit you with their cross, they see it and stop.
144
   
Like the PCOS, the ECS also reflects an important deference to church 
hierarchies.  This was clearly illustrated when attempting to arrange an interview and 
focus group at the church in Zone 3.  One morning I travelled to the church and 
finding individuals at the compound asked to see the pastor explaining why I had 
come and what I was hoping to achieve.  The attendant at the church agreed that it 
would be best for me to consult the pastor before proceeding further.  After waiting 
for several hours in a nearby shop I was informed that the pastor had arrived and was 
available to receive me.  I repeated to the pastor the reasons why I had come to 
Kakuma Refugee Camp and to his church in particular.  I asked him if it would be 
possible to interview him and arrange a focus group with some of the members of his 
congregation.  He informed me that he felt that my project and reason for coming to 
Kakuma was good and beneficial and that he would like to arrange these interviews 
but would not be able to do so without further permission from the Deacons who 
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oversee all of the churches in Kakuma.  Fortunately the three deacons were gathering 
together that afternoon so at the appropriate time I returned and repeated the outline 
of the project to the Deacons.  The Deacons likewise affirmed the project and agreed 
to arrange an interview to take place several days later with the ECS church 
leadership in Kakuma subject to approval from the High Deacon.
145
  On the 
appointed day the interview could not begin until after the project had again been 
outlined and the High Deacon satisfied.  Throughout the interview the High Deacon, 
also the most senior adult male present, was given opportunity to speak first and 
when others disagreed with him they did so discreetly.   
Confirming that the ECS also views proper behaviour and group contribution 
during the worship service as central, the High Deacon responded to what he 
considered the most important element of worship on a Sunday morning: ‘When the 
congregation are gathered in the church we see that everybody is obey[ing] the 
things… that the church [requires]…  After that we have to see that the whole 
prayers is being organised.  And after that we know that the Holy Spirit is among the 
congregation.’
146
  Another lay leader asserted, ‘so as a leader in the church our 
mission is to control people in the church.  If anyone who does wrong you have to 
correct him or her in a polite way.’
147
  Underlying this sentiment is a traditional 
Dinka approach to collectivity that is ‘closely linked with the position and authority 
of fathers, elders, and priests.’
148
  That is whereas Nuer approach group identity, as 
exhibited in the PCOS, based on a segmentary principle of independent parts 
performing in cohesion, Dinka collectivity emphasises common adherence to rules 
and forms set and maintained by the leading elders.  The net result for the ECS is a 
more corporately articulated theology that continues to maintain traditional practices 
within ongoing group categorisation.   
Unique to the ECS and important in expanding ideal corporate patterns and 
directly stemming from a common adherence to determined norms is the practice of 
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‘Bible Study Fellowships’ and ‘synagogues.’  In addition to Sunday morning 
worship adult members of the congregation are to join small Bible Study groups and 
children and youth corresponding synagogues that are spread geographically 
throughout the camp.  These meetings, which are to last approximately one hour, 
meet every evening before dusk and are typically comprised of around forty 
individuals.
149
  Although pastors are present at the Bible Studies different members 
of the group, male and female, are given the opportunity to share the Bible Study 
time rotating around so that everyone has the opportunity to lead.  These daily 
meetings allow pastors to remain closely attuned to issues arising in the community 
and respond quickly to individual and communal needs.
150
   
Synagogues, solely for youth and children, primarily focus on transmitting 
Christian songs and end with a short Biblical reading.  Though songs do not figure as 
predominantly in the ECS worship service as they do in the PCOS service, they do 
form an important medium for training and shaping, and ECS Bor Dinka have 
composed more than 1,000 new songs while at Kakuma.
151
  This difference in 
practice may stem in part from a traditional Dinka understanding that for youth songs 
are more connected to socially appropriate methods of expressing individuality and 
social tension.
152
  Nonetheless, both the fellowships and the synagogues play an 
important role in inculcating corporate identity and behavioural practice on the basis 
of common norms.   
The importance of recognising and establishing children under the proper 
community authority is further demonstrated in the ECS worship service.  Every 
Sunday morning immediately following the Biblical readings and church 
announcements is a baby dedication.  Holding their infants, women come to the front 
of the congregation and kneel before the stage.  The fathers who are seated on the 
opposite side of the congregation then come and stand behind them.  The child is 
then passed to that day’s preacher who proceeds to the back of the stage, turns his 
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back on the congregation, faces the east and then prays into a microphone for that 
child and family.  This process is repeated for each child initiating the infant into a 
broader social context marked by proper relationship with individuals and with God.  
The construction of ECS churches in conjunction with key pastoral turns to face the 
east reflects in part a traditional Dinka understanding of where life originates.
153
   
An important church celebration further demonstrated the efforts of the ECS 
to recreate traditional elements and reinforce communal identification and group 
ideals.  The ECS recently celebrated the centennial anniversary of the arrival of the 
first missionary, Archibald Shaw.
154
  The ECS congregations in Kakuma had sent a 
delegation to the celebrations occurring in Malek.  On 13 February the delegation 
returned to Kakuma.  Upon their arrival they marched down the main road the length 
of the camp with many in the community flocking to the road to see the activity that 
was transpiring.  The parade ending at the church in Zone 3 was greeted with warm 
enthusiasm, dancing and singing.  A number of important symbols were used during 
the celebration as is evidenced in figures ten through thirteen.  There was much 
dancing involving jumping and running backwards and forwards.  Drums and horns 
were used for music as were shakers attached to the feet.  I was told quite explicitly 
that the group sent to Malek were those who were trained in the way of traditional 
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The hats and uniform worn by the delegation were also symbolically 
significant.  On the way to a smaller party following the church greeting I asked one 
of the pastors I had not yet met the meaning behind the colours used on the uniform.  
He told me quite predictably that the red was for Jesus’ blood, the white for purity 
and the green for growth and heaven.  Later that afternoon the pastor of the 
congregation, with whom I had now spent several occasions, approached and asked 
if I wanted to know the meaning behind the colours.  With great enthusiasm he 
explained that the red vest which is closest to the body and the red on the cross 
represent the blood of the southerners who died during the war. The white cloak over 
the blood signifies peace and the coming of the Holy Spirit.  The black belt signifies 
the land of southern Sudan, a land belonging to Africans.  The green hat represents 
the green grass and growth of southern Sudan and that it is not dry and dusty like 
Kakuma or the north.  The uniforms therefore are an important mix of meanings and 
symbols fusing the land, the war and Christianity into a single framework of meaning 
and relevance.   
Though demonstrated in a substantially different manner than the PCOS and 
ECS congregations, the Catholic parish within the camp also displays elements of 
cultural recreation.  Elaborating on the rationales behind the recent significant 
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growth of Christ the King in the overlapping Equatoria and Dinka section of Zone 1, 
one young man explained:  
The church itself; since [before] there was no church built people were praying under the 
trees.  Most of the people they are attracted to the building because people are fighting.  
There are some people who come because of the word of God and some people because of 
the gathering.  When people gather together maybe there is a friend.  You want to meet a 
friend, and then you come to the church and meet him in that place.  So the building itself it 
attracts people in order to come.  So that is why the population increased but before the 
population was few.  And the change is also because of some of the activities of the church.  
Since before the building there were not many activities.  But now since the church has 
grown there are so many activities which were created for the youth to participate in.  So 
others are attracted for the activities.  Others are just coming with no part in any of the 
activities, they are just coming.  Even they have no faith but because of the building, and the 
meeting together and seeing other friends that is why these people want to come.
155
   
Though articulated within the context of one particular denomination the above 
resonates across the refugee camp.  The church serves as a communal gathering point 
strengthening social networking, facilitating interaction and encouraging communal 
discussions.  As Alanya Joseph the chairman for the Equatoria community noted, ‘I 
think the people are going to the church now because they know God is there and can 
help them in the situation they have.  They must persevere in some condition… So 
now you try to go to the church.  You know when you go there you can meet with 
your friends and they can council you.’
156
  In addition Christ the King serves as a 
point of contact with the broader world and a channel through which information is 
passed, especially in relation to war developments.
157
  Both the PCOS and the ECS 
also incorporate into their regular order of worship a time of greeting especially 
focused on Sudan related news.  As one of the few consistent community-wide 
opportunities for assembly, information and viewpoints disseminated in this manner 
are especially influential in shaping public perception and attitude and further 
underscore the importance of the church as a cultural gatekeeper building communal 
ideals.
158
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In addition, among the Equatoria community the Catholic church has 
contributed to maintaining traditional practices of mourning.  As part of the services 
extended to the community, Christ the King provides training to youth in songs 
appropriate for singing during times of grieving.  This enables youth to participate in 
the mourning process and processionals in a sensitive and meaningful manner.  
Offering his opinion on the biggest contribution the church has made to his 
community, the Equatorian chairman observed, ‘when we sometimes have a funeral 
in our community here they are the first people to come to make sure that they 
mourn.  So after mourning sometimes they even assist those people with whatever 
they have.  So now people think that the church is also part of us.’
159
   
Times of rapid transition and a refugee experience of cultural disintegration 
stripped away normative life patterns.  Ongoing difficulties, tensions and insecurities 
have further eroded sentiments of stability leading to a ‘whole structure… fraught 
with competition, suspicion, and mistrust.’
160
  Within Kakuma, the churches have 
counterbalanced these forces by extending and recreating elements of traditional 
southern Sudanese society.  Services among Nuer, Dinka and Equatorians reflected 
patterns of traditional hierarchy and to an important extent reconstructed communal 
identity and age-set boundaries of interaction, participation and group ideals.  
Imbued with symbols, celebrations and an unprecedented opportunity to serve as the 
prime information hub, the church has profoundly contributed to a stable and 
empowering society that though altered remains largely continuous to traditional 
patterns.  Re-establishing semblances of normality is critical as societies are held 
together not in ‘trust per se but trust in a system of normative social relations, values, 
hierarchies, statuses, roles, obligations, sanctions, and so on,’ and further allows 
members within the society to adapt to a demanding situation.
161
   While 
rehabilitating cultural patterns of leadership, processes and values, though at times 
perhaps unintentionally, the church has not sought a return to a supposed ideal state 
best emulated.  Alterations, and importantly, challenges have been made to culturally 
accepted norms.  In terms of communal stabilisation this is perhaps most clearly 
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evidenced in approaches to ethnic identity and leads to the second major contribution 
by the churches to Kakuma Refugee Camp.   
 
 
Building Peace from Hong Kong to Baghdad  
 
Hong Kong is a land of bustling activity, commercial vitality and 
interpersonal networking.  With numerous buildings and enterprising businessmen 
the air is full of buying and selling, bartering and bargaining.  In popular perception 
it is not only a major cultural crossroad in a new economic paradigm, it is more 
importantly a commercial success.  It is crowded but developed, symbolising rapid 
urbanisation.  And in this case it stands in stark contrast to Baghdad, a land better 
known for sectarian violence, popular exploitation and perhaps most subtly – Islamic 
orientation.  It is a place populated with youth who fell out of school due to hunger 
and parents lost to the war, grouped now into ‘gangs of warlord people.’
162
  Baghdad 
is full of ‘gang[s] of thieves’
163
 looking to rob you, with force if necessary, best 
avoided late at night.
164
  And in Kakuma these two zones straddle and polarise the 
camp with the Dinka on one side in the self-styled ‘Hong Kong’ and the Ethiopian-
Somali-Nuer fighting it out in a Zone 5 colloquially known as ‘Baghdad.’  The 
Equatorians are caught in the middle.  Wracked with violence and hostility the camp 
teeters between the two competing poles of Zone 3, Hong Kong and Zone 5, 
Baghdad.   
Conflict, resource deprivation and ethnic hostility characterized life within 
Kakuma Refugee Camp stretching taut tensions, suspicions and insecurity within and 
between the Dinka, Nuer and Equatorian communities.   As the Chairman of the 
Nuer community stated, ‘we have a problem with insecurity.  Shooting was going on 
all the months, all the days…  The insecurity is the first problem that we face in this 
area.’
165
  From a Dinka perspective, ‘in the camp the peace has not [come] because 
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there is a lot of crime and people are always not good… For now we are in exile.  
We are in exile.’
166
   
Conflict arose out of a multiplicity of rationales.  Sometimes the simple 
sharing of resources such as a water tap snapped into open struggles such as an 
incident that erupted between the Equatorian and Somali community in 2005.
167
   In 
1999 an argument begun between several drunken individuals turned into a fight that 
eventually spilled into a significant clash between the Bor Dinka and Equatorian 
community as family units sought to support their own relatives.
168
  Armed 
confrontations are often furthered as local communities utilise cultural songs and 
dances ‘provoking each other until something starts brewing up.’
169
   
Underlying the above triggers is the war in south Sudan.  One young man 
lamented, ‘so by the time that we came here as youths, so we are here peacefully, but 
our minds were still there in south Sudan so we were trying to practice the way we 
were in south Sudan because we are not knowing better the way of God.’
170
  Pili 
Martin who oversees the security forces for the refugee camp believes that a major 
issue is a ‘revenge cycle which has happened at home and they have brought here to 
the camp… caus[ing] insecurity especially for the ones who are already here.’
171
   
In addition to the war, pre-existing animosities and barriers within southern 
Sudanese culture transferred by refugees to Kakuma have further decreased the 
potentiality for peaceful coexistence.  Within south Sudan individuals were divided 
by cultural and religious customs and taboos that inhibited lasting cohesion.
172
  
Demarcations, especially between ethnic groups, ‘were encouraged by raids.  They 
were encouraged by supporting that this community is not good by this one and that 
one.’
173
  Another leader observed, ‘people fought also over cultural differences 
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because these people came from different backgrounds.  Now if I come from my own 
tribe and you come from your tribe and we meet without guidance then we can come 
into conflict.’
174
  That is, tribal divisions, historical raids, revenge cycles and a 
mentality of war all influenced life within Kakuma actively decreasing the possibility 
of communal peace.   
Importantly, this situation today has to a large extent been radically altered 
and overturned.  Though tensions are certainly not totally dissipated, as Pili Martin 
buoyantly stated, ‘now here in the camp it’s much better if you ask me… the 
conflicts are not as bad.’
175
  The Chairman for the Nuer community noted, ‘the 
insecurity problem is over, [it is] not like before.’
 176
  Responding to a question 
concerning ethnic conflicts within Kakuma one focus group participant affirmed, ‘it 
is difficult to understand each other because different language is there, different 
culture that one is there.  Otherwise what we are saying is that it is reduced, this one 
is reducing because of Bible sharing… We are different tribes but I can also receive 
word of God and forgiveness must also be there.’
177
  Acknowledging the significant 
impact of churches on Kakuma Refugee Camp, Sabine Knoedlstorfer asserts, ‘most 
especially the Sudanese churches have influence on the community life… The 
religious leaders try to appease the anger of the refugees and to prevent conflict in 
the camps…  The religious services have the function to solve conflicts and to give a 
kind of security to the unsafe life of refugees.’
178
  Though other elements have 
contributed, the church, reinforced by growing group identification and 
categorisation has played the predominant role in overcoming traditional barriers and 
a tenuous refugee experience to produce peace building efforts critical in communal 
stabilisation.    
In Kakuma the impact and influence of the church is significant and 
substantial.  The church helps reconstitute group identification and ideals, extending 
traditional values and practices in important but different ways.  The church also 
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exhibits a fundamental role in the development of peace and security in the refugee 
camp particularly by building a broad consensus of political consciousness extending 
beyond ethnic identification to incorporate all southern Sudanese.  In an interview in 
Kakuma, the Associate Moderator of the Presbyterian Church noted that this effort is 
central to faith in PCOS congregations:  
In fact the central element in the church is the uniqueness of the society, that the society may 
be one as God said, “I come to this world so that you may be one.”  That is the role that the 
church is to exercise is to make people to be aware with the different groups, different 
languages, different cultures [that they] might be one in God’s faith as well as human so that 
they will join hands to work for the future generation.
179
   
That the church has played such a fundamental role in contributing to the 
development of a more unified political consciousness extending in-group 
categorisation rests largely on the leadership initiative of numerous local community 
pastors.  Traditionally within both Dinka and Nuer communities religious leaders 
played an important role in establishing and maintaining peaceful relations within the 
community.
180
  In Kakuma pastors have inherited this role, responsibility and legacy 
due to a variety of important and interconnected rationales related to the changing 
nature of southern Sudanese society keenly felt and present in the refugee context.  
With cultures that value peace as a central component to societal life and 
understanding, church leadership, both trained and more significantly an active lay 
leadership, filled a peace building vacuum by actively promoting an ideology that 
extended ethnic boundaries across southern segments in a powerful, relevant and 
meaningful way.
181
   
Institutionally this effort was clearly seen in the establishment of the PCOS 
Mobile Bible School (MBS) in Zone 5.  Rev Stephen Ter Nyoun Yier a Nuer from 
Upper Nile and a PCOS denominational leader helped found the MBS circa 1998 as 
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part of a broader effort by the PCOS to facilitate pastoral training.
182
  Recognising 
that the southern war necessitated broader allegiances beyond inter-tribal sub-clans 
Yier hoped that the MBS would help reinforce a Kakuma wide Christian solidarity 
overcoming traditional tribal boundaries, allegiances and denominational 
affiliations.
183
  Towards this end he visited extensively with Dinka ECS leadership 
sharing his vision and encouraging them to send a student to the school.  After 
initially commissioning an older Dinka gentleman who quietly sat through the first 
several days of teaching the ECS Dinka leadership was convinced of the legitimacy 
of the institution and a young pastor was allowed to attend.   While strengthening 
relationships and opening participants to a healthy broader ecumenism, both 
denominationally and tribally, this effort also demonstrates the difficulty in 
institutionalising sentiments held hesitantly by the community.  For not long into the 
arrangement the ECS leadership accused one of the students of trying to introduce 
PCOS practices into ECS life and all ECS students were withdrawn.  All the same 
this short experiment demonstrates a tentative willingness by church leaders to 
formalise relational interaction while actively promoting an ecumenical 
consciousness stretching beyond segmentary divisions.
184
  In and of itself this was a 
new and important development with direct communal stabilising implications, and 
while institutional links failed to take root, less formal and more immediate response-
oriented endeavours were more numerous and more efficacious.   
As previously noted numerous clashes erupted within the camp leading to 
armed conflicts primarily between southern Sudanese refugees resulting in burned 
homes, loss of property, injuries, a destabilised community and most grievously, 
death.  In the midst of often harrowing events the church was at the forefront of 
response.  Urging peace and restraining anger, church leaders utilised their position 
of leadership to influence actions and demonstrate an inherent connectivity to 
competing tribes with an implied understanding that relational ties demand respect 
and responsibility.  Repeatedly following times of battle between Dinka and Nuer 
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communities, pastors from the two tribes at considerable risk entered into the 
opposing territory to offer prayers, urge reconciliation and demonstrate the sameness 
and therefore the safety in developing peaceful interrelationships.  This is clearly 
stated in the following exchange: 
Peter: The church says or the Christian says among the different ethnic groups, Dinka or 
Nuer or Zande or Equatorian, in coming to the point of identity is only to know that you are 
only one in Jesus.  And if you are one in Jesus you have to stop violence…  
James: For example we have the church leaders go to some of the other areas to pray 
together…  For example, sometime the pastor form this Dinka community can go up to  
Peter: Nuer community. 
James: Nuer community and pray there and, and the same with the Nuer.  They will just 




From the Nuer side Rev Peter Kai also confirmed this disclosing: 
When there are any problems to work out between the two communities in the camp, for 
example during that time we call ourselves the Nuer we are talking one way, there is 
something that occurs between the Dinka and the Nuer.  We the pastors who call ourselves in 
that time, we try our best to make the reconciliation between the two groups.  We work 
together.  That is how the church was forming itself.  If it is another community like for 
example the group who call themselves Dinka… We the pastors from both sides the Dinka 
and Nuer we call ourselves together to work together.’
186
   
The importance of this cultural exchange in the midst of heated anger, 
enflamed passions and personal injury cannot be overstated.  Traditional attitudes, 
long histories of animosity, war induced mentality and exasperating refugee 
circumstances forced the Dinka and Nuer communities to live in a state of 
destabilising fear of attack and reprisal.  The camp was often polarised into the 
competing realms of Hong Kong and Baghdad.  In precisely these circumstances 
pastoral leadership and initiative came to symbolise the opportunity of a peace 
building bridge.  Using their position as collateral the pastoral cultural exchange 
curtailed retaliation and poignantly modelled in their person a broader ethnic 
identification that incorporated all southern Sudanese thereby underscoring a 
collective communal responsibility for peace.  Though never institutionalised, as an 
informal crisis response utilised by pastors from all of the present tribes it was a 
powerful tool.  Venturing into ‘enemy territory’ to offer personal condolences and 
share in grief and mourning, while at the same time asking the community to band 
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together in prayers for peace proved deeply calming and moving.  In this way pastors 
came to embody a set of peace building principles that included broad ethnic 
solidarity.  As one Dinka church leader shared, ‘[pastors] are the symbol of the 
peace.  When you walk along with the [pastoral collar] nobody can stop you to not 
enter into that, because you are a pastor.’
187
   
Outside connections and external links to broader resources have also helped 
establish the church within Kakuma as the predominant peace building actor and to 
further facilitate peace building initiatives.  One example involves a 1995 clash 
between Dinka and Nuer that left several dead.
188
  At the time of the incident 
Kakuma refugee pastor Stephen Ter Nyoun Yier was meeting with several visiting 
American pastors in nearby Lokichogio.  After receiving word that evening Yier 
overcame initial hesitation by the American pastors to visit the camp under the 
auspices of the New Sudan Council of Churches to send a message that in times of 
conflict the churches were standing alongside the people praying for peace.  Early 
the next morning Yier and the American pastors arrived in the camp.  Initially 
greeting ‘his own people’ at the main PCOS Nuer congregation in Zone 5, the team 
quickly moved on to the central ECS Dinka congregation in Zone 3 to the chagrin of 
the Nuer church leadership.  Despite tension in the air the team visited with the 
pastors not to condemn the actions of the previous evening but to mourn, share 
friendship and pray for the situation.  With permission from the ECS leadership the 
team began to move to the various praying centres and synagogues in Dinka areas 
stopping to briefly pray at each location with those present from the local area.   
According to Yier, this non-confrontational approach on the basis of solidarity and 
friendship further demonstrated to the camp that Dinka and Nuer could overcome 
dividing tribal issues.  At the end of the day the team finished back at the main PCOS 
compound by which time many Nuer had gathered and a time of prayer was begun 
that involved both repentance and mourning.  In addition to the pastoral cultural 
exchange the presence of outside observers had an impact on the situation helping 
defuse a dangerous tribal conflict.  Kerbina Dul Myon, the head chief of the Nuer 
court, further signified the influence of broader external connections by the churches 
on the Kakuma situation noting:  
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The church is playing a very important role in the community.  One of the roles that the 
 church plays is that when there is a problem in the community, example war, so when the 
 community see that and the pastors see that this problem is big they may call the other 
 pastors who are far from them like those who are in Nairobi, those who are in Lokichogio, 
 and then they come together as a church team with the community together.  They stand and 
 they solve that problem and even they pray for those who are still insisting of what is going 
 on.
189
   
The churches have also attempted to utilise wider affiliations to emphasise 
peace building initiatives outside of times of immediate conflict.  In 2005 for 
example the Sudan Pentecostal Church (SPC) in Zone 5 hosted two workshops on 
peace and reconciliation.  Drawing in slightly less than one hundred participants each 
time from across the denominational spectrum the workshops were taught by Kenyan 
members of a Pentecostal church outside of the refugee camp.  The workshops were 
completely funded by the local church by saving tithe money and asking members to 
donate cups of maize and wheat grain for food.  According to church leaders the 
LWF peace, conflict and reconciliation programme was unaware of their activities, 
and demonstrates an effort by local churches to rely on networks extending beyond 
the refugee camp to further enable the building of peace within the refugee camp.
190
   
Similar efforts have been undertaken by the Catholic church in Kakuma.  A 
Peace and Justice Commission was created at a parish level that rotates around the 
various chapels providing workshop and training opportunities.  These workshops 
particularly focus on helping people develop the skills necessary in handling inter-
personal conflicts caused by quarrelling among individuals.
191
  In 1999, for example, 
the Commission helped mediate a conflict between the Bor Dinka and Equatorian 
community and hosted workshops that April, August and November ‘to educate 
people on the dangers of conflict and importance of peace with one another as 
children of God.’
192
   
Practised only occasionally these efforts have not had the same lasting impact 
as responses during times of heated confrontation.  Correspondingly, while outside 
resources are an asset it has been primarily local and internal efforts that have made 
the most substantial difference.  Nonetheless, internal pastoral leadership and 
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external networks of broader resources contributed to the development of increased 
reciprocity between southern Sudanese tribes within Kakuma.   
Though church leadership specifically inherited the mantle of religious peace 
building from earlier religious traditions the developing correlation between church 
and peace builder in Kakuma was produced precisely because leadership filtered 
down into congregational life and activity.   That is, a broad custodianship was 
generated.  This is most clearly seen in the development of inter-communal women’s 
prayer groups.  Following a 1996 Dinka-Nuer conflict that saw nine people killed a 
group of women formed a Dinka-Nuer prayer group that has continued to regularly 
meet to pray for peace and fast from six in the morning to six in the evening.
193
   
Over time a number of other communal prayer groups were formed by women and 
considered to be by many an integral reason for a more peaceful refugee camp.   
Practical sermons also offered training and advice in proper behaviour and 
attitudes to be exhibited.  As one young Nuer man stated, ‘even though something 
small has happened you cannot release your temper to fight this.  We have learned 
how to tackle something in the way of negotiation… So now we are in a peaceful 
community because of the church.’
194
  In the Equatorian community one man 
asserted, ‘we also see some changes done in fighting, there is also some people 
changing with this forgiveness.’
195
  In the Dinka community one supposed, ‘it is very 
clear that when people are traumatised, when people are doing some problem that 
they feel is inching into their body there is nothing that can remove that tension lest 
the Bible.’
196
  Alanya Joseph the Equatorian Community Chairman and a part of the 
Seventh Day Adventist Church leadership avowed, ‘in 1992 there was so many 
crimes here.  People were dying every time, illegal killings… But now people go to 
the church.  We [tell] them if you kill somebody your sin will not be forgiven… If 
you commit a crime you will not be given a chance to go alone.  You can be arrested 
and taken to jail.’
197
  The example modelled by church leaders was further reinforced 
through sermons and practical advice in a way that filtered into the broader 
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community slowly challenging boundaries, pushing ethnic perceptions, stressing 
negotiating skills and ultimately therefore strengthening community stability.   
Importantly the church was not alone in this endeavour.  Education has also 
played a substantial part.  One participant observed, ‘we cannot say we are all the 
same…  What lead us to unite are the school and the churches.  You have the culture 
in your tribe but when you come to school you will learn from others.’
198
  Alongside 
education has been the growth of English creating a more broad community-wide 
language critical in developing shared experiences and approaches.  Both of these are 
underscored by the growing sense of urbanisation within the camp displayed in 
larger economic zones such as that characterised as Hong Kong, the proliferation of 
new material goods, the size of the camp and the opportunity for increased 
interaction between ethnic groups.  Education, language and ‘town life’ has played a 
valuable role in contributing to peace efforts.  However these additions have assisted 
more in solidifying a growing re-categorization pushed by the churches than serving 
as the predominant movers themselves.   
Though analysis has thus far focused primarily on the role of the church in 
extending peace between tribes at a macro level, constructive contributions were also 
made during times of within-tribal difficulties particularly at the level of family 
dispute.  As previously mentioned ‘youths’ were a frequent source of discord. 
Perhaps initially low-intense, in a setting festering with unresolved anger even 
bickering related to football matches at times escalated into significant 
conflagrations.
 199
  Expressing how church leaders would respond in such situations 
one Episcopal leader explained, ‘but the priest when we are there we can do 
everything.  So you can have [them] together and divide them and talk to them and 
listen… We go and see what has happened.  And we tell them that that cannot 
happen.’
200
  Action was further underscored by Biblical guidance as one individual 
stated, ‘the Bible also is one of the councillors.  It say let us behave like this, let us 
behave like this, let us behave like this.’
201
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Related to the above is the problem of extra-marital pregnancies especially 
when concerned with young unmarried women.  Peter Kwent, the Chairman of the 
Bentiu Community at Kakuma articulated, ‘another problem that we face is fights.  
There is small fighting especially when there is the kind of pregnancy of the 
ladies.’
202
  Further elaborating Kerbina Myon accentuated, ‘when there is a pregnant 
girl [that] one cause a fight between the brothers of the lady and those who 
impregnate that girl.’
203
  In such circumstances pastors try to intervene offering 
counselling and practical advice.  Myon continued, ‘the pastor himself can solve that 
problem without involving any large number of people with the girl.  It can be solved 
easily.’
204
  Pastoral intervention in this type of case is important as it will stem wider 
spread violence, and failure to resolve the issue at this level will force the case to the 
docket of the court with fines and legal ramifications likely.  Thus church leadership 
also served as a semi-preventative frontline response in resolving micro level 
conflicts within the more localised context.   
As indicated in the above, particularly at this level, there were important 
limitations to the role and influence of the church.  Conflicts arising out of what 
could be described as ‘typical’ sources were the main responsibility of community 
leaders.  Pastoral leadership often provided an initial response only.  As Rev Peter 
Kai clarified, ‘if it is a normal case which can be solved by the church leader he can 
call this and do this process.  If it is a big case he can tell the chairman come for this 
case, and give advice to the chairman.’
205
  Participants also frequently noted the 
combination of pastoral and community leaders working in conjunction.  As an 
example one Equatorian noted, ‘when there is conflict in the community, especially 
because church leaders are well known, they will also intervene by working together 
with the authority.’
206
  Chairmen, court officials and other community leaders played 
an active and important role in resolving conflicts and easing community tensions 
especially at the micro level and church leaders often acknowledged the need to defer 
to other officials.  At the camp macro level, however, these procedures broke down 
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as within the remit of official capacities there were no mechanisms to resolve inter-
tribal clashes and disputes.  Traditional cultural patterns and approaches, of which 
the official camp positions are an inexact mirror organized by the UNHCR, often 
emphasised division and identification via communal differentiation.  In this context 
ordained and lay church leaders alike offered critical leadership by emphasising 
inter-cultural relationships and therefore responsibility, modelling an example of safe 
cultural exchange, relying on broader external networks for support, and defying and 
ultimately transforming cultural perceptions of ethnicity.  The predominant and 
overriding challenge to peace within Kakuma occurred as a result of the polarisation 
and stigmatisation of the camp into Hong Kong and Baghdad.  This process of 
dichotomisation was eventually eased and largely overturned due to church initiative 
and leadership and in this way, therefore, in Kakuma Refugee Camp the church 
exerted the primary impulses of communal stabilisation.   
As one set of authors stressed, ‘life in Kakuma refugee camp in northern 
Kenya is harsh, dangerous and characterized by social chaos and lack of normal 
social structures.’
207
  To a large extent the church helped regenerate these social 
structures by replicating traditional patterns and practices in a manner that 
transformed ethnic boundaries into a wider social network of ‘southern’ Sudanese.
208
  
This process resulted in both increased peace building initiatives and the re-
categorization of social allegiances and affiliations underpinned by a growing 
perception of ‘Christian’ religiosity.  In a rapidly socially changing milieu the church 
through its recreation of society and approach to peace building formed an important 
bridge ensuring both continuity and adaptability.  While church leaders certainly 
shaped, influenced and at times even lead in this endeavour, the process does not 
reflect the systematic pursuit of an elite agenda.  For as Vernon White notes it is 
‘through the customs, symbols, ceremonies of limited and local organizations we are 
furnished with the imagination and vision necessary to sustain allegiance to broader 
social goals.’
209
  That is, in a war-wearied Kakuma a pre-existing latent desire for 
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social peace found the necessary means and tools to be enacted within the 
ceremonies, teaching and leadership of the local church.   
That the church served as an active conduit for broadening re-identification 
was neither inevitable nor even necessarily predictable.  As particularly the following 
chapter will demonstrate, outside of Kakuma the church did not play as active and 
influential role in developing social consistency.  Within the camp churches 
themselves have not always exemplified a spirit of unity as there have been several 
important cases of church splits in both the ECS and PCOS in relation to the sharing 
of leadership and resources.  Although within Kakuma church leaders have 
responded in joint cooperation during times of intense tribal hostilities, it is critical to 
note that outside of these immediate contexts pastoral cooperation was more 
theoretical than practical.  Just as institutional efforts such as the MBS have failed to 
solidify, there is little joint inter-denominational work initiated by the churches.
210
  
Though there is respect for other denominations, each tends to function within a 
more limited enclave without significant overlap until moments of communal crisis.  
At these moments however, and within Kakuma there were many, the role of the 
church was vital and significant.   
By offering uniting Christian principles, practical training and reflexively 
utilising its own leadership as a model the church bolstered communal stabilisation 
and initiated peace building efforts that substantiated social mores and values.  
Although this effort was supplemented by other agencies such as education and the 
programmes of international NGOs, for Sudanese refugees themselves the church 
shifted to the forefront of society as it was ‘maximally representative of the shared 
social identity and consensual position of the group.’
211
  Though a re-categorisation 
of a new social in-group was perhaps an unintentional by-result, it was a result all the 
same.  As church teaching on ethnicity was imbibed by numerous individuals across 
the ethnic and denominational spectrum it was externalised and applied to life 
conduct within the refugee camp.  While at an individual level this would probably 
not have exerted significant stimulus, collectively, it produced a mass social 
movement with considerable social influence and reverberation.   The level of church 
influence, therefore, is not merely an aggregate of impact on individual lives but in 
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the case of Kakuma, the medium for social re-evaluation and collective movement 
towards re-categorisation resulting in the communal stabilisation of Hong Kong and 
Baghdad and pointing to a third impact on Kakuma Refugee Camp by the local 
churches.   
 
Modelling Social Initiatives  
 
Kakuma is a place as described by one refugee where ‘everything is made 
very difficult for the refugees and you must suffer for any simple thing.’
212
  
Recognising the needs of its local constituents as well as the necessity to help 
members adapt to the demands of the refugee setting churches extended their 
influence as the primary social custodian by providing models for social behaviour in 
two key areas.   
First, the church impacted the broader Kakuma community through economic 
and resource initiatives.  In the PCOS this is illustrated in advice offered by the 
Ruling Elder Samuel Gai Puok during one Sunday morning service.  In addition to 
reminding the congregation about proper seating arrangements during worship, Puok 
instructed the congregation to follow the example and model set by the church by 
filling extra jerry cans with water whenever possible in order to be prepared to ration 
water during this time of shortage for the Nuer community.
213
  Though it was not 
possible to ascertain the impact of this advice on the community it does illustrate the 
point that the church understood its role as one extending into the holistic needs of its 
constituents in a way that combined practical advice with moral adherence to a 
community expressed in Christian manifestations.   
The ECS similarly perceived its role as relating to the multiple segments of 
members’ lives.  As the High Deacon Samuel Deng expressed, ‘[pastors] look in the 
Bible and then they compare it to their culture and to their social and to their 
organisation politically also…  The Bible has relevance culturally, politically, 
socially and also economically.  And when they see that they have the relevance they 
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can conform together and bring together their culture and their life into the Bible.’
214
  
That is, the behaviour in general community life should conform to principles 
established within church circles.  Members of the ECS confirmed that they had 
benefited from this wide purview of the church.  For example one expounded:  
In Kakuma how we are surviving here we are given, somebody is given 5kgs for 16 days.  
This is the raw grain, the raw grains for maize and there is no other item.  And you know the 
church can teach the people you know when you are given this small food this is how you 
manage it and this teaching just spread.  If somebody just tries to survive alone you cannot 
survive.  Because now imagine you divide 5kgs for 16 days you cannot even take the week.  
It is hard.  And now what people could do is they live in community together and now this 
food should be served in the economical way, I mean in common we create our economical 
system so we can survive that way.
215
 
Especially relevant to the thousands of ‘lost boys’ unprepared and unaccustomed to 
handling food division and preparation church guidance offered needed practical 
advice in a context where food scarcity was a legitimate source of concern and a 
physically debilitating factor.  In this instance the church instructed its members to 
pool their rations and share communal meals in order to stretch the provided food.  
According to Garang it was a practice that spread into the community beyond the 
confirmed members of the church.  It furthermore illustrates the observation that 
indigenous individual’s ‘coping skills offer more hope for survival than the logistical 
and political interventions engineered by relief specialists.’
216
   
 All of the interviewed churches also described how tithes and resources 
collected by the church were distributed to help meet community needs.  The PCOS 
regularly accepts food in lieu of money that can then be distributed to the sick and to 
needy Turkana.
217
  James Ateny and Reuben Culdiac emphasised that the SPC 
distributes its tithes to offer ‘domestic help’ such as covering medical costs of the 
sick.
218
  The following exchange among ECS members is also illustrative: 
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Phillip: The church is helping orphans.  They are those people who are being 
 compassionate always.  When there is a small girl, you can even find a small girl like this one 
 there is no mother.  Imagine this girl, how you will imagine this life?  But church is there to 
 support.  There are those people who always came here, blind people but church is taking 20 
 Kenya shillings and giving every Sunday.  [Those] people are supported by the church… 
Gabriel: So the church is looking after orphans and widows because war has killed.  So many 
 women here are widows.  So I think that would be the first mission of the church to look after 
 the widows and the orphans.
219
 
Within Kakuma the church has positioned itself as the cultural custodian concerned 
with group holism.  Through recreating traditional societal patterns and overcoming 
ethnic divisions Kakuma has witnessed the development of new group identification 
on the basis of Christian religiosity.  This re-categorisation is both solidified and 
extended to the benefit of the refugee community through the efforts of the 
individual churches to provide communal guidance and practical advice in economic 
and resource management in addition to installing internal aid mechanisms for 
marginalised members of the community.  The end result is a strengthened Sudanese 
self-identification with the church community and its behavioural assumptions and 
context as well as an increased ability for the church to shape other elements within 
the society.   
 This ability is demonstrated in a second key area: modelling cultural 
developments.  Faced with a barrage of new experiences adapting to the refugee 
setting and to the demands of a progressive social agenda set by international NGOs 
can be trying and culturally stretching.  By tentatively blending traditional norms 
with new and progressive values churches have helped Sudanese refugees in Kakuma 
accept and inculcate these ideals.  This is clearly demonstrated in the area of gender 
equality.  Traditional culture across southern Sudan was broadly patriarchal.  Women 
were given few opportunities for public leadership or equal access to education.  As 
Marisan San Deng described, ‘traditionally women were not allowed to say anything 
before men.’
220
  The international regime administering Kakuma however would 
radically challenge these notions demanding not only equal opportunity but also 
equal voice.  Teresa Bul Chan the Chair Lady for the Nuer Community responding to 
a question concerning the origin of gender equality explained:  
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The idea [came] from UN and the workers of the UNHCR.  Why it is coming up, it was at 
the time of the meetings of the community leaders.  The first time only men were attending 
the meetings and the UN asked them, “Where is the lady?  Why do you come always without 
the ladies?  And then the ladies should be balanced.”  And then they grow up that idea; they 
bring it up in detail.  The UN said, “I need the gender balance.  If the men attend, the women 
should be attend[ing]…”  They opened high school for ladies alone.  Yes.  They opened an 




While churches have not been at the forefront of gender equality they have played a 
role in helping Sudanese culture adapt and implement this policy thereby expanding 
the number impacted by this development.  Chan continued on, ‘the church does not 
play any role in the community to help lift up the women but except if there are some 
activities that need to be carried out in the church.’
222
  That is though the church does 
not pursue an active development of gender equality, as it has done in ethnic re-
orientation, the churches have responded by increasing the participation of women in 
involvement and leadership in a manner that to a certain extent functions as a public 
staging ground.  Women have been given positions of leadership from church deacon 
to congregational pastor and among the ECS even Deacon.  Having received 
funding, in the spring of 2006 the PCOS was using the Mothers’ Union network to 
launch a special English course just for women with no corresponding male 
counterpart.
223
  Interviewed male church leaders were certainly familiar with and 
sensitive to issues related to gender development.  As the following quote notes; 
however there are still numerous challenges: 
We have so many problems in the camp as women…  We may have the two ways that we 
 should come up as women.  One, in the church we may come up and the second way is 
 education.  Education, if we got better education we may come up more than the men so that 
 we may do all those things that are done by men.  And even we can be good but because we 
 lack water that is why you see our minds are taking on what should you do tomorrow for 
 your children?  The clothes are dirty, the climate is hot and everything is confusing for what 
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 you want to do.  But it is destroying what you may get from the church and the way you are 
 lifted up yourself in education is very hard for us.  We face many problems.
224
   
The above highlights three relevant issues.  First, the church is playing a role in 
helping the women ‘come up.’  Second, this role is secondary to the significance and 
impact of education.  Third, although deeply desiring equality, women are 
disproportionably affected by problems within the camp in a way that threatens to 
overwhelm the small achievements already made.    
 The record of the church in gender equality is therefore equivocal.  In 
Kakuma churches have offered women leadership positions and due to the wide 
impact of the church more public prestige.  Importantly the church has helped the 
refugee community internalise gender equality ideals originating from the UNHCR 
and international NGOs.  However this development has certainly not been an active 
component of primary concern and great disparity still exists.  As Mary Akop 
lamented, ‘even in the church now we are still behind.  Yes, when you compare men 
and women even in the church where people should be equal but we are still behind, 
we the women because we don’t get education.’
225
  While the church has provided a 
limited model for this social initiative the church should more critically assess the 
existing inequities and actively develop strategies pursuing full human equality and 
development as it has in other areas.   In this respect limited models, important as 
they are, are not sufficient to meet the challenges of long-standing cultural disparity.   
 In addition to gender equality there are a number of other socially progressive 
issues that the church sought to emulate and in a limited way stretch traditional 
cultural boundaries.  For example teaching procured through the PCOS helped at 
least some members address issues of age inequality.  Referring to his experience 
prior to arrival at Kakuma, Neville Lado Lok noted, ‘by that time also the young 
people like us could not go out into the public or talk where people are gathering but 
now because the church has come into our place we know that everybody has the 
right to talk and to say what he has or what he wants to tell the people.’
226
  In the 
Equatorian community, the Catholic congregation of Christ the King stages dramas 
about HIV/AIDS that stretches traditional taboos related to the public discourse on 
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sexuality by disseminating much needed information concerning this growing 
disease.
227
  In relation to education, open Monday through Saturday, the ECS 
maintains eight public libraries spread throughout the camp based at various 
Episcopal chapels.
228
  The Catholic charity Don Bosco has opened the camp’s only 
post High School educational facility.  Located almost in the geographical centre of 
the camp Don Bosco trains men and women, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, in a 
number of vocational skills ranging from computers to carpentry and electricity so 
that ‘pupils should go and rebuild south Sudan.’
229
  Perhaps unintentionally, by 
enabling greater educational access churches are further validating a communal shift 
in perceived leadership qualifications that reinforces a growing age and gender 
equality. 
In these ways the church has responded to outside stimulants by incorporating 
broader ideals into the life and practice of the church in a limited way.  By 
themselves the individual impact of these efforts are probably not significant.  They 
do however illustrate several important realities.  First, it demonstrates that while the 
church is concerned with the spiritual needs of its constituents, it is also interested in 
the much broader physical and social needs of the community.  Second, by 
incorporating these external ideals, even if in a limited way, the church offers the 
community a possible model of cultural adaptability.  It furthermore moves a 
culturally relevant debate to a much broader societal base thereby increasing 
accessibility.  It confirms an observation made by Agnes Callamard that ‘local agents 
are not passive subjects of social change imposed by outsiders and “external” forces, 
but that they are able to transform supra-local influences and forces into local 
forms.’
230
  In Kakuma the church more than any other agency serves as this bridge of 
translation and transformation.  Alongside other forms of cultural recreation and 
successful endeavours to enact peace building mechanisms in Kakuma, the church 
reinforces among Sudanese themselves a holistic life framework at the forefront of 
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needed cultural continuity and adaptation.  That is in an environment conducive to 
traditional cultural erosion, the church has encouraged revitalisation.
231
   
 An important corollary rationale to this reinvigoration has been the ability of 
the church, particularly the ECS, to help refugees reinterpret their situation in a 
meaningful and hope inducing manner.  As one individual maintained, ‘if you have 
suffered you will be blessed…  You have suffered; you will get back what you have 
suffered.’
232
  For many Sudanese the symbolism of the cross further demonstrates 
that blessing is linked to suffering.  Replicas of the cross are found throughout the 
camp, widely used in worship services and frequently mentioned as a significant 
theological component.  At one level this focus on the cross represents an 
acknowledgment of death in a war-saturated context that borders on preoccupation as 
death becomes externally symbolised and lifted to the air during worship.  At another 
level however, it should not be understood as a macabre fascination with death itself 
but as a symbol ultimately carrying a meaning of victory, hope, purpose and 
regeneration.  It thus conveys the precarious position of southern Sudanese refugees: 
finding hope in the midst of death.  As Rachel Majok expressed, ‘suffering gives 
people a strong heart and faith.’
233
  The cross – suffering followed by victory – also 
serves as an idealised response.  It is impossible to miss the imagery of southern 
Sudanese waving a symbol of death in the air during worship services reminding 
external observers of the tenuous Sudanese situation while also giving 
encouragement to internal participants to continue in the path laid before them.  The 
symbolism of the cross then is equally witness to the outside world about the plight 
of Sudan, reminder to internal participants and a hope inspiring interpretation of 
strength and meaning.   
 The ability to grieve with hope can be clearly witnessed in the response of the 
churches to the sudden death of John Garang in 2005.
234
  Daniel Aketch explained: 
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In the Episcopal Church when people are suffering like when Dr Garang passed away you 
know what Episcopal Church does?  People come together and they sit and they arrange how 
can we counsel the people through this, people are now hopeless and people are feeling that 
there is no more hope.  So what the Episcopal Church organised, they said that we should 
move around the camp informing people that anything that happens God has a purpose...  So 
when people are suffering we say, Jesus said, “don’t worry about today or even tomorrow, 
God has a plan for tomorrow…”  So as an Episcopal we greet people so that they know God 
has a plan for them.
235
   
In a tense situation that could have easily degenerated into conflict, especially with 
neighbouring Somali refugees, church leadership moved throughout the camp 
participating in communal mourning and pointing to a broader purpose in a way that 
helped refugees focus on meaning and hope.  The above also represents the ability of 
the church to translate external events and ideals into internal realities in a method 
that allowed ongoing cultural adaptation and productivity with hope inspiring 
resonance.   
 
Analysis and Conclusion  
 
Sudanese refugees in Kakuma Refugee Camp have experienced intense and 
rapid cultural confrontations.  Many in Kakuma underwent a horrendous ordeal of 
trekking hundreds of miles through wilderness and burning sun helplessly watching 
as friends and family fell victim along the way.  Anticipated safety in reaching the 
camp proved equally elusive as Kakuma betrayed the expectation of security.   Food 
scarcity, hostile relations, debilitating climate, stripped dignity and loss of culture 
rippled shockwaves in the gathering community.  It is in this context that the 
churches within Kakuma proved a powerful and potent force.   
In the first instance churches offered a means of recreating society.   
Churches allowed Sudanese to organise themselves following patterns that reflected 
traditional values, principles and leadership priorities.  Age-groupings and traditional 
patterns of proper social interaction and arrangements were loosely reconstituted in 
public and well attended worship services.  Ceremonies, symbols, mourning rituals 
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and celebratory events further confirmed that the church more than any other local 
initiative was helping refugees create continuity critical to healthy development.   
While expected that traditional religious practices and societal compositions 
would factor into contemporary Christian practice, in Kakuma this appears to be 
more a reflexive reaction than an intentional theological incorporation.
236
  Beyond 
hot topic issues like marital customs, church leaders do not appear to be theologically 
reflecting on contemporary practices and arrangements.  This is in part because of 
the scarcity of leaders commissioned to help individuals transition into full 
membership.  Among the main PCOS congregation in Zone 5 for example, church 
attendance regularly averages over 1000 adults.  Only 384 are members of good 
standing
237
 and only evangelist John Riak is commissioned to prepare individuals for 
membership.
238
  The PCOS is certainly not alone in having an extensive membership 
process.  In the ECS tradition it can take two to three years making the SPC appear 
relatively quick at an average of six months.
239
  In addition to expanding trained 
pastoral leadership, churches would benefit from a quicker membership process that 
taught candidates basic theological tenets and church doctrines.  Though culturally 
sensitive biblical discernment is inherently difficult, the churches in Kakuma should 
engage in a more responsible theological assimilation.
240
  All the same, within the 
refugee camp the churches ability to recreate society has ultimately resulted in 
cultural continuity and communal stability.   
The church has secondly beneficially impacted Kakuma by working to build 
peace within the public sphere.   Challenging traditional patterns of ethnic exclusivity 
internal pastoral leadership supplemented by external resource networks utilised their 
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offices to demonstrate the feasibility of peaceful cultural exchange and interaction.  
Pastoral teaching emphasising collective ‘Christian’ identity broadened local 
affiliations and therefore reciprocity and responsibility.  At least initially initiated by 
church leadership, other groups such as inter-tribal women prayer groups and 
numerous individuals, further encouraged by education and urbanisation, themselves 
became the guardians of local peace that transformed an explosively hostile 
environment.   
Dichotomised into the competing segments of Hong Kong and Baghdad, the 
churches response to destabilising clashes was critical in overcoming Kakuma 
polarisation though this response was often reactionary rather than proactive.  For the 
most part institutional efforts to congeal inter-communal bonds and inter-
denominational joint relationships have faltered outside of the context of emotive 
response to pressing difficulty.  Solidifying bonds of mutual rapport necessitates 
more consistent and creative deliberations on the basis of a deeper exploration of 
cultural differences, historical memories and contemporary political possibilities.  
Appealing to a vague shared Christian religiosity has proved an effective 
psychological process that made ‘social cohesion, co-operation and influence 
possible.’
241
  However this appears to be in some senses a collective and shallow 
veneer laid over deeper divisions in order to facilitate peaceful coexistence.  While 
important as a preparatory stage it is unclear that shared relationships on this basis 
alone will extend beyond the refugee experience.  Nonetheless, in Kakuma the 
churches did build peaceful bridges between Hong Kong and Baghdad resulting in a 
more peaceful and united society on the basis of a new group categorisation and 
collective in-group.   
The churches third impact on Kakuma was the modelling of social initiatives.  
Concerned with the holistic needs of the community the purview of the church 
extended to multiple areas of member’s lives including economic and resource 
distribution.  Progressive ideals originating from outside the community were also 
tentatively modelled.  For example, criteria related to gender equality had little to no 
equivalent within traditional Sudanese society.  Exposed to international NGOs and 
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effectively forced to exist within their parameters, churches helped begin the process 
of internalising some of these understandings.  For the most part this agenda did not 
originate within the church nor was it diligently pursued, as were efforts to ease 
ethnic boundaries.  Furthermore within at least some of the churches debate was 
discouraged in lieu of conformity to schemas already set and to the primary benefit 
of existing male leadership.  One ECS gentleman said for example, ‘we have what 
are called church doctrines.  That is the ECS doctrine.  Those are rules that should be 
followed.  Whether you use your mother tongue you have to translate and follow 
those rules…  They cannot be missed, the church doctrines.’
242
  Churches within 
Kakuma need to more adequately engage through internal introspection and 
reflection a wider discourse even when it contests existing positions of leadership.   
With that understanding, however, the limited models set by the churches 
were advantageous to the broader society as it exposed a greater number of 
individuals to the dialogue.  In addition, as efficacy dictates that ‘the refugee needs to 
be a full participant in the formulation and reformulation of culture,’ the churches 
provided the only internally demarcated and administered social organisation where 
such models could be pursued to any great extent.
243
  In a culturally disruptive setting 
the limited models enacted within the churches prevented stagnation by encouraging 
a cultural revitalisation and an empowering hope-inspired understanding of the war 
and refugee setting.   
 The church therefore exerted an important and significant influence on 
Kakuma Refugee Camp.  Churches, though not alone in their efforts, directly 
contributed to the development of physical peace and safety, encouraged cultural 
growth and provided the means for social stability and hope.  The church 
furthermore built a new in-group categorisation on the basis of a loosely Christian 
civil religion extending between the various southern Sudanese tribes distributed 
throughout each of the camp zones.  As the basis of a newly developing civil 
religion, within Kakuma, Christianity provided a ‘set of values and symbols which 
nearly everyone holds in common and to which everyone responds similarly.’
244
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This civil religion is a result of and a partial explanatory factor for the high impact of 
the local churches on the refugee camp and should be understood not as a set and 
controlling agenda but an underlying Sudanese sentiment only loosely Christian with 
at least one important result: greater political peace in the camp.
245
   
Over and over focus group participants, church leaders and elected local 
political representatives acknowledged the deep impact of the church on the refugee 
camp.  Alanya Joseph the Equatorian Chairman for example noted, ‘I think the 
church has contributed in the community… They contributed a lot.’
246
  Peter Kwent 
the Bentiu Community Chairman among the Nuer explained that, ‘church leaders 
also and the church elders they are involved… especially when there is a big problem 
in the community…  The elders who are in the community and the pastors who are in 
the community can join together to solve that problem together.  They play a large 
role in the community.’
247
     
The strength of the influence of the church is clearly illustrated in the 
projected perception concerning the number of Christians within the camp.  Though 
estimates varied as to the percentage of Christians within the camp, the average 
number offered by Sudanese was around seventy-five percent.  While the smallest 
number given was fifty percent, numerous individuals emphasised that a great many 
more than seventy-five percent were Christian.  One young Dinka man enthused, ‘I 
am 100% [sure] where I am living we are all Christians.’
248
  When the Nuer court 
was asked to agree or disagree with this sentiment the head chief responded, ‘we say 
that everybody is a Christian.  But if you go the village you can get some non-
Christians.’
249
  The secretary of the court affirmed this perspective stating, ‘we have 
the mind of saying that we are all Christians.’
250
  Certainly this is not the full picture 
as realistically it can be assumed that a number of individuals choose not to identify 
with Christianity.  Limitations regarding the utilised methodology and ability to 
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communicate in ethnic dialects in addition to perceived dangers of admitting 
traditional practice, such as the need to occasionally perform acts outside of the 
camp, prevented a fuller exploration of this issue.  What is of relevance is the 
perceived conformity to Christianity even when church leaders admitted that some 
individuals attending their congregation may not actually be practicing Christians.  
Only in Kakuma did such a strong perception of Christianity exist.  In every other 
context visited and studied Christians freely acknowledged limitations to the 
Christian community and readily pointed out individuals who were not Christians.  In 
none of the other contexts would the words of John Garang have been affirmed, 
‘those people who are not converted they don’t have churches I could say maybe yes, 
though I cannot give an example of who and who and where does he worship.  I 
cannot give an example.  But the church has influenced people at the high range.’
251
  
This speaks to the strength of Christianity and the extent to which it forms a civil 
religion within Kakuma Camp.  As Stephen Ellis and Gerrie Ter Haar note, ‘If 
enough individuals collectively undergo a personal experience of change sufficiently 
profound as to alter their very perception of who they really are… then the whole 
society may be said to have undergone a type of transformation… not merely a 
change but a qualitative re-ordering, a transformation.’
252
  That is in Kakuma 
Refugee Camp while there are certainly individuals who are not Christian, the 
perceived strength and affiliation with Christianity testifies to a radically re-
categorised in-group on the basis of a transforming Christian civil religion.   
Though there are a number of reasons why Christianity has developed along 
these lines, as will be explored in Chapter Four, there is one particular rationale 
unique to Kakuma and relevant to understanding the strong development of 
Christianity throughout the camp.  For the raison d'être of the camp – the sudden 
influx of thousands of ‘lost boys’ – is embedded in a mass social movement towards 
Christianity with roots that stretch to Ethiopia and an army of boys.    
Drawn, forced or otherwise captured, an estimated 12,000 boys based in 
Ethiopia trained for the liberation of their nation.  Alongside this children’s army 
toiled a second force with little fanfare or connection to the broader world: the 
Sudanese church.  Throughout the 1980s thousands of these boys turned to the 
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churches in large baptismal services joining the youth groups of especially the ECS 
and PCOS finding meaning and deeper camaraderie.
253
  The fall of Mengistu in 1991 
saw the sudden expulsion of southern Sudanese refugees from Ethiopia.  Having no 
where to go and no one to look after them many of these boys travelled as a group 
through hundreds of miles to Kenya and a refugee camp quickly designed to 
accommodate them by mid 1992.  For many of the orphaned thousands that survived 
the ordeal ‘their faith, their comradeship and the faithfulness of a Father God gave 
them a new sense of family, of belonging and of purpose.’
254
   
The degree to which Kakuma is a unique setting sharply influenced from the 
very foundation and inception of the camp by a strong and persevering Christian 
spirituality cannot be overemphasised.  The total disruption of social values and 
norms and loss of older male custodians and guardians radically altered the 
possibility of development that simply would not have been present in other settings.  
The influx of boys committed to each other, to unity and to the Bible would 
profoundly shape the character and context of Kakuma even as other refugees 
flocked to the camp.  As many of these individuals are now in their late twenties and 
thirties and beginning families of their own, the effect will continue to be far 
reaching and ensures that within Kakuma, Christianity will continue to function as an 
active and shaping civil religion.  This is summarised in the words of one of these 
young men, John Garang: 
As you heard we were called lost boys.  First of all we left many of our brothers and old 
mothers… but we heard that there is a God and a new life and we changed from African 
Traditional to what, to Christianity.  So mostly it was initiated from that time up to this time.  
It has given us the courage to take the lead and how to [lead] our people.
255
   
 Imbibed from the inception of Kakuma, Christianity has played a powerful 
role within the camp.  It has helped recreate traditional patterns of society, built links 
of political peace and modelled needed social agendas.  The church has created 
continuity, encouraged adaptability, developed a peaceful re-categorisation of ethnic 
perceptions, inspired hope and offered stability.  While Christianity is certainly only 
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one discourse in the camp it is the predominant narrative.
256
  One final illustration 
will demonstrate the ability of the churches to blend boundaries and extend political 
identification in the midst of a harsh reality.
257
   
In 2005 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees gifted a number of bicycles 
to the Chairman of the Nuer community.  Bicycles represent the primary mode of 
transportation and a significant means of income.  They were to be distributed fairly 
throughout the community but were instead allocated solely to the extended family 
members of the political leadership.  This action caused great anger and exacerbated 
a difficult situation.  Feeling slighted the intended recipients decided to ‘beat the 
Chairman’ but ‘the Chairman also [had his] clan.’  The area quickly divided into 
competing segments that spilled into armed conflict that rocked Zone 5 for several 
days and resulted in several deaths.  Kenyan police managed to separate the fighting 
groups but ‘separation of the problem is not the solution of the problem’ and the 
LWF security forces and peace and reconciliation programme refused to get 
involved.  Recognising the tenuous nature of the problem church leaders decided to 
convene a special meeting that brought together all of the pastoral leadership across 
the denominations throughout the zone.  The meeting was further supported by the 
presence of PCOS leadership from Lokichogio who came to reinforce the local 
ministers.  During the meeting the church leaders declared the current political 
leadership invalid and created an interdenominational committee to recollect the 
bicycles.  As one member of the appointed committee noted, ‘we need to organize 
ourselves for all these clashes because tribalism is something [you] need to think 
about it.  Why, how can we take it away?  How are we going to take it?  It is like a 
disease.  So if you don’t have the medicine for the disease it will kill you.  But if you 
have the medicine then… it will go away.’
258
  After recollecting the bicycles the 
committee redistributed them equitably, held a new specially called election and 
elected a new chairman for the community.  These efforts ended the violence, 
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achieved peace and solidified the importance of good governance in the community.  
In this way the sole Baptist pastor in Kakuma came to be the chairman of the second 
largest ethnicity in the camp.   
The above story indicates that the church is able to cross numerous 
boundaries within the refugee camp on behalf of extending peace between and within 
Hong Kong and Baghdad.  It illustrates one example of a successful effort by 
collective inter-denominational church leadership to increase political identification 
and model the social agenda of good governance.  It also reveals the extent to which 
the community cedes moral authority and legitimacy to church leaders in a society 
underpinned by a Christian influenced civil religion.  Finally, it foreshadows broader 
church developments within southern Sudan and as discussed in later chapters: 
continued the building of a loose civil religion, serving as bridge between oppressed 
civilians and the government and striving for peace while demanding democratic 
change.  Unique to Kakuma Refugee Camp, the heartland for Sudanese refugees, the 
church was at the forefront of social cohesion, communal stabilisation and peace and 
societal development.   
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Chapter Three 
Internally Displaced and Ugandan Refugees 
 
A.  On the Dusty Trails: The Internally Displaced of Khartoum 
 
‘The displaced people… they were taken away from the cities to so called displaced 
camps.  They were just like the camps in the Second World War which were called 




‘Many people came to Christ here.  Before they were not Christians, they did not 
believe, but when they moved here they were under a difficult position in the 





 Located on the confluence of the muddy banks of the Blue and White Nile 
hundreds of thousands of southern Sudanese struggle in the shadows of a Khartoum 
that represents both the oasis of secure modernity and the dryness of segregated 
racial disintegration intimately tied to a long memory of ancestral slavery.
261
  Though 
slavery has long since ceased to officially exist its currents still permeate this capital 
city.  As one scholar noted, ‘the issues here relate to colour, race, 
superiority/inferiority – the whole nexus of ideas and prejudices that can be 
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subsumed under the rubric, racism.  Northern Sudanese society is profoundly racist 
and colour-conscious.’
262
   
Outside observers often query the enigma of a flowering Khartoum in the 
midst of what has been viewed as an ‘ignorant,’ ‘misguided,’ ‘warlike’ or more 
recently ‘oppressed’ rural population.  Dated only in brand names, one early 
missionary described, ‘Khartoum is quite a modern city…  You can, at a price, get 
everything you need for living in the Sudan – groceries and dress suits, golf clubs 
and enamel ware… and some very good local apologies for “Woolworths.”’
263
  Just 
as accurate today one travelogue near the turn of the twentieth century described, 
‘here were Arabs of all shades of colour from ebony black to white.  Negroes of 
many tribes.  Mohammedans nearly all…  White seemed to be the prevailing colour 
for the men, while most of the women were draped in two-piece garments of a 
curious shade of soft blue.’
264
  Modern day Khartoum continues this legacy of mixed 
luxury.  As haboob’s swirl on the desert edge the elite few and foreign expatriates 
enjoy espressos and ice cream at the Ozone café, drive in new $165,000 BMWs and 
surf wireless internet and satellite TV on flat panel plasma screens.
265
  The 
Economist perhaps summed this best, “Khartoum: An Island Unto Itself.”
266
   
If Khartoum is an island it is a small one sitting on a turbulent volcano.  The 
nearly two million southern Sudanese displaced by war, poverty and hunger are 
neither welcome or if possible, even noticed.
267
  Forced to the margins the displaced 
often live far from the cultural and economic hubs that comprise the triad of greater 
Khartoum: Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman.   In a programme called 
kasha the Government of Sudan sought to undermine security by bulldozing southern 
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encampments, forcibly relocating displaced to increasingly distant settings and 
targeted destruction of church buildings.  One scholar noted that between April 1991 
and 1993 more than 400,000 displaced individuals were forced to flee into the desert 
areas outside of greater Khartoum.
268
  A UN report noted that in August 2006 
without warning the Government of Sudan demolished 12,000 homes in the 
displaced camp of Dar Assalam.
269
  Even when forced to begrudgingly acknowledge 
the existence of IDP camps, ‘the government was unwilling to provide such services 
lest the displaced get the wrong idea that their occupation of these parts of the cities 
was condoned by the government.’
270
  Bona Malwal, the former editor-in-chief of 
The Sudan Times, a daily English newspaper in Khartoum emphasised:  
If the government of the northern community were to regard these people, [southerners], as 
Sudanese citizens of the same country as people for whom they must care, the impact on the 
rest of the country would have been stunning.  But these people are not seen like that.  These 
are wretched, poor, hungry people who live on the outskirts of Khartoum and are viewed by 
the northern Sudanese as different from them.
271
 
Racial feelings of disdain mingled with fear enabled the government to utilise the 
presence of the displaced as a political means of shoring support for an increasingly 
costly war against southerners often portrayed as subjects to external influence eager 
for northern rescuing.  Political calculations underlined by racial and religious 
machinations, therefore, resulted in a systemic psychological reinforcement of 
minority status to southern Sudanese displaced to their capital city.   
In 1989 as an ideological wall was demolished in Berlin, the National Islamic 
Front (NIF) was quietly laying the foundation for a religious movement that would 
soon have global reverberations.
272
  Standing behind these efforts seasoned in 
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political realities and with a reputation of scholarly religious innovation was Hassan 
al-Turabi and he brought to the militarily-backed ruler Omar Bashir two committed 
rising stars: Ali Osman Taha and Nafi Ali Nafi.  As the NIF struggled to establish 
Islamic purity in governance, the next decade in Sudan witnessed the bloodiest 
escalation of the war in the south and the most intense repression of southerners 
displaced to Khartoum.
273
    
Beginning in Khartoum this new government commenced a policy of internal 
realignment and repression to enforce an ideologically Islamic-driven agenda.  
Towards this end multiple internal security agencies were established such as the 
Amm ath Thwara which had ‘their own arms networks and command operations, and 
[were] generally responsible for the practice of detainment-release-redetainment in 
unofficial prisons (“ghost houses”) that has characterized NIF’s response to its 
opponents.’
274
  By 1993 Nafi was overseeing State Security and forty-two known 
‘ghost houses’ in Khartoum alone.
275
   
Turabi focused on external relations attempting to secure for himself and 
Sudan a prominent role in the Middle Eastern world by using Sudan as a sanctuary 
for worldwide militant Islamists.
276
  In 1991 Hamas opened an office in Khartoum 
and at Turabi’s invitation Osama bin Laden moved to Sudan ‘[marrying] Turabi’s 
                                                 
273
 For Turabi’s pragmatic Islamic ideology and political ascendancy see Abdelwahab El-Affendi, 
Turabi’s Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan (London: Grey Seal, 1991); Raghid El-Solh, “Islamist 
Attitudes Towards Democracy: A Review of the Ideas of Al-Ghazali, Al-Turabi and ‘Amara,” British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 20, no. 1 (1993): 57-63.  Turabi appears to have been particularly 
influenced by his 1960s doctoral education in law at La Sorbonne, Paris.   
274
 T. Abdou Maliqalim Simone, In Whose Image? Political Islam and Urban Practices in Sudan 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 64. 
275
 Ann Mosely Lesch, The Sudan – Contested National Identities (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1998), 137.   
276
 Historically Riverine elite have attempted to associate themselves with the broader Middle Eastern 
region.  For key contemporary developments related to this region see Peter Mansfield, A History of 
the Middle East (London: Viking, 1991; reprint, London: Penguin Books, 2003), 339-406 (page 
citations are to the reprint edition).  Sudanese, however, have often been marginalised by the Middle 
Eastern region: ‘Northerner’s think of themselves as Arabs, whereas the Arabs think otherwise.’  Al-
Baqira al-Afif Mukhtar, “The Crisis of Identity in Northern Sudan: A Dilemma of a Black People with 
a White Culture,” a paper presented at the CODESRIA African Humanities Institute tenured by the 
Programme of African Studies at Northwestern University (undated and unpublished), p. 11, Centre 
for Documentation and Advocacy, Nairobi.  For example, due to Khartoum’s support of Iraq during 
the Gulf War Saudi Arabia expelled all Sudanese immigrants.  David Pratten, Return to the Roots? 
Migration, Local Institutions and Development in Sudan (Edinburgh: Centre of African Studies, 
University of Edinburgh, 2000), 27. 
   88
niece as his third wife.’
277
  By the middle of the 90s Turabi had bridged the divide 
between Iraq and Iran forming an ‘Iraq-Iran-Sudan axis… forged by secret 
agreements’
278
 as well as ‘[brokering] a truce between al Qaeda and Saddam.’
279
  
This allegiance freed the Sudanese government to purchase weapons and vengefully 
pursue its own civil war.   
Interpersonal rivalries centred on several key events, however, began 
unravelling the internal unity of Bashir, Turabi, Taha and Nafi.  In 1994 Bashir 
extracted significant military-support enhancements from the French government in 
exchange for Illich Ramirez Sanchez.  Known worldwide as ‘Carlos the Jackal,’ 
Sanchez had been personally invited and settled in Khartoum by Turabi and Nafi.   
In 1995 Taha and Nafi helped plan and pay for a failed assassination attempt 
on the Egyptian President Mubarak in Addis Ababa.
280
  This coincided with an 
increasingly desperate financial situation in Khartoum that forced the internal 
security apparatus under Nafi to use deadly force to suppress a riot of 15,000 
students.
281
  Re-evaluating the political situation Bashir fired Nafi and a year later 
forced bin Laden to leave Sudan on 18 May 1995.   
In 1996 Turabi was appointed Speaker of the Parliament shifting his attention 
to the Sudanese political situation and repositioning Nafi within the NIF political 
organisation.  Already isolated internationally, for Bashir the final straw came in 
August 1998 when the United States bombed the al-Shifa chemical plant based on 
the outskirts of Khartoum on accusations that the plant was producing VX nerve 
gas.
282
  By the end of the following year Turabi was arrested, Taha had been 
promoted to first vice president and Nafi was retained in the NIF political party 
apparatus.  Bashir, with reconfirmed support from the military, repositioned Sudan 
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economically, internationally, militarily and though still committed to Islamic 
primacy, less concerned with strict Islamic purity.   
This period of attempted purification and internal Islamic realignment 
affected southern Sudanese displaced to Khartoum in several key ways.  First, as 
already noted, Khartoum’s displaced were subjected to intermittent seizures and 
destruction of property.  As one long-term critic living in Khartoum noted, ‘it is now 
the rule, rather than the exception, for public funds and property to be 
misappropriated.’
283
  One result was that ‘refugees in Khartoum were from time to 
time rounded up and evicted to the countryside.’
284
  This policy stood in stark 
contrast to the government’s treatment of neighbouring refugees seeking safety in 
Sudan
285
 and was part of a broader strategy to intentionally undermine and 
destabilise southern economies and environments.
286
   
Second, southerners routinely faced harassment, imprisonment and with 
forced economic exclusion, sustenance on irregular petty jobs, crime, sex and the 
selling of alcohol.  Many southern Sudanese women turned to brewing as a means of 
basic provision.  Criminalised under sharia the NIF unleashed a fury of internal 
cleansing in order to establish social purity with women caught selling beer usually 
beaten and fined.  Police either confiscated monetary or material goods to pay the 
fine or subjected the women with whatever small children and infants were present to 
harsh indeterminate lengths of imprisonment.
287
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A third impact on displaced Sudanese in Khartoum was the prevention of 
extended external aid and services from NGOs 
and the UN by the Government of Sudan.
288
  
Admittedly though the UNHCR has attempted 
to resist the incorporation of IDPs into its 
mandate,
289
 Sudan, at the time hosting the 
‘world’s largest internally displaced population’ 
was an exception.
290
  There was however one 
important exemption to the government’s 
external blockade: Middle Eastern Islamic 
charities.  These NGOs were allowed complete 
access with the hope that food relief, medical 
aid and minor material distribution would be 
accompanied by Islamic conversion.   
 
Largely funded by external donors the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) was 
also allowed to provide a limited number of services to the internally displaced.  For 
example, one 1996 report described that during the first six months the eight SCC 
clinics in greater Khartoum had an ‘average attendance per clinic per day from 90-
150 patients with a total of 52,989 cases.’
291
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 Though the SCC was present its influence was limited and its activities were 
monitored.
292
  This was part of an effort by the Government of Sudan to 
psychologically impose its dominance on southerners while weakening venues of 
resistance and removing barriers to Islamic advancement.  As Lillian Craig Harris, 
the wife of a recent British Ambassador to Sudan avowed, ‘what does exist is 
widespread opportunistic violence against the helpless by those in positions of 
power.’
293
  This is clearly elucidated in the destruction of church buildings and 
property among the displaced in Khartoum.  For example, ‘it was in Karton Kassala 
[Hajj Yusuf] that a road was built through 20 preaching and teaching centres of the 
Catholic Church.  It seems to have been deliberate to run a road which went through 
20 centres located in different areas.’
294
  Though there are a number of examples of 
targeted church property destruction 
analysing one occasion will suffice.
295
   
 All Saints Cathedral is located 
on Street One, Amarat section directly 
across from a restaurant called 
‘Delicious.’
296
  All Saints is the 
predominant Episcopal worship centre 
in Khartoum comprised almost entirely 
of displaced southerners.  On New 
Year’s Eve 2006 All Saints held a 
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midnight ‘watch service,’ an event peacefully practiced for more than twenty-two 
consecutive years, though on this occasion four police cars positioned themselves so 
that they faced the main entrance to the Cathedral.  About twenty minutes after 
midnight gun shots were heard outside the church and several minutes later as 
George Maker, Secretary for First Vice President Salva Kiir stood to read the 
evening’s first scripture a tear gas canister was launched into the Cathedral.   
 Panicking, many within the congregation rushed for the back door leading 
through Canon Sylvester Thomas’ office.  In their haste several individuals were 
knocked down and trampled as others raced for safety.  In full vestments Thomas 
rushed towards the entrance of the Cathedral to speak to what was now obviously 
police continuing to shoot into All Saints.  As he ran he saw a small boy sitting in a 
plastic chair hit directly in the stomach by a tear gas canister knocking him to the 
ground and setting the chair on fire.  Several fragments from the canister lodged in 
his legs requiring medical attention.  After briefly stopping to help, Thomas reached 
the police, demanded that they desist and then called the local branch of the SPLA on 
his mobile.  When the police heard this conversation they quickly retreated to their 
cars and left the scene.  Within twenty minutes SPLA members had arrived in 
civilian clothes and deployed themselves around the Cathedral compound remaining 
throughout the night patrolling, as did several hundred members of the congregation.   
 Altogether the police fired ten tear gas canisters into the packed Cathedral 
from a distance of less than twelve feet.  Inspection the following morning also 
revealed the presence of several bullets shot from a pistol into the congregation.  The 
sound system, the Cathedral’s only computer and a number of pews and chairs were 
ruined by the attack leading to approximately 3,500-4,000 worth of damage.   
 The day after the incident the Deputy Governor arrived and spoke to a group 
gathered outside the sanctuary explaining that the police were chasing some youths 
causing trouble that had run into the sanctuary.  Thomas disputed this claim 
explaining that individuals at the door noted no such young men entering the 
sanctuary and that furthermore, although the attackers were in a police car, their 
uniform was not that of the police but of one of the Popular Defence Forces.  Despite 
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an investigation, evidence collected and a promise given to repay the damage, 
nothing concrete has yet transpired and no money has been received by All Saints.
297
  
 In a letter written to the Governor of Khartoum State, Right Reverend Ezekiel 
Kondo, ECS Bishop of the Diocese of Khartoum, noted that this was not the first 
attack on the Cathedral:  
The ECS/Diocese of Khartoum has passed through very difficult times as you remember in 
2001 during Easter Celebration, when the police forces attacked “All Saints Cathedral” with 
hundred troops and as a result of that “156” people were sentenced to prison, nine (9) girls 
were lashed, one person lost his right eye and one person lost his right hand by “hand 
grenade”, let alone the emotional effects.  Many were traumatized because of these events.
298
 
 The above highlights several interrelated themes pertinent to displaced 
southerners in Khartoum.  First, in spite of recent positive developments towards 
religious freedom, persecution and harassment remains latently present with sporadic 
outbreaks in violence.  Second, multiple security agencies with competing loyalties 
to feuding governmental officials sufficiently obscure judicial proceedings granting 
even low-level officers virtual immunity.  This trend has been recently compounded 
by the development of more extreme Islamic elements within Khartoum.
299
  Third, 
displaced southerners subjected to constant racial inequities live as a powerless 
subset with a negative social categorisation involving ethnic, economic and religious 
elements constantly imposed on them.  For southerners the cumulative result is a 
disjointed experience, the reinforced ‘otherness’ of minority status and constant fear 
of detention, torture and robbery preventing development of connected stability 
despite years of residence.  Ultimately however, this constant repression stimulated 
the growth of the church and the utilisation of Christianity as a vehicle for cultural 
endurance and sanctity as well as a means for expressing resistant communal 
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politicisation.  This development is clearly demonstrated among displaced 
southerners grouped into one corner of greater Khartoum.   
  
Hajj Yusuf: From ‘Carton’ Kassala Squatter Settlement to Hai El Baraka, ‘The 
Place of Blessing’ 
 
 The smell of bricks baking in the hot sun as black smoke trails into the air 
greets the senses as one crosses the bridge over the banks of the Blue Nile.  
Stretching beyond these homemade kilns to the east of Khartoum as the lone paved 
road turns into hardened dirt on the very edge of the desert is a sprawling area known 
as Hajj Yusuf.  Located approximately fifteen kilometres from Khartoum, Hajj Yusuf 
is today a semi-urban suburb of mixed northern and southern ethnicities dominated 
by the majority Riverine Arabs.
300
   
 The history of this region stems from the thousands of southern Sudanese 
who fleeing war and famine sought refuge in their capital city.  With an estimated 
forty percent of those who attempted this journey ‘lost on the way,’ southerners 
reached Khartoum only to find that stability would be just as elusive here.
301
  
Congregating on the fringes, ignored by their own government, obscured from 
international aid, southerners claimed for themselves in spontaneous settlements 
whatever space they could.  One such area came to be known as ‘Carton’ or 
‘Kartoun’ Kassala, ‘from the thousands of shacks built from whatever refuse could 
be salvaged, this site offered no health clinic, no school and no clean water.’
302
  One 
northerner described: 
Kassala squatter settlement had been a closed area in history.  It was difficult to penetrate 
because the huts, arbors and shanties, which were made of cardboard were inaccessible.  
Streets were non-existent.  Walking was only possible striding over people.  The shanties 
were infested with extended families crammed in narrow spaces.  It was difficult to define 
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the number of people living in the squatter settlements or in a single shanty for their 




 Around 1992 the Ministry of Engineering Affairs decided to redevelop Hajj 
Yusuf, demolishing much of Carton Kassala and removing many of its residents to 
more distant now official camps for the displaced.   IDPs who had managed to more 
permanently integrate themselves into the local community were allowed to stay and 
were even given legal plots of land for development.  One of the displaced recalled 
that at that time of the destruction ‘we just came together to pray and fast and 
suddenly the authorities… [said] we are not going to demolish the area but we are 
going to give the plots to the citizens so that they remain in Baraka.  And the name, 
the name should be changed [from] Carton to Baraka.
304
 
 With this experience in mind the displaced who remained organised into 
tribal clusters and ‘created a committee to supervise and organize installation of new-
comers, resist efforts to expropriate their land, and mediate conflicts within the 
community...  The committee made construction according to official norms its 
ultimate goal, hoping to… obtain the recognition of the Ministry of Housing.’
305
  As 
displaced and the very poor arrived seeking shelter the community grew eastward 
into the desert, squatting on uninhabited land and maintaining a building code 
centred on constructing small mud brick homes in organised blocks.  Over time as 
Khartoum itself grew these low level homes were bought and replaced with more 
upscale accommodation with portions of Hajj Yusuf regularised and integrated into 
the nearby culture and livelihood of the capital.  For the majority of displaced 
southerners, however, this process has resulted in forced settlement deeper in the 
desert.  It has furthermore incorporated and subverted southern identity and culture 
into a predominant Arabic framework that leaves southerners more disconnected, 
marginalised, anxious about thin legal claims to plots of land and open to fear, 
oppression and instability.   
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 While Hajj Yusuf is certainly only one among many areas of displaced 
southerners throughout Sudan, it remains an important one.
306
  For the thesis it serves 
as an internal balance to the external rural case studies stemming from the highly 
organised and regulated Kakuma Refugee Camp and the more loosely assisted 
community of Oliji Refugee Camp in Uganda.  Furthermore it allows the thesis to 
explore from the perspective of southern Sudanese Christian spirituality and 
institutions one specific theme that is especially pertinent in Khartoum.  That is, how 
does close interaction with northern Arabic Muslims intersect with the development 
of peace, reconciliation and the politicisation of the church?   
 In general it is important to again note that urban self-settlement forces 
refugees to regularly interact with the structures, boundaries and culture of the 
dominant host community.  The political efforts to initiate a cleansed Islamic 
community within Khartoum accompanied with underlying racist pejoratives has set 
the framework in which southern coping strategies must be formed and articulated.  
While the physical arrangements and order of worship of Hajj Yusuf churches is 
fairly similar to that described in Chapter Two, the effect on participating 
communicants is not exact.
307
  In Khartoum while the church does help reconstitute 
traditional structures, arrangements and values, this impact is less significant on the 
community due to the overriding imposition of the Arabic culture.  All the same 
while the displaced ‘are well aware of their powerlessness in the face of ongoing 
wars and political conflicts, they are nonetheless agents in creating their own 
meanings in the world in which they have been cast.’
308
  In Hajj Yusuf the church 
has increased communal stability and internal southern reconciliation by empowering 
displaced southerners to generate responses to arisen needs, convey necessary 
sacredness during life hardships and offer a form of articulated political resistance to 
the dominant discourse.  That is, the church has significantly impacted displaced 
southerners in Hajj Yusuf in two predominant ways. 
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Bestowing Cultural and Practical Sacredness during Life Transitions  
 
With hands raised, voices join in unison to sing, proclaim and praise.  
Gathered under a simple makeshift shelter in a crowded Muslim neighbourhood the 
faithful have come seeking healing, strength, encouragement and advice.  Their 
desire is to ‘experience something new,’ a divine filling that will filter into the week 
ahead.  Like many other gatherings spread throughout the area the group originated 
in a personal conversion, in this case of Joseph Loro who in 1999 attended a large 
Pentecostal meeting in Bahari Omdurman where he was ‘born again.’
309
  Invited 
friends and neighbours eventually coalesced into a regular small group that over time 
outgrew Loro’s home, employed a full time pastor and rented a small plot of land 
from a Muslim family.
310
  The name of the church perhaps best symbolises their joint 
aspirations, ‘Victory Bible Fellowship,’ each word critical in understanding the 
importance of this small Pentecostal church in one corner of Hajj Yusuf.   
Moving from cultural periphery to central axis, for many southern Sudanese 
displaced to Hajj Yusuf the first impact of the churches on communal stability is the 
churches’ ability to function as an internal culturally sanctifying agent that extends 
practical suggestions and divine 
sacredness to the southern community 
during key life transitions.  That is the 
community turns inward to the church 
rather than the church shaping the broader 
external culture. As such the church is 
concerned with an authentic internal 
spirituality accessible to the community at 
key life transitions as can be evidenced in 
four ways. 
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Figure 16 – Victory Bible Fellowship, 
Khartoum 
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First, as was displayed at Victory Bible Fellowship, the ability of the 
churches to enable new internal spiritual access that grants divine sacredness can be 
evidenced at a corporate ecumenical level by the growing influence of 
Pentecostalism throughout Hajj Yusuf on church worship and practice.  Though all 
of the churches experienced growth during the 1990s, often in direct relation to the 
intensity of applied persecution, underneath the radar the more lasting development 
concerned the growth in influence of Pentecostal focus, style and methodology 
among the youth.  Fermo Ogilla, the former General Overseer of Sudan Pentecostal 
Church (SPC)-North explained: 
There was what we call Young Christian Fellowship, YCF, and it was this YCF was actually 
mainly pushed by the… leading preachers of the Pentecostal [Church]…  It is the Catholics, 
the Anglicans, all of these churches where the young people [joined] what is called the YCF 
that were very much affected by this Pentecostal kind of preaching, praying practically and 
so we had a revival.  But when it broke off it was not only among the Pentecostals though the 
Pentecostal [Church] played a very big role, a very big role in most of the churches.
311
 
Transported from Juba to Khartoum in 1983 the YCF is an ecumenical 
movement aimed at strengthening the existing churches.  Gaining public prominence 
in the 90s though leadership rotated among the denominations, ‘the Christian 
experience offered was powerful and transforming, and so a distinctly Pentecostal 
form of youth religion was carried into all the Churches, including those like the 
Catholic Church, the Episcopal Church and the African Inland Church where 
Pentecostal teaching was virtually unknown.’
312
  Kenneth Duku of the SCC further 
confirmed the influence of Pentecostalism throughout the displaced areas noting: 
There are new churches which are coming… For instance there are practical churches like 
what they call Pentecostal.  People like to go I think because of music and there are some 
activities which people like, like the full gospel whereby people pray.  We had Abunnke who 
came here and he was healing people and so on.  And in the small way some of these 
[Pentecostal] churches are doing the same way and people prefer to go…  And [so] that one 
also affects you know the congregations in these traditional churches.
313
 
The youth who regularly attended these social clubs imbibed a fresh sense of 
internal spiritual vigour that they often enthusiastically carried back to their own 
church.  As one Presbyterian leader described, ‘the youth were mobilised by this 
revivalism… In Khartoum, therefore most of the youth become Christian and at the 
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same time they begin to preach.  So some of them will go to the trips, some of them 
will go to visitation and so on and this is how people came together, how they came 
to Christ.’
314
   However some of the churches were not accommodating and rejected 
the new youth impetus either retaining through discipline or evicting the youth if 
they refused to desist.  Those who were evicted often planted their own churches 
sometimes under the banner of the SPC.
315
   
Though numerical church growth was often a political response, internal 
church renewal was carried on by youth often seeking to implement new theology 
and strategies that replaced established hierarchies and emphasis that had in many 
ways replicated traditional structures.  The result was a weakening of the ability of 
the church to strictly maintain societal patterns and mutually reinforcing cultural 
norms that emphasised united conformity and respectful acceptance as was clearly 
seen in Kakuma Refugee Camp.  Although such elements are present in Hajj Yusuf, 
it was perhaps inevitable that traditional elder hierarchies – ethnic, Christian or 
otherwise – would weaken in Khartoum where southerners were forced to adapt to a 
dominant culture that sought to consistently discredit those authorities.  Unable to 
significantly alter the broader cultural paradigm shifted the churches’ focus to 
providing practical spiritual guidance to a struggling community.  Though small the 
Pentecostal church was best positioned to effectively serve as a corresponding 
model.  Further corroborated by an historical Islamic Sufism prevalent in the capital 
that is highly experiential, personal and mystical, the spread of Pentecostal influence 
was most keenly felt throughout Hajj Yusuf churches in two areas.
316
  The first was 
emphasising personal internal spirituality enhanced through communal sharing and 
available as a source for needed hope and strength.  The second was an increase in 
the need for churches to offer practical communal guidance in producing beneficial 
interaction with the dominant cultural narrative.   
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Both of these elements were clearly discernable at the Pentecostal Victory 
Bible Fellowship in Hajj Yusuf.  Responding to what he perceived as most important 
in a worship service pastor Hani Kamish noted: 
You know there are two things which we perceive to be the most important.  The word is 
 first.  And the second thing is that as people listen to the word and then accept it for their 
 individual needs.  So the word must meet their needs and this means that they must 
 experience the word in a real life.
317
 
Several members of the congregation picked up on this theme responding to why 
they believed the congregation had experienced recent growth: 
Ipiol: I think because of the difficulties that people have faced here. 
Joyce: There are many reasons… [Some] came when they were sick and then when they 
 were in the church they got healed and they remained in the church.   Others maybe God 
 spoke to them direct calling them.  Others maybe they heard the word of God.
318
   
In the midst of difficulties southerners found in the church strength, healing 
and solutions to the problems that surrounded them.  Broadly representative, the 
above highlights that the emphasis of the SPC was on providing the space to help 
southerners navigate spiritual and social challenges in a format intersecting sound 
advice and spiritual sacredness.  Among the displaced of Hajj Yusuf this Pentecostal 
focus on being a ‘practical’ church came to permeate many of the denominations. 
That the church is concerned with developing internal spirituality and is seen 
by the community as a safe haven for depositing difficult struggles is demonstrated at 
a church worship level by the increased practice of sharing personal testimonies.  
The following testimonies given by three different women during one worship 
service are representative: 
Lillie: She wants to share something that happened to her…  Her husband was on a mission 
and some people came to her house and prayed against the devil there.  She was cooking 
some food but as they were chatting and praying as the guests were leaving the gas canister 
in the kitchen exploded.  In the kitchen was a lot of smoke and a big flame.  And the house 
was made of local materials but in her heart she knew it was not the gas canister.  So she 
went through the flame and saw that it was just the saucepan and not the cylinder so she 
grabbed the saucepan and threw it out.  And all the other people were just watching.  God 
gave her this courage and kept the two cylinders in her house from exploding.  So take God 
at his word and trust him. 
Joyce: She is glad to be here.  She didn’t know there was a church here but some people told 
her so she came.  She had cancer and was very sick and when she was diagnosed the devil 
filled her heart with fear.  As she was going to surgery she remembered the lady with blood 
who touched the hem of Jesus.  And then her fear went away and she went into surgery and it 
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has now been gone for 16 years.  But then her doctor found another blockage but the doctor 
did not want to do anything.  She took all the papers of her diagnosis and put her hands on 
them and prayed for God’s healing and then she burned the papers and was healed.  She was 
attending an ECS but will come here from now on.  So when you are sick, pray to God.  He 
is free to do whatever he likes.   
Her husband had a donkey that was producing some work for them.  But the donkey was old 
and she wanted to get another one.  She wanted to buy also a new cart.  And she prayed.  And 




Though testimonies range over a variety of subjects they often centre on three 
issues especially relevant to the Khartoum experience: developing strength and 
confidence to deal with a difficult setting, physical healing and miraculous financial 
provision.  Though sharing testimonies is a particularly strong characteristic of the 
SPC, it was in a similar vein observed in other Hajj Yusuf 
congregations.
320
  For those offering the testimonies, ‘it 
builds confidence in them[selves],’ while listeners are 
exhorted to maintain hope and communal solidarity by 
learning to ‘share our experiences together.’
321
  Furthermore, 
‘producing a testimony not only helps to relieve symptoms; it 
also helps survivors to integrate the trauma story into their 
personal histories by allowing them to understand its 
significance in the context of political and social events.’
322
  
Building confidence, extending hope, strengthening 
community and helping individuals connect difficult personal 
experiences to a broader framework are all critical in 
communal stabilisation.  Modelled first by the Pentecostal 
churches and spread by interacting youth to the other 
denominations, the emphasis of church worship and practice in Hajj Yusuf shifted 
towards a focus on internal spirituality that connected individual’s common problems 
with divine power, guidance and advice.   
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Figure 17 – Prayer for 
Healing in an ECS 
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A second ascertainable way in which churches increased southern stability 
was a collective extension by the churches of culturally relevant divine access and 
sanctity to the displaced during births and marriages.  Gordon Awetch for example 
remarked: 
Originally before the people become Christian if somebody doesn’t care about the church 
they do their own traditional thing.  If somebody’s wife is giving birth to a child they don’t 
care about the church.  But recently the church is more important [so] that when somebody 
falls away they will call for the church to come and carry them… When somebody has an 
occasion, a thanksgiving, they will call for the church.  Anything which is little or small they 
will call for the church.
323
   
To a certain extent displaced southerners in Khartoum do not strictly adhere to 
traditional religious practices.
324
  This has left a spiritual void keenly felt during 
times of important life moments.  Furthermore, the overriding Arabic culture in 
Khartoum has challenged and shifted traditional taboos.  Isaac Cham Jwok 
explained: 
We the Shilluk we have traditional which respects big people and traditional system of the 
Shilluk.  But now we become involved in Arabic system and it is [impossible], it is 
[impossible] for the Shilluk to let the boy marry their relative.  But because what the Arabic 
practice here some Shilluk become involved which is ideas that we got here in Khartoum… 
It is not feared like what the Shilluk was before.  It is a shame.
325
 
 Traditional marriage practices are complex and a fundamental component to 
community stability throughout south Sudan.
326
  The decrease in the efficacious 
power of traditional practitioners of religion in Khartoum in combination with the 
weakened set of governing relationship laws has further disrupted marriage and 
family values.  In this context pastoral leadership offers an opportunity for 
counselling and more importantly, through performative prayers and religious 
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ceremonies restores a sense of divine sanctity otherwise missing during these 
endeavours.  As Lillian Paul and Boulis Francis noted, ‘when the baby is born 
previously people organised the ceremony or things not connected with church but 
now they invite church to come and pray for the small baby that is born in the 
family… many things have changed.’
327
   
In a community riddled with insecurity, shifting standards and cultural 
degradation, reinstating a sense of sacredness establishes worth, respect and 
boundaries of permissibility integral in solidifying communal relationships.  
Importantly, church leadership and values are not necessarily determining the scope 
of new marriage patterns and standards.  The influence is more fundamental: it is a 
performative rite in which the southern community at large can turn inward and self-
regulate in a way that establishes a spiritual sense of stability and a normalcy to 
societal relationships.   
 Mirroring the above, for the churches in Hajj Yusuf sickness and death is a 
third way in which the broader community turned to Christian spirituality for 
sanctification, access, advice and aid.  Health problems and concerns were frequently 
cited as a significant problem facing the displaced community and there is among 
displaced southerners a palpable fear of actually pursuing substantive care at local 
hospitals.  Recorded by Elizabeth Coker one Sudanese refugee in Egypt bemoaned: 
There are women whose wombs have been stopped so they will never give birth.  We are 
blind, we are not doctors.  They [doctors] remove the womb so that our women will never 
give birth.  These are all the things that we are facing here as refugees.  The oppression we 
get here is the same oppression we got back in Khartoum.
328
  
 Though these fears are often hyperbolic and unsubstantiated they are regularly 
passed as word of mouth truth persisting because of the real pejorative racism 
southerners regularly encounter.  Mary David remarked that even in hospitals there is 
a problem of segregation whereby southerners and northern Arabs are treated 
differently and unequally.
329
  Furthermore, although there are two health centres in 
Hajj Yusuf, one administered by the SCC and one associated with the Islamic Dawa 
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party,
330
 more serious health concerns necessitate travel which for displaced 
southerners is often prohibitive.
331
  For southerners displaced to Hajj Yusuf, the 
cumulative result is an acute sense of disempowerment and inability to beneficially 
interact with the dominant culture. 
 In southern Sudan religious practitioners have historically been appreciated 
for their medicinal capabilities and are often qualitatively judged accordingly.  In 
Hajj Yusuf the community at large is increasingly turning inward to the church 
perceiving that it functions in this capacity.   Joyce Guwo emphasised that the local 
community has never ‘interrupted’ their services: 
Instead if they have problem they call us to pray for [them].  And even they telephone us: I 
am sick, I am having problem with husband and in your prayers include me.  And later on we 
invite them to come in, join our group… Like this sister of mine she is diabetic and she has 
been sick and when they prayed here she became well.  And when people heard of this they 
also wanted to come in.
332
 
Lillian Paul expressed a similar sentiment: 
[The] church used to give support to the community, for example, when somebody is sick we 
call for our pastor Yohannes to come and he has to take that patient to the hospital by his 
car… not demanding anything.  And sometimes if somebody is sick he cannot provide the 
medicine for himself he will bring the receipt or the prescription paper to the church and the 
church will buy it.
333
   
 The above quotes highlight several distinct but interrelated threads.  First, the 
church understands and is indeed perceived to extend services that incorporate the 
broader community regardless of religious affiliation.  Second and as already 
indicated in Joyce’s SPC testimony, through sometimes vigorous prayer sessions the 
church promotes the possibility of physical healing through divine intervention.
334
  
This coincides with a traditional view that connects physical maladies with spiritual 
remedies.  With a decline in traditional practitioners and a demoralising severance 
from ‘modern’ health care options the potentiality of healing provides an outlet for 
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expressing pent frustration and grief while restoring a semblance of choice, control 
and connection to an overarching purpose and paradigm.  Third, the church is a 
source for practical help in facilitating interaction with the health care infrastructure.  
In this way the church not only beneficially influences the southern displaced 
community it repositions itself from cultural periphery to communal centrality in 
terms of providing guidance in interaction with the dominant Riverine society and in 
affirming spiritual sacredness and connectivity.   
 Though to a lesser extent, death and burial ceremonies also afford an 
opportunity for the church to impact the Hajj Yusuf displaced community.  One 
pastor observed that church members regularly utilised gatherings as a ‘very good 
time to give a message to the people… to preach the good news.’
335
  Hani Kamish 
elaborated further that ‘in funeral places people talk with their relatives.  After all the 
people have prayed they bring this issue of peace… they enlighten people about the 
issues… They enlighten people about the issue of peace.’
336
  This continues a 
traditional practice that understood burial ceremonies as a critical component in 
maintaining spiritual and societal peace through the airing of grievances and the 
restoration of relationships.  In addition to transmitting these values the church has 
expanded the focus to incorporate updates and implications regarding the broader 
inter-societal peace process.  The outcome is the perseverance of a traditional 
approach to interpersonal and communal reconciliation that increases communal 
stability and accentuates the capacity of the church to help usher the community 
through times of grief and transition.    
A fourth and final way that the church increases communal stability among 
displaced southerners in Hajj Yusuf through a bestowal of cultural and practical 
sacredness, relates to the tentative proffering of solutions to three of the most critical 
problems facing the community.  This is first seen in an effort by the churches to 
help southerners connect with educational opportunities.  As one of the local 
members of the council of chiefs noted, ‘the most important thing is the education, 
the education of the displaced children here.  The education should be increased.’
337
  
In Sudan, there is a long history of Christian provision of education that to a large 
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extent has been maintained in Khartoum.  Importantly these efforts were attractive 
less because of their association with churches and more to their basic provision of 
education.
338
  That is the churches are not so much shaping educational interest or 
discourse as they are responding to the practical needs of the community.  Within 
Khartoum itself there are several sizable schools associated with churches such as 
Unity High School which in 2001 had five hundred students enrolled.
339
  Though 
much smaller Hajj Yusuf is home to multiple schools initiated and administered by 
various churches.  For example, the ECS hosts both a preschool and an adult literacy 
class through the indigenous NGO Salvation Mission Sudan.   The PCOS Shilluk 
congregation regularly provides small scholarships to help with student tuition fees.  
The Mission, Evangelism and Education Department of PCOS-Malakal oversees 
three schools in Hajj Yusuf, and the Catholic Church runs perhaps the largest school 
for displaced southerners in Hajj Yusuf.
340
  These institutions and efforts provide an 
invaluable service to the community opening opportunities to displaced southerners 
that are otherwise denied to them by the overarching framework of governmental 
neglect.
341
  Significantly the provision of this service does not appear to dramatically 
increase local attendance as the community has come to expect that the churches will 
attempt to function in this fashion.  With a positive benefit on communal 
stabilisation, these institutions further illustrate that the displaced in Hajj Yusuf 
regularly turn for guidance and support to the churches that have themselves shifted 
from cultural periphery to centrality.   
Hidden in broad daylight on the dusty streets of Hajj Yusuf is one of the most 
tragic underreported consequences of the decades-long war: the shamassa.  The 
shamassa are ‘the children of the sun,’ a ‘vagrant army’ of more than twenty 
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thousand children roaming the streets between the ages of six and sixteen.
342
  Forced 
to the streets to work, abandoned or simply the sole surviving member of a family 
seeking safety from wrenching war the number of the shamassa is growing at an 
alarming rate.  In July 2007 the United Nations Children’s Fund reported that ‘an 
estimated one hundred new born babies were being abandoned on the streets of the 
capital Khartoum every month.  Half of these were dying on the streets.’
343
  One 
study found that between 1998 and 2003 out of the 2,500 abandoned babies who 
survived and were admitted to the Maygoma institution for illegitimate babies, 
‘2,100 died – a mortality rate of 84 per cent.’
344
  The children that subsist on the 
streets face a number of difficulties and a dismal future.  Hunger, homelessness, drug 
and glue addiction, ‘Pepsi glass’ fighting, street battles with the police and rival 
gangs, prostitution, sickness and death are prevalent.  As one observer noted, many 
in Hajj Yusuf see these children simply as ‘rubbish.’
345
   
In this context churches have attempted to practically respond in what is a 
second example of provided church guidance within an unaltered setting.  Although 
the ECS does oversee sixty such children distributed in various church members’ 
homes,
346
 the most important effort in relation to the shamassa street children in Hajj 
Yusuf is the Boys Hope Centre administered by the Sudan Interior Church.
347
  
Founded in 1994 Boys Hope is home to forty street boys ranging from age six to 
eighteen.  With seventeen teachers across the denominational spectrum the Centre 
offers the first four educational classes, provides funds for further education and 
teaches practical skills such as welding.  Several times a week the Centre also offers 
drop-in activities attended by anywhere from fifty to seventy additional street boys.  
Eighty percent of the budget is provided by three international partners with the 
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remaining twenty percent raised by the Centre itself from local individuals and 
churches.  Although some of the boys that have been taken in have left and reverted 
to their previous life, a number have graduated and successfully integrated into the 
broader community.  While this effort is numerically modest, it is the largest and 
most important endeavour of its kind in all of Hajj Yusuf.  Although more could be 
done to encourage family cohesiveness and child rights, an awareness of this 
growing need coupled with several initiatives further illustrates an attempt by local 
churches to provide practical assistance.
348
   
A third and final prominent manner in which the churches in Hajj Yusuf 
increase communal stability through an interjection of practical advice is in relation 
to the area of employment.  As already noted southerners face stiff competition and a 
number of difficulties in procuring reliable employment often excluding them to the 
economic margins.  Churches often serve as a basis for encouragement and 
networking as well as a source of practical advice.  Responding to a question 
concerning the role of the church in the community, the following comment by a 
Hajj Yusuf pastor is illustrative: 
You know the role is to educate the community on how they can help themselves…  We 
actually have a number of people who are suffering.  They could not get the job.  We educate 
them, we teach them.  We say it is not a shame to pick up, to work as a housemaid.  Still if 
you are not doing something evil you are [at least] earning a wage by your job.  So you may 
be somebody who washes the cars and get the income… We educate them so that they have 
confidence in themselves.  Whatever they can do at their reach, let them do it since it is not 
conflicting with the word of God.  So know we have few of them who got a job, you see…. 




Churches function within a continuous cycle of encouraged motivation and 
empowered hope as members counsel one another on the path to employment.  
Although labour opportunities exist within this sphere, they frequently entail a level 
of genuine risk.  One individual commented, ‘the woman has to go and work in this 
Arab’s house to get food for the family.  It is not easy.  Sometimes even a woman is 
accused of stealing things, which is not true.  It is just because she is a southerner.  
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Because she is a southerner she will be arrested and beaten properly and even taken 
to the [police] station.’
350
  More significantly, these jobs often carry a demeaning 
personal and social stigma doubly reinforced by racially prejudiced employers and 
many southerners will refuse to work or turn to dangerous illegal activities before 
engaging in these types of occupation.
351
  As these types of vocation are commonly 
the only accessible opportunities for southerners, church teaching that acknowledges 
the risk while working to remove a stigma of shame is enormously beneficial.  In an 
environment where the international community provides little to zero regular aid 
and where the government actively ignores and disrupts, procuring a regular small 
income reduces the risk of frustrated fighting, lost education, abandoned children and 
an array of diseases.  Churches therefore act as agents of empowerment providing 
practical suggestions, networking and transforming mental and emotional 
perspectives towards an encompassing environment.     
Located firmly within a Muslim dominated milieu that the church is unable to 
alter, Christian spirituality and emphasis has shifted to providing practical solutions 
and guidance to beneficial engagement with the broader culture.  Demonstrated at an 
ecumenical level in the spread of Pentecostal teaching and practice the religious 
focus has distilled an internal holiness that connects spiritual well being with 
physical livelihood.  By continuing and extending what amounts to a traditional 
understanding of religious objectives, the southern displaced community in Hajj 
Yusuf has increasingly turned inward to self-regulated churches as cultural 
custodians that extend divine sanctity at key life transitions.  This bestowal of 
cosmological significance is reinforced by efforts to assist in alleviating the 
educational, vocational and childhood displacement problems facing the southern 
community.  While these endeavours have increased communal stability, it was the 
religio-nationalistic Islamic politics of ‘purity’ driven by the interpersonal rivalries of 
Bashir, Turabi, Taha and Nafi as well as the Riverine Arabic racial prejudices that 
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lead to a second overarching impact of the churches on the southern displaced 
community. 
 
Centralisation of Politicised Resistance 
  
 Father Jacobs, a Catholic parish priest tells the following story about a church 
destroyed via ‘town planning’ by the government following Easter 1997: 
During lunchtime I got news that the bulldozer was coming to break the church… I rushed 
there, I saw people not all of them were Christians...  Some of them they were small children 
with stones waiting for these people to come.  The youth, some of them were not Christians 
but there they were, there they were actually saying, we are Christians.  When we talk about 
Christianity by way of receiving baptism and things like that that is not what they mean when 
they say, but we are Christians.  I think what they are also trying to say is that we are not 
Muslim…  We are Christians and we will defend the Christians places.  I think that is what 
they understand… Then nobody [from the government] came.
352
 
Pastor Isaac Cham Jwok relayed a similar experience concerning the 
destruction of the PCOS-Shilluk church building in 1998: 
Sometime ago the church of Hajj Yusuf can be destroyed by the government and these 
people, [the church members], can quarrel and then after that get quiet without knowing their 
rights.  This is the church built by the people.  And then after the survey was done they did 
not give us anything.  And now I will show you this place, but they did not give us 
anything… This is a violation of human rights, which we want to fight for it, because you 
cannot build a house and be destroyed simply like that without giving you [something]… The 
church is facing a lot of problems here.  But we know God gives us the courage to continue 
on.  We will be able to continue in this cycle… Sometimes the government can come and 
destroy it but we will never give up.
353
 
The above two stories highlight a common thread woven into the fabric of 
southern Sudanese internally displaced to the dusty streets of Hajj Yusuf: the 
increasing centralisation of politicised resistance in the locus of the church.  The 
Government of Sudan attempted to promulgate a united Islamic front that was 
inevitably victorious politically, militarily, socially and culturally.  Increasingly 
southerners found in the church the space to unite and voice defiance that was as 
much political as it was religious.  This politicisation of the church as a resistant 
force against militant Islam is most clearly seen among displaced churches in 
Khartoum.  As one observer noted, ‘the politicization of Islam by the government in 
Khartoum made religion a political issue in the Sudan.  Consequently, many 
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Southerners have come to see churches as their political allies in struggle against 
injustice and oppression.’
354
  For displaced southerners in Hajj Yusuf the result is a 
partnered sense of stabilising solidarity.   
Churches throughout Khartoum displayed numerous efforts of individual and 
united resistance.  For example in the March 1995 Khartoum State elections, six 
Catholic Bishops ‘issued a daring pastoral letter that called on parishioners to boycott 
the polls since the elections were imposed on the people, parties were banned, and all 
candidates had to support a predefined Islamist orientation.’
355
  The SCC maintained 
an active Advocacy and Communication Programme that for example, in 1996 
prepared an official position paper on peace for the SCC, developed information on 
AIDS, circulated 3,000 copies of a women’s newsletter titled ‘Arise’ and produced a 
number of radio programmes aired both in Khartoum and Juba.
356
  Following the 
second Meeting of the House of Bishops in Nairobi in February 1999 the ECS 
established a Justice and Peace Department with an office in both Khartoum and in 
Juba that eventually came under the guidance of Bishop Daniel Deng.
357
  Within Hajj 
Yusuf the ECS church hosts Salvation Mission Sudan, a small indigenous NGO 
under the directorship of Stanley Khamis.  Hosting its first workshop in 2005, this 
NGO has two primary areas of concern: generating awareness for returning southern 
IDPs about landmines and conducting workshops on conflict resolution, peace 
building and good governance.
358
  Though each of these endeavours were important, 
politically their influence was nominal.  The real influence was more diffused among 
displaced southerners that continued a shift in turning towards the churches as a 
collective source of resistance and unity. 
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 In the early 1990s as Hajj Yusuf was transitioning from the unregulated 
squatter settlement of ‘Carton’ Kassala to Hai El Baraka the southern community 
was further destabilised by interethnic clashes.  One observer articulated that fighting 
occurred among ‘the Nilotic groups – Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, these groups.  In fact in 
Hai Baraka I witnessed people spearing themselves.’
359
  When these incidents 
occurred: 
 The church is the first to move.  They will go and talk to these [community] elders so they 
 can negotiate something because, you know, they sometimes feel powerless, they cannot do 
 anything they cannot have a full control.  Because, you see, you live in an area where there 
 are mixed tribes.  You do not have this control.  But you need it, and actually somebody to 
 help you.  So when the church comes to advise, you can do like that, you can meet here, and 
 then you can talk these things and so on then they begin to help.  We used to talk; we used to 
 reconcile people, then facing the elders, talk together.
360
 
A Shilluk confirmed this development communicating, ‘before becoming a Christian 
you will find that tribe and tribe cannot sit together but now people are used to sitting 
together and praying together, marrying each other, because they became aware 
when they got the Good News.’
361
   
Importantly, by the middle of the 90s southern inter-tribal conflicts seem to 
have mostly dissipated and were never mentioned as a central concern in any of the 
focus groups hosted in Hajj Yusuf.  That these conflicts decreased is probably a 
reflection of a growing awareness concerning the importance of southern solidarity 
against a more powerful external northern threat most regularly confronted through 
hostile police beatings and harassment, altercations over public brewing of beer and 
the destruction of church property.  This shift was further substantiated, rather than 
directed as in Kakuma, by an underpinning Christian religiosity.   The influence of 
the churches was in the arena of political interaction.  Church leaders helped 
empower community elders with the tools to cross over traditional tribal boundaries 
that were hampering their reconciliation efforts and in this churches played an 
important and necessary role in extending communal stability and peace building.  In 
addition, politically the churches exerted a second important influence: overt sign of 
resistance.  As a motivational symbol, the church was paramount.   
                                                 
359
 Hani Kamish, interview with author, 20 March 2006.   
360
 Ibid.   
361
 Isaac Cham Jwok, interview with author, 20 March 2006.   
   113
Churches therefore exerted a critical political function in Hajj Yusuf in 
establishing practical channels of guidance and interaction with existing elders and 
communal venues of power rather than intentionally developing among constituents 
a broad southern consciousness crossing tribal boundaries.  Rather than shaping the 
primary discourse, churches helped ease confrontations while functioning as a buffer 
agent that sought to protect and operate as a voice for southerners.  As the church 
continued to develop as a symbol of resistance the broader community increasingly 
turned inward to the church as the central mode of communicated desire for reform.  
This is illustrated in part by the convergence of southerners around Christian self-
identification proclamations during times of targeted church destruction as indicated 
in the story relayed by Father Jacobs at the beginning of this section.   
That the church functioned as a central component facilitating beneficial 
inter-communal north-south interaction is seen in that the primary emphasis of 
church teaching on relationships concerns proper interaction with Muslim neighbours 
rather than south-south associations.  For example, one SPC member noted that her 
approach to ‘my neighbours… [is] to be kind to them and to interact with them 
according to my gospel.’
362
  One ECS participant emphasised that ‘the Bible says 
you should love your neighbour, you should love your enemy, you should love each 
other.’
363
  Another individual stated that the importance of Sunday is that ‘after seven 
days people come together and they give thanks to God for his protection, his 
blessing.’
364
  The overarching picture is one of trying to establish a normal 
interaction perhaps best described as quiet.  At times this comes across as an almost 
forlorn acceptance.  For example one PCOS member in comparing the ability of the 
church to effectively evangelise against Muslim counterparts lamented, ‘when the 
Muslims go and preach to the people they give food… And they give clothes.  But 
we as Christians we feel without food, we don’t carry anything.  This is the thing, do 
they believe us or do they believe those who have some food?’
365
   
Perhaps as a result, at the grassroots level in Hajj Yusuf the majority of the 
everyday interactions between northerners and southerners is generally mild.  
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Although there have been flare-ups, there have also been occasions of genuine 
support.  This was clearly demonstrated at the SPC Victory Bible Fellowship during 
the 2005 Christmas season.  The church was approached by a Muslim living across 
the street stating, ‘I want to be part of your Christmas celebrations.  You don’t have 
electricity but I will allow you to extend this [extension cord] from my house.’
366
  
Although the individual did not himself participate in the Christmas service, he did 
allow the church to use his electricity for their special celebration without charge.   
Interaction with the local political community elders and leaders is more 
ambivalent.  Hajj Yusuf has been divided into numerous small sections demarcated 
as ‘Popular Organisations,’ each with their own community chairman.  In addition, 
the displaced are also accountable to traditional tribal chiefs.  The leaders of the 
various Popular Organisations report directly to the northern government and as such 
often have a tenuous relationship with local church leaders.  This was clearly 
demonstrated in an incident involving the SPC focus group.  Prior to the initiation of 
the focus group an individual was approached and asked about helping with 
arrangements to meet with the local leader of the Popular Organisation.  After 
expressing some initial concern the individual agreed.  However, at the conclusion of 
the focus group the individual took a circuitous path that led far away from the 
church to a central headquarters that the individual, after arrival, admitted knew 
would be closed because it was Friday.  In the end the individual proceeded a 
substantial distance from the chapel before declining to help in this regard out of an 
expressed nervousness of planted government spies.   
The relationship with traditional chiefs is also often strained.  Responding to 
his dealing with the local southern leader one pastor described: 
Sometimes they do not function in what is the need of the community…  They say in the 
sharia people are not allowed to drink.  So when they find alcohol or wine there they used to 
beat people… Sometimes there is a relation [between us], but it is very weak because they 
are defining themselves as the people who are the two heads as the southern people and at the 
same time as part of the government to implement their policy… They understand the needs, 
even they are connected but they are more interested for the government.
367
 
Traditional chiefs are however likely to recognise the importance and influence of 
the church.  One emphasised: 
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Many people are coming to church.  [It] acts as an umbrella.  It gives support in many areas: 
the area of education, previously they distribute relief to people, and they also give medicines 
sometimes when they get it from other friends outside they also give it to the community.  
This is why people are coming.  They see that the church is good and that the church will 
help.
368
   
All the same, at a political level, even at the grassroots the relationship between the 
church and local representatives is often tense as the church functions as a small 
bulwark that the government would assume eliminated.   
At an elite governmental level with the state or national government inter-
religious relationships have occurred only on the grounds determined by the ruling 
regime.  Although there have been several Christians included in the national 
Cabinet, the relationship has more frequently been characterised as that which 
occurred during the April 1993 Conference of Religions in the Sudan.  The 
conference was sponsored by the Peace and Development Foundation and included 
eighty-five international participants in addition to numerous Sudanese.  President 
Bashir himself addressed the convention stating, ‘we have made religious values 
guide the individual’s as well as the state activities in our country.  This is aimed at 
creating a basis of good citizenship and humane community in order to lead a 
modern nation.  We are doing this… to change the society, promote economic 
prosperity, achieve justice and attain political stability.’
369
  At the same time at the 
last minute the conference organisers withdrew an invitation to the General Secretary 
of the SCC to present a paper arguing that ‘the paper was too critical of the 
Government’s policies… A compromise was made and [the] Deputy presented the 
paper.  He was ordered to limit his speech to three minutes.  Originally, the paper 
was to be presented in 30 minutes.’
370
  The national government has often attempted 
to project to the international community a unified celebration of Islamic values that 
is respectful of other religious traditions while internally suppressing voices of 
Christian dissent.  The churches in Hajj Yusuf or in greater Khartoum more 
generally, have been unable to alter this framework.
371
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The churches in Hajj Yusuf saw intense persecution that further destabilised 
the community and disrupted efforts to generate a more peaceful holistic coexistence 
at the grassroots level.  As Stanley Khamis and Boulis Francis expressed, ‘previously 
the relationship of the church with the past government is poor because the 
government does not like the church to exist as a church in northern Sudan here…  
The government just fights the church by all means.’
372
  This targeted approach 
resulted in a crystallisation of the church as the most potent symbol for resistance in 
the displaced camps.  At the same time ‘there was a big church evangelism during 
the war…  In the displaced camps, which is very hard for southerners, even those 
who had Muslim background became Christians because of what they saw happened 
to them and their relatives during that time.’
373
  That is the broader southern 
community de-emphasised their own religious affiliation in order to stand in a protest 
of united solidarity.  The church became a politicised space that further shifted it 
from the edges to the centre of the displaced culture benefiting further from the 
strengthening of a vague civil spirituality expressed in Christian attendance and 
vernacular.  The Hajj Yusuf community itself also positively gained from this 
expansion as churches emphasised positive interaction with individual Muslims even 
while advocating for southern rights generated tension and difficulty with local and 
national power bases.  Thus, while the overarching framework was maintained, the 
broader southern displaced community turned inwards to the church for help in 
engineering beneficial channels of interaction with the dominant paradigm.  In 
addition, displaced southerners also utilised the church as a form of resistance to that 
established structure with an overall result of increased communal stability for the 
southern community.   
 
Analysis and Conclusion 
 
 Displaced southerners in Hajj Yusuf endure numerous trials and difficulties 
on a daily basis.  Excluded from the mainstream economy and blocked from regular 
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international aid southerners subsist through meagre opportunities on the desert 
edges of greater Khartoum.  In an environment shaped by elite interpersonal 
rivalries, multiple non-accountable competing internal security agencies and a 
government aiming to erect a structure of purity, southerners have found Islamic-
based agendas imposed on them at every level including at the very personal and 
individual.  For example, one woman remarked, ‘most of the people they fear; to be a 
Christian they also fear.  People like to pretend to be Arabs not Christian because of 
persecution… During those times even we were forced to wear a long [hijab] to 
cover ourselves up.’
374
  Southerners were abducted off the streets, disappeared in 
‘ghost houses,’ regularly harassed by police officials, denied educational and health 
care facilities, expelled without warning through the wanton destruction of their 
homes and constantly racially profiled by a prejudicial Riverine Arabic society.  In 
this context the churches in Hajj Yusuf beneficially impacted the displaced 
community in two ways. 
 First, churches bestowed cultural sanctity and practical sacredness to the 
southern community.  This is evidenced in an internal spirituality that modelled by 
the Sudan Pentecostal Church came to influence all of the denominations through an 
emphasis on linking spiritual connectivity to physical livelihood.   The result is a 
greater sense of empowerment and ability to translate suffering and difficulty into a 
broader paradigm of meaning.  As Lucia Dak explained, connecting with the love of 
God ‘helps us overcome our suffering that we face as displaced in Khartoum.  When 
we turn to Jesus it is like coming from under a pressure.’
375
  As a methodology and 
worship focus this emphasis was particularly demonstrated in the sharing of personal 
testimonies during worship services.     
 With important communal stabilising reverberations, the ability of the church 
to deeply resonate with the displaced community is perceived in the increasing 
turning of the community to the church looking for divine blessing and sacredness 
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during key life transitions.  Responding to the influence of the church on the 
community, pastor Yohannes Benjamin articulated: 
Actually the impact on the community is very great.  All the community now they know the 
church it is super in their life.  Every activities that take place in the community they used to 
come to the church.  When there is a newborn, newborn baby born they send for church to 
come and pray.  And when there is funeral rites.  When there is death.  When there is the 
marriage they used to come to the church.  Where there is somebody sick, he needs prayers, 
they send for church.  And even if there is discrimination in the family they also call for the 




During births, marriages, sickness and death, southerners increasingly turned inward 
to a self-regulated church for the needed bestowal of divine sanctity shifting the 
church from periphery to cultural centrality.  Church leaders began to function as 
divine custodians implicitly trusted during times of life infused with deeper spiritual 
meaning.   
 The church enhanced its standing and contributed to communal stability by 
further emphasising its ability to provide ‘practical’ suggestions and solutions.  
Although the focus on life application extended to a variety of situations across the 
spectrum of life, at a communal level in Hajj Yusuf they were most keenly 
concentrated in the arenas of education, care for abandoned and orphaned children 
and employment.  These segments were often specifically denied to southerners by 
the ruling regime and by intersecting in these areas churches not only provided 
meaningful practical help; they demarcated themselves socially from the enacted 
Islamic religio-nationalistic politics contributing to a second development. 
The second significant impact of churches on the southern displaced 
community in Hajj Yusuf was the centralisation of politicised resistance within its 
own parameters.  Due to the targeted destruction of church property and the ability of 
churches to collectively voice resistance across denominational and tribal boundaries 
the church served as the most potent symbol of politicised resistance.  Fermo Ogilla 
elaborated: 
Actually the government find it very hard because the more they tried to persecute actually it 
seems the more they are putting fire.  And even when the northerners, Muslims, were 
attracted to Christianity at that time, big numbers, very big numbers.  The more they were 
persecuted there was big excitement, especially among the young people.  They don’t care 
for anything; they don’t care for their lives.  They just go and preach…. So that was a big 
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There was growth in a collective civil religion that while not intentionally 
directed by the church, was articulated in terms of Christian solidarity and 
identification.  Individuals were willing, at least temporarily, to subsume their own 
religious practice under the rubric of Christianity in order to resist and protest the 
government.  At the local grassroots level in Hajj Yusuf churches were able to ease 
interaction with and between community elders and leaders though the relationship 
often remained tenuous.  At an elite level though churches were unable to 
significantly influence the dominating Islamic narrative, the benefit to the 
community of lodging such defiance should not be underestimated.
378
  It further 
illustrates the willingness of the community to turn inwards to the church during 
times of difficulty perceiving that the church was a central component in providing 
guidance and establishing beneficial patterns of interaction. 
It is important to note that in this way the influence of the church was more 
reactive than directive.  One result is that while numerous, most likely even the 
majority of southerners displaced to Hajj Yusuf, self-associate themselves with 
Christianity this identification is shallow.
379
  The church is viewed as an important 
source for guidance and divine sanctification during times of life difficulties.  
Though this itself is an increase in the prestige of the church it is distinctly different 
from the churches in Kakuma Refugee Camp that developed an ability to actually 
shape culture from the forefront.  In terms of locale nomenclature the church in Hajj 
Yusuf would therefore be labelled as ‘central:’ consistently turned to for guidance 
and the practical extension of divine sanctity, a collective voice for advocacy and 
resistance determined and advanced by southerners themselves and critically 
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important in helping the displaced community procure beneficial interaction with the 
overarching dominant culture. 
The geographical composition of Hajj Yusuf contributed to the development 
of the central status of the church.  Hajj Yusuf is a loosely regulated settlement 
allowing for ‘spontaneous’ construction of new homes as IDPs and Muslim land-
speculators arrived.  The result is a patchwork of clumped southern enclaves bisected 
by larger Muslim neighbourhoods.  In addition to making the convergence of large 
southern gatherings and communities difficult, for southerners this arrangement 
ensures a constant intermingling that reinforces minority status.  In comparison to 
Kakuma there is furthermore an overt depression of emphasis on individual tribal 
allegiances.  Overarching southern affiliations are therefore muted by the overriding 
Khartoum culture until activated by communal persecution most keenly felt in Hajj 
Yusuf at times of church property destruction.  Times of church destruction were 
efficacious in prompting sudden southern solidarity for several important reasons.  
First, as tribes and traditional tribal loyalties had been geographically divided, local 
church destruction allowed a ‘safe’ commingling of whatever tribes were present.  
Second, in comparison to the large-scale destruction of displaced homes during the 
kasha programme, a united southern community could realistically face the force 
applied to the sporadic removal of various church buildings.  Third, as all other 
organised institutions of resistance in the capital have been eradicated, the church 
was the predominant symbol of opposition with political, religious and cultural 
overtures.  At times of church destruction southerners could therefore exert a united 
protest that would eventually re-dissipate.
380
  Displayed surges of reaction are a 
further acknowledgment of the importance of ‘youth’ rather than senior community 
leaders in terms of influencing overall church development.  Therefore, while the 
influence of the church is important and substantial, it is centrally diffused 
throughout the community.   
Recent post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement developments offer a further 
testimony to the nature of Christianity in Hajj Yusuf.  Pastor Fermo Ogilla expounds:  
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In 90s when the war was so up the churches were growing very, very, very fast and also the 
persecution was very high when the government… on each side was maybe trying to do 
away with anything that was called church.  Churches were growing at that time both 
spiritually and numerically they have been growing.  Practically we have seen God’s hand 




Abraham Kuol further enunciated this theme: 
During the time of war people came to Christianity in good number.  Why, because they have 
been displaced from their places and they left their traditional worship and came in contact 
with Christianity and they come and join the Christianity and they continue in it… There 
were so many fellowships and then Bible Studies was always being done in the church.  
But… at this time there is no Bible Study.  Churches do no more Bible Studies and at the 
same time the disputes in the churches have dropped the number of those who come and also 
the activities also become so low.
382
   
The end of overt persecution of the church with the signing of the CPA, the 
corresponding removal of an active overarching enemy, the repatriation of numerous 
southerners and an expanding and diversified market in Khartoum all combined to 
reverse some of the recent gains to see a decrease in church attendance and perceived 
influence.  These forces and pressures have been first felt by southerners living in 
greater Khartoum and may indicate a reality churches will soon face throughout 
southern Sudan.  In Hajj Yusuf while the church retains a cultural centrality that 
substantially and beneficially influences the southern displaced community by 
bestowing divine and practical sacredness and centralised politicised resistance, 
among the most faithful communicants there is a new sense of realism and concern 
about the future of the church.  Newly developed, this attitude foreshadows what has 
beset the community of Oliji Refugee Camp in Uganda.   
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B.  Density of War: Oliji Refugee Camp, Uganda 
 
‘When they entered from Sudan they entered differently because they were 
traumatised.  Everyday you are focusing on that, you are focusing on hunger, you are 




‘I think our biggest help is not really material things because we rely on other people 
to give to us…  Our biggest help is we want to prepare people psychologically to 





Northern Uganda is rife with insecurity.  Located on the far north-western 
frontier of Uganda, Adjumani town is an outpost on the crossroads of three 
competing currents: the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, the Government of 
Sudan and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).  Travelling north on lonely dusty 
roads via the regular Gateway Bus Services requires for the last few hours of an 
eleven-hour journey a mandated military convoy.  With five transition camps and 
twenty settlements flung around Adjumani the more than 60,000 southern Sudanese 
refugees are afforded no such protection.
385
  Rather, the Government of Sudan 
‘targets them as hostile areas from which information on the SPLA could be 
gathered.  The SPLA target them as rear bases to mobilize fighters and supplies, and 
the Lord’s Resistance Army, West Nile Bank Front, and other Ugandan rebel groups 
see them as supply replenishment centers.’
386
   
Ugandan policy dictates that southern Sudanese refugees are sequestered into 
the Adjumani, Arura or Moyo district with refugees further subdivided into 
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numerous settlements inclusive of pre-existing indigenous populations.
387
  Isolated 
into small communities Sudanese refugees experience constant flux and 
destabilisation.  In 2000, for example, out of thirty-five ‘security incidents’ thirty 
were ‘attacks on refugee settlements.’
388
  One 2002 LRA raid on Maaji settlement 
witnessed one hundred twenty homes, five classrooms and a grinding mill razed 
forcing the entire settlement to abandon their cultivated land, possessions and 
houses.
389




Posited with the numerically densest assemblage of southern Sudanese 
refugees, the Sudan-Uganda border has been a corridor of insecurity for the past 
century.
391
  Recent events however compounded into a spiral of aggressive 
instability.  Following the overthrow of Idi Amin, the fall of Obote’s second regime 
in 1985 and the ascendancy of current President Yoweri Museveni, a potent friction 
developed between Khartoum and Kampala.
392
  After Uganda opened the doors to 
the SPLA, the Government of Sudan violated Ugandan airspace by launching 
frequent cross-border military flights that involved on occasion dropping bombs near 
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southern Sudanese refugee settlements.
393
  More importantly, the Government of 
Sudan facilitated the arming of the LRA encouraging attack against southern 
Sudanese civilians on both sides of the border.   
Disillusioned, in the mid-1980s Alice Lakwena led her troops of seven to ten 
thousand men and women under the banner of the Holy Spirit Movement on a 
southern march to Kampala.
394
  Lakwena ‘imposed a moral discipline on her 
soldiers, prohibiting charms, drunkenness, theft, smoking or rape before battle, but 
encouraging prayer and ritual cleansing, and the singing of Christian hymns.’
395
   
Defeated at Jinja, only thirty miles north of Kampala, leadership of the movement 
shifted to her father Severino Lukoya from 1987-1989 and then merged with forces 
led by an individual claiming to be Lakwena’s cousin: Joseph Kony.
396
   
Finding solace and armaments courtesy of the Government of Sudan, Kony 
re-launched the movement as the Lord’s Resistance Army vociferously attacking 
civilians and committing innumerable acts of horrendous atrocity.  Rape, amputation, 
abduction, forced marriage and indiscriminate machete killing by hacking and 
mutilation spread throughout northern Uganda terrorising southern Sudanese 
refugees and Ugandan civil populations alike.
397
  More than 25,000 children in 
northern Uganda have been inflicted with forced child soldiering.
398
  Southern 
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Sudanese have been uprooted from refugee settlements fleeing without warning and 
forced to begin afresh processes of rehabilitation.  The result is a critical density of 
war.  As Vigdis Broch-Due notes, ‘the “density” of war is a matter of both 
topography and intimacy.  War topography determines whether there are pockets of 
safety where some notion of normality in terms of production and everyday 
relationships can persevere… The intimacy of war concerns the social distance 
between combatants.’
399
  The seemingly illogical and repetitive nature of the attacks 
in conjunction with the intimacy of the horrendous acts witnessed and experienced 
has profoundly shaped the social memory and coping mechanisms of southern 
Sudanese refugees.
400
  As one individual angrily testified: 
Civilians have been a big target and when they come it is a destruction, killing, real killing.  I 
witnessed it by myself people killed by the LRA.  They don’t want to use guns very much on 
civilians.  They attacked, take them somewhere and hack them to death… One time I came I 
counted a heap of people killed in a compound, 14 of them… For them, the human being is 
the enemy… So psychologically it is a big torture…  When they come and get you at night, 
because their movement is mainly at night, when they get you, they burn your house and kill 
all the children so it is really a very big psychological problem.
401
 
Located at the base of a gentle hill as the road flattens out and the banks of 
the Nile begin to shimmer in the near distance is a southern Sudanese community 
that has deeply experienced the psychological destabilisation of life in northern 
Uganda: Oliji Refugee Camp.  Reaching Oliji requires one to travel the lone northern 
road from Adjumani, taking the westward fork near Robidire Refugee Camp and 
passing the southern refugee settlements of Alere 1 and 2 as well as several small 
Ugandan communities.
402
  By vehicle the trip lasts approximately twenty to thirty 
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minutes.  Comprised entirely of individuals from Equatoria, Oliji lies literally at the 
end of the road.
403
   
According to the refugees, for Oliji the Nile has been the primary source of 
protection from the feared LRA.  The Nile functions as a natural barrier that reduces 
the ability of the LRA to launch surprise offensives or to scatter during 
counterattacks.
404
  Whether true or not, Oliji has not experienced any direct assaults.  
Importantly, the Government of Uganda is not credited with protection and indeed, 
‘one of the most serious problems associated with many camps is the failure of the 
local authorities to provide full protection for refugees.’
405
  For southern Sudanese 
living in Oliji the perception that the Government of Uganda is either unable or 
unwilling to extend security increases the feeling of isolation in the midst of a hostile 
environment.   
Although the Oliji settlement has not endured a direct attack, the residual 
collective memory of these assaults remains a potent force in the community.  In fact 
the majority of the refugees residing in Oliji were not assigned to the community by 
the UN but individually relocated there from settlements that once ambushed by the 
LRA became places of fear.  Out of the approximately 6,000 residents of Oliji, 2,578 
were originally settled there by the UNHCR, the rest, close to 3,500, fled there.
406
  
The refugee camp therefore is a bifurcated community partitioned into ‘settlers’ and 
‘displaced’ with a profound impact on the security and destabilisation of Oliji.   
The memories of these attacks are compounded by the nature of the violence.  
In an LRA raid some individuals are murdered, at times by just simply being beaten 
to death, others will disappear into the ‘bush’ without a body ever located, a few 
manage to escape passing along horrendous accounts and perhaps most damaging, 
when women are found alone in their huts they are instructed to provide food and 
supplies without ever discussing the situation on the risk of the LRA returning to 
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murder the individual and their family.
407
  The LRA psychologically undermines 
security increasing destabilisation and shock by inhibiting survivors from releasing 
their trauma to others and finding integrated healing.  One refugee described the 
aftermath of an LRA attack:  
Some people lost their people, their relatives.  And then some people lost their belongings, 
their houses were burned just to the ground level to pieces.  And then when they fled here 
there is no, there was no place for them for building a tukul sometime.  And then no place for 
digging so they are facing a lot.
408 
That is, there are also ecological consequences that bring further hardship to the 
community.   
 UNHCR policy in Uganda actively promotes and relies upon a strategy of 
refugee self-reliance.  Each family is allocated a small plot of land to cultivate 
supplemented with a small ration from the UN.  In Oliji, climatic conditions in 
addition to the influx of more than three thousand unanticipated individuals have 
severely limited the ability of Sudanese to rely on this strategy.  One UN report 
acknowledged, ‘the path to self-sufficiency has also been adversely affected by 
shocks (i.e. climate and security).  The review team has also questioned whether the 
self-reliance strategy can be largely based on land, given plot sizes, soil quality, non-
rotation, and in some cases non-availability of land.’
409
  Due to limitations in the area 
many of the displaced in Oliji are not assigned a plot of land further adding to the 
tension and strain of the community and forcing them to choose between one of two 
predominant options. 
The first option, promoted by the UNHCR, is the return of refugees to their 
original community even though security arrangements have not improved.  In some 
instances men will travel to their assigned land for a period of time in an attempt to 
provide for their family.  This solution however is risky, further isolates individuals 
and is not durable.  The second option involves negotiating land-renting agreements 
from Ugandan landowners and is equally problematic.  These arrangements are often 
legally informal and subject to the discretion of the owner leading to high fluctuating 
prices.  Furthermore, as one individual expounded:   
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In some areas where they can cultivate, those areas the natives go at night and steal from 
their food and say, “you are digging in our land.”  They just tell them directly, “don’t 
complain.”  And then sometimes… the refugee women who go to the field and when the men 




Emphasising self-reliance in an environment that actively strips the ability for self-
reliance is doubly damaging especially as ‘access to land with perceived security of 
tenure – not necessarily conventional legal title – is highly instrumental in the 
consolidation process.’
411
  Furthermore, as land tenure is tied to democratic 
participation and representation, the displaced are denied access to political 
recourse.
412
  The Oliji refugee community situated in the midst of a destabilising 
dense war are therefore unable to consolidate processes of security, healing and 
political participation.  However memory of LRA attack and torture is not the only 
memory living in the community.   
A second enduring memory communally present inhibiting Sudanese 
consolidation is a select remembrance of treatment offered to Ugandan refugees who 
sought protection in Sudan following the fall of Idi Amin.  Sudanese refugees 
distinguished between the reception offered to Ugandans and that extended to 
themselves insisting that Ugandan treatment of Sudanese was both ‘un-Christian’ 
and unbeneficial.  Although this memory is largely contrived the effect is a 
highlighted perception of intractable difficulty and isolation.
413
   
Even though the refugees are residing in Uganda the memory of an ongoing 
assumed susceptibility to Sudanese Governmental infiltration further erodes pillars of 
communal confidence.  Southern memory regarding past enslavement by northern 
Arabs has not diminished.  Two individuals pressed that while modern day slavery 
might not exist, Khartoum regularly practices ‘indirect slavery’ that attempts to 
economically, culturally and religiously lock southerners out of the mainstream.
414
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Several relayed stories of janjawiid poisoning meat along the border of Sudan so that 
‘the meat is brought to the market at 9:00am [and] by midday it has turned to 
green.’
415
  Although no one claimed to personally know someone thus poisoned any 
food item that came from the north had to be carefully inspected to see if it had been 
tampered with or poisoned.
416
  Communal security is therefore undermined by active 
remembrance of LRA attack and the subsequent difficulties regarding life as 
‘displaced’ refugees, memory of Sudanese treatment of Ugandan refugees and the 
assumed skilful ability of Arabs to inflict harm on southern Sudanese regardless of 
their location.   
One result of these cumulative memories is an ongoing experience of 
impoverishment.  Although southern Sudanese refugees in Kakuma Refugee Camp 
and Khartoum also exist in situations of poverty, other currents, as has been 
illustrated, attenuate at least the perception of this experience.  In Oliji, the 
community internalises the situation of poverty affecting attitudes, experiences of 
traumatisation and in relation to the thesis, perception of and the areas in which the 
church influences the community.  Although many would echo the sentiment of one 
elderly woman, ‘the church is not growing because of poverty,’ Oliji Refugee Camp 




Encouraging Community Unification 
 
Fractured and traumatised Oliji has seen its fair share of conflict, fighting and 
murders.  One individual commented, ‘the fighting’s among the people you will find 
mostly… here, there are different tribes, many, so you will find that other tribes 
cannot communicate with other tribes so that one also will bring the conflict among 
them.  And also you find people, other people just insulting people so that one also 
just brings conflict.’
418
  In addition, alcoholic drinking can also be an instigator 
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behind these conflicts as one described, ‘in Oliji here people drink [so] that the drink 
will take away their suffering.’
419
  Events within Sudan also impact the community:  
When we came here since Sudan you find that other relatives kill other relatives so people 
kill among themselves… When somebody kills somebody so that one there, there is revenge, 
you have to revenge.  So that people think that at least for a year he or she is planning to 
revenge.
420
   
Significantly although there has been conflict between tribes, it did not 
involve large-scale attacks.  There was rather a greater predominance of killing 
among relatives and fellow community members.  This is in part because among 
many of the smaller Equatorian tribes in central and western Equatoria ‘the idea of a 
“tribe” is continually being negotiated…  Most of the time “tribal” identity seems to 
be something rather abstract and remote from the concerns of daily life.’
421
  In Oliji, 
as in much of northern Uganda, tribal and national identities are in constant flux 
shifting in an attempt by refugees to self-maximise each situation.
422
   
In this context churches have played an important role in preaching against 
these conflicts and encouraging unification among the community.  For example one 
SPC leader responded to a query about his thoughts on God, ‘firstly that God is 
saviour, but not only saviour.  When we say God is holy we refer to our life and we 
refer to the forgiveness that God has shown to us…. So at this relationship, [we 
show] this kind of forgiveness, this kind of reconciliation to each other.’
423
  This 
emphasis has filtered into the congregation.  In relation to what he found helpful 
about the Bible, one SPC communicant responded, ‘in the New Testament it is 
written rightly that we should love each other and forgive our enemies.’
424
   
In addition to worship initiatives, various workshop endeavours have also 
afforded formal opportunities for churches to emphasise peacemaking while 
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extending practical guidelines for interaction.  Father Ananias Odaga described, ‘we 
have workshops for peace and justice.  This is one of the things we do in the 
camps… how people can relate together this small thing we do.’
425
  This focus has 
important ramifications for communal solidarity, security and stabilisation.  As one 
ECS pastor claimed, ‘now we built the reconciliation again within the camp here.’
426
   
Importantly although the church has beneficially enhanced communal 
stabilisation and reconciliation through these endeavours its importance should not 
be overstated.  As the leading Catholic catechist in Oliji noted, ‘there is a peace but 
not deep but a select peace but now people are united.’
427
  This statement indicates 
several important elements.  First, there has been a reduction in violence between 
southern Sudanese refugees living in Oliji.  Second, this stems from a newfound 
unity that to a large extent was popularised by the churches and Christian spirituality 
and vernacular.  Third, this peace is ‘not deep’ or rooted into a transformed 
community.  Related, the peace is ‘select,’ that is, the memory of necessitated 
revenge killing, though subdued, remains alive underneath the surface of the 
community.  Peace is therefore shallow and unclear if it will hold following 
repatriation.  All the same, the Ugandan context and church emphasis has helped 
engineer a veneer of peace within the community based primarily on a philosophy of 
communal unity in suffering.  As the Catholic priest observed, ‘it is part of our work 
to preach unity, unity, first we are human beings…  Secondly, we are one nation… 
We have come out of the country for one problem, the war, which has brought us 
out.  There is no need to divide so it is part of our work as Christians to work for 
unity.’
428
   
Near the centre of Oliji community, just north of the market, is the Catholic 
chapel, host to the largest congregation in Oliji.  This church has the clearest 
articulation of a related theology of ecumenical unity in the face of suffering.  As one 
of the members expressed, ‘the person who is praying in different denomination… 
you are not to oppose it so that you live as one because Jesus said we are one… we 
live as one. Yes, you show no difference between you and other congregations or 
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denominations… Those people who are praying in other churches God also loved 
them.’
429
  The rationale behind this new emphasis on denominational spiritual 
similarity and cooperation stems from an active memory of previous detrimental 
church competition: 
Last time in Sudan people were not growing, the church was not growing because there is 
difference in churches, in other church, people are opposing each other. That one will oppose 
the other church and that one will oppose that one.  “Ours is the one which God like it.”  And 
now people are trying to convert people from other churches to come into their chapel and 
their church so that they live together with them by opposing the other one.  But now people 
is sticking in their faith that in church when I hear the word of God then God will like me and 
also I will have eternal life when I believe in him.  So now people are not moving… people 
are sticking in one church.
430
 
In past experiences denominational affiliation was communally divisive increasing 
competition, opposition and societal segmentation.
431
  In Oliji churches have largely 
overcome this partition through focusing on an overarching unity of shared 
spirituality.  As catechist Andrewgo Felix articulated, ‘we come to realise that we are 
using the same words of God.  That means we see no difference now.’
432
  This 
development, arising out of the refugee experience, was not unique to the Catholic 
Church and produces a theological spirituality that underpins other broad communal 
unification endeavours, such as interpersonal reconciliation, by focusing on the 
commonality of shared approaches to accessing God.  The churches therefore 
contributed to a vague spirituality that loosely functioned as a moralising and 
stabilising civil religion emphasising communal unification.  Although the 
ecumenism is not a deep unification on the basis of theological examination and re-
articulation it does contribute to a common platform of interaction that avoids a 
memory of divisive suffering. 
 Christianity is not the only active religion in Oliji Refugee Camp.  Within 
viewing distance of the Catholic chapel is a small nondescript mosque with 
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approximately fifteen regular 
worshippers.  In general the 
community appears to accept that 
the church and mosque worship 
the same God, even though 
distinctions regarding Christ are 
demarcated, and according to at 
least one elder Muslim, the 
mosque stands firmly behind the 
SPLA and maintains basic good 
and open relations with Oliji 
Christians.
433
  While the Muslim community remains a small minority with little 
apparent communal influence, there is a much more open and vibrant third religious 
current in Oliji: African Traditional Religion.   
Eduru Alex relayed the following account regarding the origin of his wife’s 
ability to function as a traditional healer: 
One cannot apply for it or say I intend to do it.  It doesn’t come that way… Let me give you 
the direct example of my wife. My wife and I married in 1968, 1968 it was December 28 
Saturday in the church.  We stayed for about five months together in the church, it was about 
up to May the next year when these things happened.  To me it was new but the parents they 
knew.  When the girl was still very young these spirits attacked her.  They found a way of 
sort of stopping or closing the spirits so as not to disturb her temporarily.  And when she 
came to my place these things opened… What did I do?  I took her back to her parents… 
They closed those things there.  Then she stayed for many years until we got the children… 
Then the disturbances started.  It was so serious it made me lose my job… She would eat 
three spoonfuls of porridge in a day… For two months… she would jump up and down like 




In 1993 it was agreed that a traditional healer should be employed and following his 
consultation the wife fully recovered, regained normal behaviour and began helping 
other individuals disturbed by spirits and in need of healing.
435
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According to Alex, who manages the business aspects of his wife’s 
endeavours, a number of individuals in the community seek their help: ‘There are 
some who come at night, especially church leaders…  Some others… they don’t 
come but they send their relatives.’
436
  Indeed the sound of their drum was quite 
discernable with the most common serious complaint given to the practitioners one 
of ‘white ghosts… spirits that come from trees, rivers, mountains, these are the 
sources… They come close to us here.’
437
  Although a number of Christians profess a 
belief that these individuals continue in this practice simply for economic 
rationales,
438
 at the same time some Christians admitted encountering talking 
mountain, tree or river spirits with the power to disturb individuals.
439
   
Although a full analysis was not possible, if Alex’s assertion that a number of 
Christian individuals petition their services, a fact conceded by several church 
leaders, it is possible to ascertain that a number of individuals blend traditional and 
Christian elements in their daily practice.  In a setting of traumatising and uncertain 
physical security it is unsurprising that ‘the impersonal, the unseen and the 
unpredictable spirit powers makes people search for power which can help in this 
dangerous world, where fate, evil and death abound.’
440
  Though referencing the 
experience of the related Equatorian Kuku tribe seeking refuge in northern Uganda 
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during the first civil war, the description of scholar Scopas Sekwat Poggo is still 
equally applicable to the Oliji context:  
The Kuku people who became Christians did not, however, have a radical change in their 
traditional way of life.  Rather, they chose some aspects of the Christian religion that did not 
conflict with their own traditional religion, values, norms, and customs… In the final 
analysis, the Kuku people do not have a determined attachment to either the Kuku traditional 
religion or Christianity.  Rather, they strive to strike a balance between the two religions as 
an insurance for peace and tranquillity in their own society.
441
   
Even though many individuals within Oliji Refugee Camp likely synthesise 
Christian and traditional practices at a personal experiential level, from a communal 
perspective the role and influence of ‘traditional’ religion has been subsumed into a 
broader Christian framework.  For example, divination and healing occur during 
weekday ‘working hours’ but never on Sunday as ‘Sunday we leave to God.’
442
  This 
is perhaps in part a result of Alex’s ongoing regular attendance of Sunday mass, a 
habit he has maintained since childhood.  Though currently barred from communion, 
Alex emphasised that Sunday is a day for honouring God through abstention from 
work.  Furthermore, traditionally certain forms of divination were public events of 
‘some importance, and those who live in the neighbourhood regard them as 
interesting spectacles well worth a short walk.’
443
  In Oliji these divinations have lost 
their public appeal functioning now as a more private affair discreetly engaged to 
relieve symptoms of suffering.  Traditional religion has shifted to a more personal 
and individual religious experience that though very important has been 
disassociated from some of the broader implications for communal living, solidarity 
and security.
444
  This disengagement is seen most clearly in the fact that although 
spirits and commingled deceased ancestors remain a prevalent reality for many 
southern Sudanese refugees living in Oliji, death rites, funeral and mourning 
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practices have undergone a significant transformation squarely locating them within 
a publicly adhered rubric of Christian articulated civil religion.   
Father Ananias Odaga clearly expressed the estimation that the community 
perceives the church as an important source for spiritual acuity during times of 
sickness and death: 
When there is somebody sick they rush to us the priest to go and offer prayer…  They will 
never wish somebody to die without being helped I mean spiritually helped…  From time to 
time in case there is death already they can call the priest to go and pray just for the thing, the 
burial and so forth. And if the priest cannot go they need the church leader whether the 
protestant church or the Catholic or whatever it depends on the denomination… and that can 
help them psychologically that there is a God who is helping them.
445
 
Traditional burials and periods of mourning were expensive and at times even 
violent occasions for close family members.  As one individual noted, ‘this old 
traditional has left… Church has replaced [it].  It has lifted that burden, that burden 
because when someone dies in your home there is a big burden, which is disturbed 
by the uncles, but now the church has lifted that burden.’
446
    
Churches are therefore helping the community shoulder the costs associated 
with death and easing a time of tension that had previously proven a flashpoint for 
conflict.  As Judith Onesemo described, ‘when somebody dies… this traditional 
performance is going [down] because of influence of the church.’
447
  Certainly times 
of sickness and burial are not the only occasions that churches promote a beneficial 
solidarity.  As one individual stated, ‘the women’s fellowship it is supposed to go 
and encourage the people… The women will be able to come and share the hardship 
together.’
448
  Another responded that the importance of corporate worship was 
‘coming together… because if you are not coming together you cannot understand 
each other.  So if you come together then you discuss, and then you pray together 
[and] God comes to help.’
449
  All the same in terms of promoting communally 
beneficial interactions, efforts to transition burial ceremonies into a Christianised 
paradigm that were stabilising and reconciling proved predominant.  One SPC leader 
assured, ‘most of the funerals are being handled by the church, but before we did not 
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see that.  The funerals had been handled in the way that we Africans know it.’
450
  
From providing mechanisms for reconciliation, contributing to a decrease in societal 
conflict, easing denominational divisions and standing in solidarity with individuals 
in grief, churches have greatly encouraged communal unification in a context of 
isolating trauma.  The churches have been effective in this regard in part because 
they have beneficially influenced the Oliji community in a second principal manner.   
 
Pointing to a Secure Hope 
 
Meeting in a classroom on the far northern edges of Oliji Refugee Camp Lodi 
Francis, a pastor for the Sudan Pentecostal Church, affirmed during one sermon: 
Our situation is not good.  We are having problems, hardships in our families.  And the life is 
difficult for us.  Sometimes we are thinking, we are thinking, is God really there?  I need to 
know… And you don’t know, you don’t understand, and you don’t see.  He can see each of 
them, he knows each of your problems.  He knows all the plans written for you.  So the Lord 
said you have to get advice from him and he will help us.
451
   
As already noted a number of difficulties threaten to overwhelm the community of 
Oliji stripping security, dignity and ultimately trust.  Trauma, violence and anxious 
uncertainty are daily realities.  In this context churches exert an often-
underappreciated encouragement with important communal stabilising implications 
related to psychological morale, motivation and improvement: hope.   
 Theologically this hope was most clearly articulated in the importance and 
expectation of an eternal life of peace in heaven, a focus consistently denoted in all 
of the approached denominations in Oliji.  For example one gentleman among the 
Catholic congregation described, ‘[it is] through the Bible so that we learn there is 
eternal life in the future…  Eternal life is so important because that is the life which 
you get where there is no more suffering.’
452
  Responding to a question concerning 
the very first thing one thinks of when considering God one SPC communicant 
emphasised, ‘for me the first thing I think of God, it is the eternal life.’
453
  Sequonda 
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Wilson, member of ECS-Torit, stated in relation to the most significant 
encouragement stemming from the Bible, ‘Jesus came down from heaven for us and 
he promised that he will go to heaven to prepare a place for us and take us to that 
home where we shall live together and that is the most encouraging part.’
454
   
Connecting the alleviation of suffering in this world with the security of an 
eternal peace mediated through the message of the church helps clarify the growth 
behind the importance of Christian affiliated burial ceremonies.  Certainly the church 
emphasises its own role in this process as evidenced by what the ECS-Kajo Keji 
leader noted as the primary focus of his teaching, ‘this is my vision, my vision when 
I preach to them, God says if you believe in him… your soul will go to him.’
455
  
Among the SPC one individual expressed that he converted to Christianity following 
his flight to refuge in northern Uganda and subsequent displacement due to LRA 
incursions because of the promised 
new life in the coming eternal ‘new 
world.’
456
  That is while heaven or 
the ‘new world’ often remains 
nondescript in terms of life and 
personal subsistence, it does carry 
connotations of peace, security, 
happiness and provision, all 
elements missing in the daily 
existence of Oliji Refugee Camp.  
One elder member of the ECS-Torit congregation maintained, ‘the first thing that 
comes to his mind is the forgiveness that has been made and the promise of eternal 
life that he has given so he will be happy to go there.’
457
  At the same time it is clear 
that a number of Christians retain a belief, even if discreetly, in spirits and ancestors.  
One reason for the influence of heaven therefore, is that it is both a continuation of a 
traditional worldview that blends God, spirits and eschatological belief while also 
providing a sharper sense of beneficial clarity in the language of Christian 
conceptions.   
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In this context it is possible to understand that focus on heaven is in part 
escapist.  There is clearly a construction of an alternate reality that reverses the loss 
and disintegration experienced that for many refugees, as noted in the excerpt from 
Lodi Francis’ sermon, is often non-comprehensible.  However it is important to 
maintain that there is not a total separation or disassociation from reality experienced 
within the camp.  Rather, the focus on promised unalterable security confers hope 
otherwise missing and in Oliji, the church is cognisant of its role and ability to 
endow this encouragement.     
Oliji Refugee Camp is a community that has been severely traumatised.  As 
Guus Van der Veer notes, ‘traumatization refers to extreme, painful experiences 
which are so difficult to cope with that they are likely to result in psychological 
dysfunction both in the short and in the long term.’
458
  Often undervalued the church 
posits a secure hope that is critical in stabilisation and healing.  Father Ananias 
Odaga confirmed, ‘our biggest help, our target, and we wish to continue with it, is to 
prepare the people to be psychologically healed.’
459
  In terms of communal 
stabilisation therefore, by granting access to a secure source of hope the church helps 
mitigate negative traumatisation and dysfunction further tendering communal 
solidarity, stabilisation, encouragement and persevering motivation.   
 
Analysis and Conclusion 
 
Oliji Refugee Camp faces a number of overwhelming difficulties as 
illustrated in the following exchange: 
David: For him he was telling that the experience of shortness of land, the shortness of food, 
there is no proper feeding for them. 
Fibicio: And also they have experienced the problem of health so the medicine they don’t 
have for the community, they are still facing the problem. 
Dali: And also they experience the problem of education.  When you like to send your 
daughters for the higher studies you are not able to do that.  
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Eremugo: And also they experience the problems of insecurity.  Now other peoples leave 




The LRA has ravaged northern Uganda displacing more than three thousand 
additional southern Sudanese refugees to the community of Oliji.  Fear of LRA 
attack and retaliation remains a living memory that is further compounded by a 
perceived remembrance of treatment of Ugandans who had previously sought refuge 
in Sudan and by traditional inter-southern revenge cycles.  The cumulative result is 
an increasing density of war producing intense trauma and isolation.   
In this context churches have increased stability and benefited the community 
in several key ways.  First, churches are involved in promoting and increasing 
reconciliation among members of the community.  As Dali Dadauto noted, ‘the 
church helped people to become united through reconciliation.’
461
  Related, churches 
tempered traditional burial practices in a manner that added comfort, peace, 
solidarity and communal unification.  Finally, churches enabled broad access to a 
‘new world’ dubbed ‘heaven’ that posited within the community a source of secure 
hope.   
However, despite these influences, the overarching perception regarding the 
influence of the churches on the community by the Sudanese refugees themselves 
was most often labelled as ‘poor’ or ‘low.’  As one individual stated, ‘the church is 
planning on preaching the word of God but only power is not there.’
462
  There 
appears to be two predominant rationales behind this self-articulated assessment.   
First, churches in Oliji are often associated with women.  Jerisa Meling of the 
SPC observed, ‘let me say in all the churches, the majority are women.  And these 
women, the majority of them are those who do not have husbands, the widows.’
463
  
Eunice Kojo of ECS-Kajo Keji confirmed, ‘the church may be full of believers [but] 
most of them are the women.’
464
  Traditionally women are often denigrated, cast into 
second-class moulds and given little public prominence or input into cultural 
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development.  In this instance the communally estimated correlation between church 
and women increases the perception that churches offers little beneficial influence to 
the community.  Significantly the church has not actively challenged this perception 
or overtly attempted to increase gender equality.   
A second and more important reason related to the perceived inability of 
churches to significantly influence the community centres on the assumption that 
church membership equates material assistance.  One prominent leader disparaged, 
‘they think that if they go to the church then they will obtain what they want from 
there.  Other people go there for women or other things because they want to obtain 
something from the church, not to get any truth.’
465
  As churches are generally 
unable to contribute within this arena some within the community ‘tend to think as if 
God is a burden so with that we have the experience that some believers have gone 
back.’
466
  To a large extent churches have internalised this value so that one leader 
declared, ‘actually here there is no help that we have… because we have no support 
from anywhere then the church cannot help.’
467
  Churches in Oliji perceive 
themselves as poor and have consequently developed an attitude of outside 
dependence that displaces alternative forms of creative interaction and diminishes the 
possible influence churches could exert on the community.
468
  If the churches in 
Kakuma were conceptualised as at the forefront, Khartoum in the centre, Oliji would 
be labelled as ‘low,’ at the ‘end’ or even ‘falling behind.’   
Importantly, actual church influence was higher than the common perception.  
The churches wield a strong sway on the community through their encouragement of 
communal unification via interpersonal and familial reconciliation, denominational 
ecumenism and proffered solidarity during times of sickness and death as well as the 
depositing of a secure and accessible hope articulated as a mirroring reality.  There is 
a loose but underlying civil spirituality couched in Christian terms and practice 
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underpinning the communal stability.  This was perhaps most clearly articulated by 
Eduru Alex, the husband of the leading African Traditional Religion practitioner who 
responded to his conception regarding the influence of the churches: ‘It is big… 
There is no, there is no old way of mourning, of crying, of beating the house, these 
things are not there, people now sit down to pray, to pray for the dead and pray also 
for those who remain alive.  It is good.’
469
  Therefore, while the influence of the 
churches is higher than generally perceived, it is still limited.  As one scholar 
denoted:  
The characterization of sociocultural displacement as a condition of disintegration does not 
imply that the displaced are unable to give meaning to their existence in suffering.  
Nevertheless, their coping responses mask uncertainty, anxiety, and stress; the most 




In Oliji Refugee Camp the ongoing superior threat of intense suffering serves 
as the primary motivating factor yielding communal unity.  As one individual 
conveyed, the ‘problems they have faced together is uniting them, the problems are 
so great for them.  And then here they are suffering equally.  They are all being taken 
care of by UN.  They don’t have food, they have to share equally so there is no point 
for them to be disunited.’
471
  Though the influence of the churches is greater than 
typically articulated by communicants due to churches contribution to reconciliation, 
hope and underlying shared spiritual religiosity, this influence is limited and 
uncertain to meaningfully extend beyond the Oliji refugee experience.  This 
limitation, though certainly substantiated by the overwhelming and demoralising 
broader external factors, is more importantly the result of a failure by the churches to 
creatively maximise their own resources, imagine alternatives or mobilise 
constituents.  The most important limitations are self-imposed limitations.  
Therefore, although the churches have beneficially contributed to communal stability 
and reconciliation, in Oliji Refugee Camp the churches’ influence is best understood 
by the internalised perception of poverty posturing church influence as an actively 
decreasing reality positioned as behind or at the end of the culture.   
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Chapter Four  
Convergence Along the Road 
 
‘When the Sudan came into war people looked, asked and changed their thinking 
from traditional [religion] to look for God in their trouble.  Therefore the church 




‘Anyway we cannot actually compare our suffering to Jesus’ suffering.  A human 





Underneath the palm fronds of an open wooden-poled community centre in a 
far southwestern corner of south Sudan the community gathered in a cleared field 
adjacent to the sole muddy football pitch.  With the atmosphere full of anticipation 
the gathering is graced with a number of local notables – the Acting Governor of the 
State, the Cabinet and many of Western Equatoria’s State MPs.  Spread around the 
perimeter a line of machinegun wielding SPLA soldiers casually observed as a long 
line of women marched from the Women’s Centre to the middle of the clearing.  The 
celebration for the International Day of Women can now officially commence and it 
begins just as it will end: with a prayer of Christian thanksgiving.  Bracketed 
between these two prayers speeches were offered and songs were sung in the format 
established by the County Commissioner, a greeting in the name of the Lord Jesus 
Christ and the utilisation of the Bible as a reference point, standard and example.
474
     
Unheralded and unnoticed by the international community this small 
celebration in Yambio highlighted in a very public display the ability of a Christian 
spirituality to infuse and underpin every aspect of the southern Sudanese landscape, 
ideology, aspirations and civil society.  Evidenced in the celebration and in the three 
refugee settings of Kakuma, Khartoum and Oliji, although Christianity has varied in 
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the extent of its impact on the community, its influence has substantially grown 
numerically, communally and in articulation of a loose and nascent civil religion.  
This chapter will delineate rationales related to the recent Christian acceleration, 
compare and contrast overlapping areas of convergence between the three camps and 
more thoroughly demarcate indicators of a national emergence of a Christian 
influenced civil religion in south Sudan.   
 
Converging Growth: Rationales Behind Christian Expansion 
 
Christianity has grown among southern Sudanese for a variety of rationales 
first understood as a counteracting balance to a perceived threat of external forces.  
At a national level this is best understood as resistance to a threat of Islamic 
assimilation.  A number of respondents noted that they believed the recent growth in 
Christianity was intimately related to the persecution of southerners.  Most clearly 
and consistently expressed among the displaced of Hajj Yusuf, Khartoum one 
individual for example noted, ‘during the war, the time of war, the preaching was 
strong.  Christians were facing the persecution but at the same time they were 
resisting to preach.’
475
  Another stated, ‘at that time when the government here 
decided that the war should be jihad… even the Muslims, the southern Muslims who 
used to be Muslims changed to Christianity.’
476
  Broadly representative of a 
sentiment resonating throughout southern Sudan one refugee in Uganda echoed, ‘we 
have to reach our people so that they may not be consumed by the Islamic 
religion.’
477
   
Importantly however, while a number of individuals perceived Christianity as 
a potential tool for resistance, for the majority of southern Sudanese the war was not 
conceptualised primarily in terms of Christian-Islamic conflict.  In fact such a 
schema of interpretation is more consistently applied by the international community 
and at times, even by the Government of Sudan.
478
  The result therefore is that ‘the 
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problem here is not religion but those who politicise it for political and economic 
ends.’
479
  A number of southern Sudanese expressed an ambiguity concerning the 
nature of Islam as a religion, as is partially demonstrated by the ongoing participation 
in Islamic practice in Oliji Refugee Camp, while clearly differentiating that the ruling 
Sudanese governmental regime was unacceptable.  Expressing the multi-dimensional 
nature of the root causes of the war one cleric in Kakuma stated:  
You can know the real problems of Sudan.  One, we are different from our colour.  They are 
the Arab world that is the one thing.  The second is that… we are Christians, they are 
Muslims… They want us to be submissive to them.  If you do not want to be submissive to 
them they want to kill us all, the southerners in Sudan.  It is not because of one person who 
ruled the country, Omar Bashir.  Is it all the people because they say that we [northerners] are 
Arab and we [southerners] are African.
480
   
Whereas displaced in Khartoum frequently utilised religious vernacular to 
frame conceptual conflicts, refugees in Uganda more often referred to broad and 
vague notions of problems with ‘Arabs.’  This is in part because for the majority of 
Equatorians negative interaction with governmental forces has not revolved around 
religious ideology but the deeply 
damaging disturbances of the 
LRA, for which the Government 
of Sudan is partially blamed.  As 
one gentleman declared, ‘Omar 
Bashir has given their place, 
Eastern Equatoria, to the LRA.  
Now LRA is disturbing people 
there… And that one is the 
promise of Omar.’
481
  Further validated by the research undertaken in Kakuma 
Refugee Camp, the majority of southern Sudanese understand the war as a religio-
nationalistic conflict with multiple and overlapping causes in which Christianity 
offers one form of active resistance.   
At a local level within the refugee context churches in all three settings 
offered a second format of resistance as cultural custodian.  Labelled discriminatorily 
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as ‘refugees’ by both northern Sudanese and the international community, southern 
Sudanese inhabited a space predominantly stripped of choice, control and cultural 
continuity.
482
  As was explored, particularly in Chapter Two, church format, teaching 
and practice maintained substantive parallels with traditional patterns of societal 
organisation and expression.  By offering opportunities for advancement and 
southern demarcation outside the control of external agencies in a format both 
flexible and largely analogous to traditional approaches, churches exerted a powerful 
positive influence on the community that significantly increased the appeal, at least 
temporarily, of Christianity.  Producing beneficial outcomes in terms of communal 
stabilisation churches helped southern Sudanese resist, interpret and adapt to settings 
of destabilisation and disempowerment.   
At a national level therefore, Christianity supplied the vernacular and to a 
certain though limited extent communal identification, while at the local level 
churches functioned as the actual mechanism for resistance by providing a forum for 
cultural continuity, maintenance and adaptation.  Christianity attracted a number of 
new adherents bolstering its numerical baseline precisely because it first operated as 
a counterbalancing tool of resistance.   
A second predominant reason for the rapid expansion of Christianity among 
southern Sudanese relates to the communal benefits offered by the churches in all 
three settings.  To varying degrees the churches in Kakuma, Khartoum and Oliji 
efficaciously responded to forces of social division by promoting platforms of 
reconciliation.  In Kakuma Refugee Camp, a community sundered by tribal 
divisions, the church activated elements of inter-ethnic reconciliation.  As one young 
man commented, ‘when we were in Sudan many people killed each other and in the 
Bible it is written not to kill… So as we came to Kenya as a refugee maybe God 
wants us to learn that… we should have peace and we should understand the problem 
of your neighbour.’
483
  Pastors reflexively served as models of healthy interaction 
through programmes of personal visitation and exchange during times of conflict, 
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churches steadily advocated broadening communal identification and reciprocity and 
communicants organised community workshops on peace building.  Although 
churches were not the only channel encouraging this development, in Kakuma they 
were predominant in advancing communal solidarity and new collective 
identification critical in the peaceful stabilisation of the camp.   
Though to a lesser extent, in both Khartoum and Oliji churches were also 
involved in elements of reconciliation primarily in promoting resolution to intra-
familial disputes and beneficial interaction with the local host population.  As one 
refugee in Khartoum described: 
The Bible rebukes us and also the Bible tells us to reconcile or to forgive others.  For 
example this civil war has created deep hatred and the causes of war are from our brothers.  
As we know them now we can understand that forgiveness is the only way that people can 
live together.  We have to forgive them for all what they did.  As you have been to south I 
think you have seen much destruction that happened in south. This is from our brothers.  And 
you read the Sudanese, the black people, are the people of this land.  We are the real people 
of this land.  And we are treated badly and all this but we should forgive them.
484
 
In addition to reconciliation the churches produced a number of other 
communal benefits.  These ranged from extended services such as education, 
orphanages and health care to congregational networks of support in the distribution 
of resources, information and spiritual livelihood.  Particularly in Khartoum and Oliji 
churches often provided spiritual access and sanctity to key moments of life 
transition.  Living among communities tattered and frayed churches were a critical 
beacon of inspiring hope that empowered refugees.
485
  Across the various refugee 
settings the ability of the churches to offer solidarity, rehabilitate networks of 
support, build peace and reconciliation, broaden otherwise limited physical services, 
promote hope and grant divine sacredness both substantially influenced communal 
stability positively and functioned as a significant rationale behind the numerical 
growth of southern identification with Christianity particularly post-1989.   
There is a third and final overarching reason related to the growth of 
Christianity throughout southern Sudan: communally defined frameworks of 
interpretation.  As the war intensified and communities were wrecked southern 
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Sudanese increasingly searched for new venues of interaction and understanding to 
adapt to the war zone.  Christianity is to a large extent significantly indigenised due 
to an initial scarcity of missionaries reinforced by the 1964 governmental decision 
expelling all missionaries.
486
  While retaining important elements of continuity, 
churches increasingly functioned as conduits that beneficially adapted and 
transitioned traditions into new frameworks of interpretation.  For example 
Christianity provided in Kakuma, Khartoum and Oliji an overarching vernacular and 
rationale for unity between southern ethnicities without significantly challenging or 
altering the existence and characteristics of those ethnicities outside of times of 
interaction.  That is, Christianity allowed unity for southern Sudanese on the basis of 
a maintained diversity of tribes and denominations.  The capacity of the church to 
balance limited maintenance of traditional continuity within a new framework of 
interpretation proved numerically strengthening and as it relates to ethnic interaction 
will be more fully explored in the following chapter.   
Spiritually, Christianity’s granting of new and unmediated access to God 
attracted a number of adherents dismayed at the perceived failure of traditional 
religious practices to stem the tide of war and offer meaningful protection.  Sharon 
Hutchinson observed that among the Nuer, ‘civilian youth and women of all ages 
were especially attracted to Christianity’s promise of more direct relationship with 
God, unmediated by the rigid age and gender hierarchies characterizing indigenous 
sacrificial practices… Christianity encouraged hope in the protective powers of a 
compassionate and accessible God.’
487
  This new spiritual paradigm provided an 
alternate framework that proved especially powerful as it was primarily transmitted 
via traditionally formatted songs composed and heralded by indigenous itinerant 
evangelists often without the knowledge of even local clergy.
488
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The ability of Christianity to function beneficially as a new framework of 
interpretation is perhaps most clearly expressed in a substantively shifted 
understanding of the meaning and purpose of the war as a tool of internal cleansing 
and calling.  Many southern Sudanese perceive that God if not originating, at least 
utilised the war as a form of discipline on southern Sudanese for failing to maintain a 
right relationship with him.  Importantly however the ultimate result of this divinely 
sanctioned suffering is purification, rehabilitation, blessing and victory.
489
  For 
southern Sudanese Isaiah 18 is one of the most frequently cited and important 
Biblical passages understood as a prophecy of destruction and renewal: 
Woe to the land of whirring wings along the rivers of Cush,  
which sends envoys by sea in papyrus boats over the water. 
Go, swift messengers, to a people tall and smooth-skinned,  
to a people feared far and wide, an aggressive nation of strange speech,  
whose land is divided by rivers. 
All you people of the world, you who live on the earth, 
when a banner is raised on the mountains, you will see it, 
and when a trumpet sounds, you will hear it. 
This is what the Lord says to me: 
“I will remain quiet and will look on from my dwelling place”…  
He will cut off the shoots with pruning knives, 
And cut down and take away the spreading branches. 
They will all be left to the mountain birds of prey and to the wild animals; 
The birds will feed on them all summer, the wild animals all winter. 
At that time gifts will be brought to the Lord Almighty  
from a people tall and smooth-skinned, from a people feared far and wide, 
an aggressive nation of strange speech, whose land is divided by rivers –  
the gifts will be brought to Mount Zion,  
                                                                                                                                          
people in the forest but deep down his heart was not right.  Then one evening he was bitten by a 
deadly snake and very shortly he fell unconscious to the ground…  During his period of 
unconsciousness he had a vivid dream.  In the vision two people came to him and one of them said, 
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the place of the Name of the Lord Almighty.
490 
As one southern Sudanese pastor stated, ‘maybe what God mentioned in the Old 
Testament is reality because God mentioned one thing, the corpse, and you know the 
corpse, the body of these soldiers, the bird would eat them and the sun will see them 




For many displaced southern Sudanese Christians the geographical land of 
southern Sudan has been infused with mystical qualities symbolising freedom, 
provision and restoration.  It is a ‘promised land’ with Biblical connotations, divinely 
decreed to southern Sudanese, secured upon the restoration of a proper relationship 
with God now centred in Christianity and church affiliation.  One individual in 
Kakuma stated, ‘we cannot blame God as to why we came to Kenya as refugees.  No 
we cannot do that because maybe the time when we were in Sudan we did bad things 
and now God changes us from those bad things to good things.’
492
  Another 
explained, ‘we have Isaiah 18, which is the reference to what we are doing in Sudan.  
As he said the God will call his people from Sudan… and when they go back to their 
country later on they will be the gift of God to thank God for what they have learned 
and what God has [taught] them during the crisis.’
493
  Responding to why he believed 
the peace came one displaced southerner in Hajj Yusuf said he would ‘refer us back 
to Isaiah 18 which says that the Sudan will be punished… Every community was 
praying for the peace to come and now the peace has come.’
494
  Replying to a similar 
question Richard Thomas, a vicar in Yambio observed, ‘what I see is within all this 
war and peace has come that it is really, I can just can say, that it is God’s work.  
God is trying to change this south Sudan into another form.’
495
  Widespread the 
belief that God has divinely chosen south Sudan to experience significant blessing on 
the condition of large scale turning to the church has fuelled a mass conversion of 
southerners seeking a new framework of interpreting the war and locating meaning 
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in the midst of suffering.  Many would echo the sentiment of one young man in Oliji 
Refugee Camp, ‘the Israeli people they never accepted God but when they came later 
to accept the word of God then they returned to their place.  And now at this time 
peace also came to our land there because now people realise that they really 
understand or they agree with the word of God and that prayer helps the peace to 
come.’
496
   
The result of this change in interpretation is the further empowering of 
displaced southern Sudanese in three important ways.  First, focus on divine 
intervention on the basis of southern realignment preserves a measure of control for 
many southerners.  As was borne out during field research what one ‘almost never 
finds is a confession of ignorance about the answer to some question which the 
people themselves consider important.’
497
  That is when queried about the origin of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the details of which are not widely distributed, 
it is likely that some respondents attributed the origin to God rather than admitting a 
lack of knowledge to an outside observer thereby relinquishing control.  At a social 
level, concentration on the need for action by southerners themselves undermines a 
narrative of Islamic control.  It shifts the paradigm of reference away from negative 
response to external threat to an internal reaction of positive development.  In many 
ways it actually bypasses the need to understand, respond or build bridges to the 
Islamic discourse as northerners are subverted to a tool of functionality in the hands 
of God.  For many southern Sudanese, interpretations of the war centre on dialogue 
within the southern community and between God rather than a narrative of Islamic-
Christian conflict.
498
  This shift in understanding is clearly articulated in one of the 
most popular songs of the 1990s written by Mary Alueel Ngongdit Garang: 
“Let Us Give Thanks” 
1) Let us give thanks; 
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let us give thanks to the Lord 
in the day of devastation;  
and in the day of contentment….  
When we beseech the Lord 
and unite our hearts and have hope, 
then the jok has no power.
499
 
God has not forgotten us. 
Evil is departing and holiness is advancing, 
these are the things that shake the Earth. 
 
Chorus: Do not look back; we are the people 
who have received the life of Christ. 
Let us show forth the light 
of the Son of God. 
Do what you are able to do 
according to the gift which has been given you. 
 
5) It is not that God does not have power to deliver us, 
but we had to endure our punishment because of our foolishness 
because of our foolishness 
of worshipping wood and animals. 
So God thrashed out sin  
from within mankind 
and then he called us 
to come with purity into his presence. 
Salvation has come; 
jok is departing with its hands tight to its sides. 
Let us be strong, 
God wants to visit the earth.
500
 
Second, emphasis on Christian participation in the emergence of peace allows 
greater access to individual and communal contribution.  In a context demanding 
support for the liberation movement headed by the SPLA, prayers and directed 
worship are understood as one potential tool in the fight for freedom.  Participation in 
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Christian religiosity offers space for the development of a semblance of identification 
and contribution to the broader effort otherwise restricted for many displaced 
southerners.   
Third, as a framework for understanding, this shift enables refugees to locate 
their suffering and disintegration in the midst of broader meaning and purpose.  
Belief in an ancient prophecy of divine selection bringing sustainable peace after a 
limited period of suffering points to a valuable rationale in what is for many an 
otherwise incomprehensible war of anguish and attrition.  As Broch-Due affirms, ‘in 
many warscapes religion plays an important role precisely because of the desire to 
situate horrific material events in a cosmological framework that renders them 
meaningful.’
501
  Powerful symbols such as the cross and a vibrant theology of 
cosmological meaning and ordering allow the church to function, therefore, as a 
social sanctuary of regeneration and hope.   
Christianity has grown among southern Sudanese with rapid alacrity.  
Although exact numerical quantification is beyond the scope of the thesis, remaining 
an important area for future exploration, available research indicates that sixty to 
seventy percent of all southern Sudanese would self-identify with Christianity.  This 
development reflects a dramatic increase from around ten to twenty percent prior to 
1989.  It is unsurprising that many southern Sudanese Christians will claim even 
higher percentages of growth as individual numerical growth gave way to broad 
social identification wherein ‘group beliefs are usually held with great confidence 
because they are considered to be facts and verities.  This occurs because group 
beliefs define the essence of the group and thus the reality of the individuals who 
view themselves as group members.’
502
  Christianity grew for a number of rationales 
summarised as a tool of resistance to external forces, a source of numerous 
significant communal benefits to local settings and as a facilitator of empowering 
frameworks of war interpretation.  Reflecting on the explosive growth of Christianity 
one southern Sudanese scholar noted: 
The Church has become a new community capable of absorbing that suffering.  It is trying to 
provide encouragement, protection, refuge, healing and hope for the victims of the war.  In 
the difficult realities of war and its extensive destruction, the church with its meagre 
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resources, tries to feed the hungry, nurse the wounded, clothe the naked, educate the 
illiterate, defend the defenceless and speak for the voiceless and the marginalised.  For many 
people, the church has now become what it never was in the past.
503
   
 
Convergence of Three Camps: Kakuma, Hajj Yusuf and Oliji  
 
Geographically separated by hundreds of miles and varying cultures each of 
the three camps represent a current of interaction that exists within southern Sudan 
along a continuum of war, social stability and peace building as is charted in 
Appendix One.  Within Kakuma Refugee Camp, despite a number of substantial 
difficulties, in recent years the camp itself has been spared major influxes or external 
threats.  The predominant challenge has been internal conflict generated between 
southern Sudanese on the basis of tribal and ethnic affiliation.  In this context 
churches have largely succeeded in helping establish communal peace, reconciliation 
and stability with a strong social identification with Christianity.  Most associated 
with leading elders and men churches have been at the ‘forefront’ of shaping cultural 
responses and reformation. 
Among the displaced in Hajj Yusuf, Khartoum ethnic conflict was present 
only to a limited degree.  The predominant threat to security and healthy interaction 
was an external imposition of discrimination, segregation and exclusion imposed by 
the dominant Riverine Arabic host population.  Forced to the margins and alienated 
from southern Sudan to a greater extent than the other two settings, individuals 
grappled with endeavours to establish an Islamic agenda of purity at their expense.  
Increasingly the community 
turned to the churches for a 
bestowal of divine sanctity 
in key transitions and for 
guidance and advice in 
establishing beneficial 
patterns of interaction 
within an unaltered culture.  
Linked symbolically with 
youth churches became 
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‘culturally central,’ functioning as cultural custodians with significant influence and 
impact on southern communal stability in a context demanding adaptation. 
Refugees in Oliji Refugee Camp were subjected to a high density of warfare 
that forced multiple occasions of displacement and intense fragmentation.  External 
threats from the Government of Sudan, the LRA and the SPLA fused into a single 
force continuously psychologically undermining the majority of the refugees.  
Though churches were able to resolve a number of familial disputes, increase 
communal solidarity on the basis of shared suffering and contribute to a meagre but 
critical measure of hope, at a popular level the churches were correlated most 
commonly with women and an influence best understood as low or ‘falling behind.’   
Each of these three case studies represents responses found throughout 
southern Sudan to both the war and the establishment of Christian influence.  That is, 
taken as a whole a composite picture develops of the impact of Christianity on 
southern Sudan during the second civil war: an internal agency of significant impact 
at the forefront of shaping southern perspectives on inter-tribal relations, trusted and 
turned towards as a centre for divine blessing and practical aid that only to a lesser 
extent actually altered practices of worship at a personal and familial level.  While 
the influence of Christianity is significant on southern Sudan as a whole it is limited 
and even problematic in several key ways. 
First, although church leadership and methods of evangelism have been 
largely indigenised, important areas of theology lag behind.  This is perhaps most 
important in the area of individual social equality.  While churches have been vocal 
in promoting reciprocity between southern tribes they have been less intentional and 
adamant about translating equality into the contextual life and practice of the church, 
especially in relation to women.  The following excerpt from a sermon by a pastor in 
Juba is revealing:  
Who can deny that there is corruption and violence here, especially in Juba town?  And 
silence means acceptance.  During the International Day of Women [four days ago] the 
women complained that the men were treating them as second class and violating their 
human rights.  And on this day the men were supposed to be in the kitchen so the women 
could go to the celebration.  But some women just cooked the food for their husbands and fed 
them before they went to the celebration because this is how the traditional culture and laws 
of our culture are.  It is impossible for men to be in the kitchen.  This is the role of the 
women.  So if the men do this they are violating the role of women.  They are fighting the 
human rights of women.  [Laughter and agreement by men.]  And even the Bible supports 
this because the Bible talks about gender balance and roles.  The woman is to support her 
husband and the husband is to take care of everything.  Today there are many things coming 
trying to violate and corrupt our character, to violate our culture.  And so we must examine 
these things against the local laws and the Bible and not allow these things to corrupt us.   
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Today Juba town is like Jerusalem and Jesus Christ is weeping.  What is happening in Juba 
today is beyond evil…  So our town is going to be destroyed and Jesus Christ is weeping.  If 
we are not careful then our town will be destroyed.
504 
The above passage highlights the ability of many leading church elders to 
actually co-opt the language of human rights and equality in a manner that subverts 
the status of women.  Organisations such as the ECS’ Mother’s Union offer limited 
leadership exposure and some church leaders with international contact have at least 
begun to recognise the importance of supporting the rights of women.
505
  However 
these endeavours remain extremely limited in scope and influence.  For example 
among the churches in Hajj Yusuf and Oliji there were no clear examples of efforts 
to increase gender equality and as an issue, it was raised in none of the interviews 
and focus groups.
506
   
Related to the above one of the most significant areas of needed ongoing 
theological reflection is the area of marriage and family as war has considerably 
strained many traditional forms of socially approved relationships.  In an 
environment of substantively increased widows and high mortality church teaching 
has further eroded support for many practices engineered to encourage communal 
care, responsibility and solidarity.  By categorically emphasising monogamy without 
reflexively establishing other venues of social care for women and children many 
local church leaders are indirectly loosening ethical bonds of common kinship that 
once defined communities.  To a certain extent, Christianity is contributing to the 
loosening of individual social mores.   
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As was particularly emphasised in Chapter Two, though borne out during 
research in Khartoum and Oliji and indicated by the preceding discussion on gender 
equality, there is a tendency for church leaders to emulate traditional patterns of 
organisation, power and control.  Although in a refugee context this imitation may 
prove helpful in establishing levels of continuity and stability, there are important 
long-term negative implications with the maintenance of predominately male 
oriented hierarchies.  The centrality of male dominion even when individual women 
are given roles of leadership was clearly evidenced during a meal following one SPC 
worship service in Oliji.  As the meal was served men and women divided into 
separate areas of consumption with one notable exception.  Evangelist Victoria 
Bulsa, an individual described as ‘powerful’ in spirit was the sole woman to eat and 
freely interact with the gathered men.  Church leaders should more theologically 
assess standard church seating arrangements, organisation and hierarchies in order to 
promote greater social equality among constituents.   
This lack of theological development is rooted in part in the rapid expansion 
of Christianity.  As Andrew Wheeler noted, ‘the Church in Sudan has not been 
formed by missionary endeavour and proclamation, but by rural evangelists with 
minimal education (in the western sense of that word) preaching an inculturated 
message conveyed in a vernacular language rooted in vernacular translations of 
portions of the Bible.’
507
  Unguided and often unrecognised the growth of 
Christianity in southern Sudan is a journey of evangelists carrying a message adapted 
to local institutions threatened by a traumatising war.  Though the endeavours of 
these individuals to promote social identification and interpretations of hope in the 
midst of destabilisation are laudable, it remains unclear that corresponding official 
training institutions emphasise responsible theological reflection and assimilation.
508
   
Though largely beyond the scope of the thesis it is important to also note that 
for many southern Sudanese private individual worship is highly fluid.  While church 
influence has helped create space and ease in discussing and transitioning inter-tribal 
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southern relations within the public sphere by an encouragement of communal 
Christian identification, influence within the private sphere remains limited.  At a 
grassroots level Christian teaching may actually loosen inter-personal bonds while 
simultaneously encouraging a generic and less meaningful overlay of public and 
political unity.  In south Sudan, therefore, the greatest impact of the church is 
primarily at a political and social level as was demonstrated in the three specific 
refugee camps of Kakuma, Khartoum and Oliji.   
In terms of theological expression and emphasis, churches tended to reflect 
their local context rather than their denominational affiliation.  For example an ECS 
congregation in Kakuma Refugee Camp displayed a closer similarity to PCOS 
constituents in Kakuma than to other ECS churches in Hajj Yusuf or Oliji.  This does 
not imply that there are not certain characteristics common to churches in a 
denomination.  ECS congregations tend to emphasise a symbolism of the cross and 
themes of suffering.  SPC members in general articulate Biblical passages more 
frequently and fluidly.  However themes and practices related to the local context 
were highlighted as predominant by the participants themselves.  In addition to 
reflecting the limited theological development of official denominational education, 
it also demonstrates the ability of the various churches to remain close to grassroots 
concerns and developments shaped within the more practical sphere of local setting. 
Theologically, one specific theme tied all of the denominations in all three of 
the examined locations, Kakuma, Khartoum and Oliji: robust evangelisation.  
Consistently maintained during all of the various interviews and focus groups was a 
legitimate concern centred on the need for personal salvation in Christ.  All of the 
churches, from Catholic to Pentecostal, tend towards a conservative evangelicalism 
that embraces personal repentance and piety as well as a literalist reading of the 
Scriptures.
509
  Other themes that emerged as shared emphasis between the camps 
were value based: apocalyptic victory, hope, the sacredness of southern Sudanese 
land, divine selection and adaptation.  These themes point to a performative value 
rather than a strictly theological value.  That is these themes are deeply rooted 
grassroots concerns of healing, holism and limited social progressivism that seeks 
empowerment to overcome the daily struggles of lives caught in a destabilising war.   
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In addition to problems associated with limited theological development, 
especially in relation to issues of individual social equality, a second problematic 
area for southern Sudanese churches has been fragmentation and upheaval 
particularly within structured denominational leadership.  The most chronicled 
example is a split that occurred in the Episcopal Church of Sudan from 1986 to 1992 
over a disputed election of a new Archbishop that ended in reconciliation shortly 
after the death of one of two contenders for the episcopate.  Resolution was stymied 
as the church was ‘full of tribal tension’ affiliated around support for leadership 
chosen accordingly.
510
  The ECS is not alone in struggles in this arena.  In fact many 
respondents in the PCOS, particularly in Kakuma, automatically equated the tribal 
demarcation Nuer with PCOS membership.  In 1994 the Governor of Upper Nile 
helped arrange a replacement of the leadership of PCOS-Malakal, a ‘kind of take 
over by force,’ that also involved pastors related to the Governor.
511
  Thomas Melut, 
then Secretary for Mission and Evangelism lost his job during this process because as 
he later claimed, ‘when there is war people of course do not think the same as when 
there is no war.  There was some trauma you see in the minds even of the leadership 
of the people of the church because of these troubles.’
512
   
In 2000 the Sudan Pentecostal Church-North also experienced internal 
conflict on the basis of financial control as relayed by Fermo Ogilla who was at the 
time the Acting Overseer: 
All the churches are experiencing some kind of internal conflicts, tribal, political within the 
church.  Actually it has happened in Pentecostal Church, it has happened in Presbyterian 
Church, it has happened with the African Inland Church, it has happened in Sudanese Church 
of Christ and I think also it could be behind the reason why there has been a slide… Yeah, it 
has happened in the Pentecostal Church.  Actually it almost broke the church but by the grace 
of God the church did not split…  It started with my wife was sick, she was sick with some 
kind, she has some mental problems.  And actually I did not like to be a General Overseer for 
that reason but when our former General Overseer decided that he would not contest the 
election he wanted to go, I mean he wanted to go for further studies then I was forced to 
come in because I was only the next person.  But later on some of my colleagues used that, I 
mean my wife’s sickness, I mean it was more or less like a coup d'état.  But behind it was the 
misuse of money… The money that was meant for projects and relief and so these colleagues 
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had been using the money… They thought that I was too strict and so the best way for them 
was to find that there was a misuse.  I said people this problem with my wife is not new, 




Though churches at both a grassroots and denominational level have 
promoted unity, reconciliation and good governance they have at times themselves 
been sites of competition and corruption.  Tribal politicisation compounded by 
access to foreign cash flow and opportunities for advancement has caused conflict 
and setback.  The SCC itself recently underwent significant purging with all two 
hundred staff members released after accusations that leading members of the 
Council misappropriated money during the SCC response to Darfur.
514
  Despite these 
problems related to the internal application of individual social equality and struggles 
with denominational schism, churches, as was demonstrated in Kakuma, Khartoum 
and Oliji, have significantly and positively impacted the development of communal 
stability and reconciliation.  In all three settings churches recreated social networks, 
granted access to divine sacredness during birth, marriage and burial ceremonies, 
encouraged resolution to communal disputes, extended practical advice in the search 
for economic alternatives, provided social services such as schools, libraries and 
health care and were a repository for communal symbols of peace, victory, meaning 
and hope.  The churches therefore facilitated convergence along the road to peace 
and generated a loose national identification with Christianity.   
 
National Convergence: Indications of Civil Religion 
 
Sipping steaming tea in small clear glasses in the back office of All Saints 
Cathedral, Khartoum on a hot March afternoon Canon Sylvester Thomas relayed the 
results of his most recent visit to Juba, capital of the Government of Southern Sudan: 
initial approval for the construction of a ‘Centre for Reconciliation and 
Forgiveness.’
515
  The focal point of the Centre would be a specially constructed ECS 
cathedral built around the tomb of John Garang and connected by hallway to the 
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Parliament of the Government of Southern Sudan.  Surrounding the chapel would be 
a cafeteria, Internet café, lecture rooms and a library comprised of two sections, one 
dedicated to reconciliation and forgiveness and another to good governance.  After 
viewing some of the initial sketches generated by an architect Thomas stated that the 
overall visual effect was a marked similarity to Washington D.C., with a new 
national chapel, the tomb of Garang, analogous to the Lincoln Monument, and 
Parliament arranged along a spatial line.  James Wani Igga, the Speaker of the 
Parliament for Southern Sudan, Rebekah Garang, a Member of the Parliament and 
wife of late Colonel John Garang, and Salva Kiir, President of South Sudan were all 
briefed by Thomas who was commissioned to continue exploring the possibility of 
this new Centre commemorating the legacy of John Garang in an architectural bridge 
between the Government of Southern Sudan and Christianity.   
Richard Pierard and Robert Linder define civil religion according to five 
prominent characteristics:  
First, it will refer to the widespread acceptance by a people of a shared sense of their nation’s 
history and destiny.  Second, it will relate their society to a realm of absolute meaning.  
Third, it will enable them to look at their society and community as in some sense special.  
Fourth, it will provide a vision which ties the nation together as an integrated whole.  And 
fifth, it will provide a collection of beliefs, values, rites, ceremonies and symbols which, 
taken together, give sacred meaning to the life of the community and thus provide an 
overarching sense of unity that transcends internal conflicts and differences. 
516
  
Among southern Sudanese Christianity satisfies a number of these 
prerequisites.  Isaiah 18, symbolism of the cross and the consistent intermingling of 
themes related to Christianity, the war and south Sudan point to a widespread 
acceptance of an interpretation that posits south Sudan within a sphere of divine 
meaning and predetermined destiny of blessed sanctity.  This was clearly seen in the 
ECS centennial celebration in Kakuma Refugee Camp and the double symbolism of 
the participants’ uniforms – red for the blood of Christ and the blood of southerners 
who died during the war, white for the Holy Spirit and the coming of peace, tied 
together with a black belt representing the geographical land of the south, completed 
with a green hat signifying both heaven and the green grass of assured growth in 
southern Sudan.
517
  Furthermore in all three of the examined locations Christianity 
was exhibiting a previously unknown prominence in the performative rites of death 
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and burial ceremonies increasing sacredness, hope, meaning and unified solidarity 
among the communities.  Finally as was demonstrated at the local level of Kakuma, 
Khartoum and Oliji, and as will be expounded at the national level in the following 
chapters, Christianity offered an overarching paradigm for unity transcending 
internal southern tribal and ethnic conflicts.   
It is important to note that Christian moulded civil religion within southern 
Sudan remains at a stage of early development.  It is most likely not yet categorically 
ascertainable in every context nor is it certain to continue in this trajectory though 
several key markers are present.  First, civil religion often emerges from times of 
national war.
518
  The establishment of 
national monuments and institutions of 
remembrance, such as that being currently 
explored by the leaders of the Government 
of Southern Sudan and Canon Thomas of 
the ECS, will help influence the prominence 
of collective honouring and moral 
obligation.  Should southern Sudan vote 
independence in the scheduled referendum 
the initiated national pledges and anthem 
will further clarify the scope of this 
development. 
Second, civil religion differs from state religion.  In the context of southern 
Sudan Christianity is amenable towards other religious traditions, particularly 
African Traditional Religion.  Furthermore, Christianity is not compulsory and is 
unlikely to be imposed as a state religion in south Sudan.  In an interview with James 
Wani Igga, Speaker of the Parliament for Southern Sudan, he insisted that while 
separation between church and state would officially be ‘strict,’ churches had an 
extensive civil service network that for the foreseeable future would be relied on for 
the provision of communal services such as education and healthcare.
519
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Though southern Sudanese civil religion is most frequently articulated in 
Christian terminology and vernacular it is not singularly Christian in its content.  
Rather Christianity has capitalised on pre-existing tenets of reconciliation and peace 
building traditionally upheld by the leading religious practitioners with the broadest 
inter-communal legitimacy.
520
  That is the Christianity expressed by numerous 
individuals throughout Kakuma, Khartoum, Oliji and southern Sudan point towards a 
set of values, interpretations and impulses within the public sphere rather that at the 
level of individual practice.  This Christian influenced civil religion does not reflect a 
mandated social identification but a loose and stabilising force ecumenically 
advanced across the denominations influencing the development of an ethical 
paradigm of united solidarity and consciousness.
521
   
A third marker pointing to the securing of a Christian influenced civil religion 
will be the establishment of a successful and beneficial southern Sudanese 
government.  Interpretations of Isaiah 18 depend upon the eventual creation of a state 
of shared dividends.  Should ‘the eschatological promises of development and 
material prosperity slip away, so too may the edifice of the national faith begin to 
crumble.’
522
  That is the final conferring of legitimacy will be based on economic 
development and democratic good governance.  This area is potentially the most 
problematic in terms of analysing the long-term prospects of a robust civil religion as 
there are already mixed indications regarding the transparency of the Government of 
Southern Sudan.
523
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While acknowledging important limitations it is possible to discern the 
beginning stages of a Christian civil religion in southern Sudan most clearly 
evidenced in the fusion between Christian religious leaders and elected 
representatives.  In Kakuma Refugee Camp the leader of the Nuer community is also 
the Baptist pastor.  Alanya Joseph, the leader of the Equatorian community in 
Kakuma is also a member of the leadership team at the Seventh Day Adventist 
Church stating, ‘now if you want to be a good leader what are you supposed to be?  
You can read thoroughly in the Bible and it can give you all the guidelines.’
524
  The 
Welfare Refugee Chairman over Oliji Refugee Camp is also a preacher in the 
Seventh Day Adventist Church.  The Governor of the State of Western Equatoria 
informally consults Father Joseph Garzi, Catholic Bishop of Yambio and Tambura, 
about upcoming legislation.
525
  There are numerous pastors in the Government of 
South Sudan and Salva Kiir, President of South Sudan, is a faithful communicant in 
the Catholic Church and widely considered supportive of the NSCC and the churches 
it represents.   
In addition there is a preponderance of Christian language in public 
proclamations and official gatherings as was clearly evidenced at the International 
Day of Women in Western Equatoria described at the beginning of the chapter.  In 
Kakuma Refugee Camp, where a form of Christian civil religion has grown 
strongest, one individual elaborated, ‘in any committee formed whether in the 
government or within the camp here you get a representative from the church within 
that committee, to do what, to open with the word of prayers.  And maybe if there is 
a meeting they must call the pastor first of all to open for them…  It is one of the 
links between church and the government.’
526
  Christianity is developing an 
important influence behind the scenes in a way that is neither institutionalised or 
controlled but present and efficacious all the same.  Though writing in a different 
context Kenneth Wald’s words could well be applied to southern Sudan:  
At the core of the rich and subtle concept of civil religion is the idea that a nation tries to 
understand its historical experience and national purpose in religious terms… civil religion 
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reflects [an] attempt by citizens to imbue their nation with a transcendent value.  The nation 
is recognized as a secular institution, yet one that is somehow touched by the hand of God.
527
 
The converging of civil religion and Christianity within the political sphere is 
clearly and intimately tied to the dominance of a destabilising and devastating war.  
This connection between war and Christianity is not new within southern Sudan.  In 
1971 Joseph Lagu, the leading southern rebel, captured twenty-nine northern 
civilians in a crashed airplane fourteen days after government forces attacked a rebel 
village that included burning down a church with worshippers inside.  Upon their 
capture Lagu asked himself, ‘what would Christ have me to do?’
528
  Contrary to 
popular assumption Lagu released the civilians as a symbol of generosity thereby 
undermining the Sudanese government’s accusations about him and the rebels.  
Shortly thereafter the World Council of Churches and the All African Conference of 
Churches initiated and brokered a peace agreement that ended the first civil war.   
This intimate connection was maintained during the recent civil war.  
Churches at the grassroots were clearly affected by the war and offered consistent if 
sometimes meagre attempts to shape and influence the horrendous conflict in their 
midst.  On four separate occasions PCOS churches in Hajj Yusuf collected, 
transported and distributed clothing and shoes to destabilised areas in southern 
Sudan.
529
  In 2000 churches in Kakuma collected clothing, blankets and even money 
and ‘these things were given to the soldiers deployed in Eastern Equatoria.’
530
  One 
church leader in Yambio reflected, ‘we announced to the people bring food to the 
church so that we can give it to our soldiers….  If this New Sudan Council of 
Churches had some aid coming to the churches, churches can give certain percentage 
to the government and certain percentage to the Christians.’
531
   
The bond between war and Christianity extended to Biblical interpretations 
and even the perceived basic purpose of the Bible itself.  One man in Oliji asserted, 
‘the Bible also is a spear to fight against the Satan,’
532
 and another in Kakuma 
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avowed repeatedly that the cross is ‘the gun’ of the south, ‘the gun’ of the south.
533
  
Chaplains and church leaders travelled with soldiers ministering to their needs, 
challenging their atrocities, grieving in their losses and blessing their combat.  Two 
church leaders who travelled with a company of soldiers explained:  
Peter Kai: We can pray first when they go to war… They [the SPLA soldiers] say, “church, 
church, church.”  They call to God.   
Peter Lual: They use a slogan something like this, they say, “church.”  They used to go to 
war they just say, “church, church, church.”   
Author: So when the soldiers would go out to fight they would all be saying, “church, 
church, church?” 
Peter Kai and Peter Lual together: “Church, church, church.” 
… 
Peter Kai: Moses when he was with the people of God, they put God in front of them, the 
word in front of them, and they pray the word of God and they go to fight people.  And you 
[the pastor] can do like that.  And you give them [the soldiers] encouragement, 
encouragement to be strong.  When they go to fight, they say that if it is God, it is not him 
alone, he will be with God if he goes to fight them.
534
 
While one individual stated that there was no Christian influence or presence among 
the men he commanded,
535
 another claimed that he instructed the men under his 
direction to take their guns and use them to make the sign of the cross in the air 
before running into the battle’s fray.
536
  It is impossible to analyse the growth of 
Christianity without understanding the impact of the war.  Likewise, it is impossible 
to understand the development of peace without analysing the influence of 
Christianity.  Christianity and the war functioned as mutually reinforcing prisms that 
refracted and refined the other.  In the midst of a destabilising war Christianity 
converged as the primary interlocutor with individual, communal and national 
permutations.  The convergence of a civil religion built upon the sacredness of the 
land, the war and Christianity is clearly expressed in the following hymn composed 
by a young man in 1988 on the basis of Matthew 2:1-2: 
God, Jehovah, here, take the land, 
and lead the land 
Jok has no power to lead us 
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You will lead our land, Jehovah,  
together with John [Garang] so that we taste freedom. 
We are suffering double slavery 
We are enslaved by jok,  
and enslaved by man as well. 
The power of the SPLA, Wa yiyeei! [X2] 
Raise up your left hand! 
Victory will be with the left hand! 
Bible on the right! 
The place of the jok will be no more. 
The two great points of strength 
will give us respite.
537
   
Whereas each of the refugee settings of Kakuma, Khartoum and Oliji 
demonstrate the impact of the church at a local grassroots context, taken together 
they form a composite picture of an overarching impact of the church on southern 
Sudan as a whole.  Growing out of a grassroots analysis collectively churches: 
recreated traditional Sudanese society, built peace between southern ethnicities, 
modelled social initiatives, offered to the community cultural and practical 
sacredness, centralised political resistance, encouraged community unification and 
posited a secure hope.  Though all of these impacts are not significantly 
demonstrated in each individual setting, all are present at least implicitly and at the 
national level form explicit threads that empowered the church to function as a 
primary agent on the road to peace.  Each refugee setting reflects select components 
and rationales behind a national movement with significant reverberations deposited 
in the locus of the New Sudan Council of Churches.  The NSCC therefore, 
functioned at the forefront of establishing reconciliation and peace building between 
southern ethnicities, resonated from within as a cultural custodian that centrally 
provided pressure on the SPLA and carefully positioned itself as a substantive force 
behind the scenes lobbying and pushing from behind Sudanese, regional and 
international political agencies in the brokerage of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement.  The remainder of the thesis will focus on the mediatory process carried 
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by the NSCC as a reflected convergence of Christianity and civil religion.  This 
convergence and the power of Christianity to proffer stability, peace building 
initiatives and southern reconciliation is illustratively crystallised in an Easter 1985 
prayer by Cardinal Gabriel Zubeir Wako: 
It has become very difficult 
To say the prayer you taught us, Lord. 
We suffer at the hands of others so much. 
Are we to be the object 
Of the Father’s Displeasure as well? 
For he will not forgive us 
Unless we forgive them. 
… I have to think this over…  
They are forcing me out of my Father’s house, 
For in this house 
There can only be peace and forgiveness. 
Stand in our midst, Lord, 
And say: PEACE IS WITH YOU. 
And may that peace 
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Chapter Five 
Navigating Reconciliation: The New Sudan Council of Churches in 
Peace Mediation  
 




‘The church during this war was the voice of the voiceless.  If there was any evil 
thing done either by the government or by the movement the churches spoke out and 





1991 proved a pivotal year for south Sudan and it began that spring in the 
refugee camps in Ethiopia, host to approximately 400,000 Sudanese refugees.
541
  
Following the overthrow of President Haile Mariam Mengistu, Ethiopian forces 
expelled southern Sudanese refugees and the SPLA from their borders forcing the 
majority to seek safety in an already strained Upper Nile.
542
   On 28 August 1991 
with the tacit blessing of his British wife Emma McCune and the assurances of 
fellow Upper Nile commander Lam Akol, Reik Machar announced over the SPLA 
two-way radio network a call for southern Sudanese to overthrow the leadership of 
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John Garang.
543
  With that announcement Machar split the SPLA, unleashed a tribal 
and ethnic fury and ushered in a decade of the bloodiest fighting in southern Sudan 
as southerners turned on each other.
544
  Ignited by the Nuer attack on the Dinka town 
of Bor, site of one of the single greatest massacres in southern Sudan, the Upper Nile 
quickly fragmented into ethnic warlords who easily shifted allegiances to maximise 
tribal positions as southerners attacked southerners.
545
  In the following year and a 
half the US Committee on Refugees estimated that in Upper Nile alone 300,000 
people were killed.
546
   
It was this context of southern disintegration and ethnic militarisation that in 
1991 the door was opened for one other significant development.  Founded one year 
earlier the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) correctly perceived that the 
fragmentation of the SPLA provided a unique opportunity for the NSCC to directly 
grapple with the southern political situation as an independent platform.
547
  Nurtured 
by an ecumenical spirit that permeated the Ethiopian refugee camps in 1989 key 
church leaders approached John Garang and the SPLA about constituting a new 
council of churches with a spiritual and administrative mandate for the ‘liberated’ 
areas of south Sudan.
548
  The committee recommended the Catholic Bishop of Torit, 
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Bishop Paride Taban, and the Episcopalian Bishop Nathaniel Garang from Bor as the 
initial leaders of the NSCC.  In January 1990 John Garang agreed to the proposal 
because: 
For the Movement, this had several advantages.  It improved its credential with the 
industrialised countries, by contriving simultaneously to suggest religious freedom and 
Christian identity, in contrast to the newly-installed Islamic regime in the North.  It hoped 
this might stimulate western countries to grant aid to the South.  At the same time, NSCC 
would provide convenient channels for assistance particularly from Christian organisations 




On 17 January 1990 John Garang announced over the SPLA radio network the 
formation of the NSCC under the leadership of Taban and Garang though the two 
Bishops themselves were not consulted about the utilisation of the SPLA Radio and 
were deeply disquieted about the political implications of its usage and of the 
inclusion of the words ‘New Sudan’ in the official title, and as a result initially 
withdrew their involvement.
550
  It was only after senior Sudanese church leaders in 
Ethiopia sent Abraham Mayom to personally lobby Taban and Garang that they 
relented in February and agreed to become the NSCC’s first Chairman and Vice 
Chairman respectively.
551
  As their first official responsibility they jointly visited the 
Vatican and the World Council of Churches in Geneva.   
Indicative of the NSCC’s desire to retain independence from the SPLA, in 
1990 Bishops Taban and Garang headquartered the new council of churches in 
Nairobi, Kenya and agreed to the appointment of American Roger Schrock from the 
Church of the Brethren as Executive Secretary.  Schrock was a committed pacifist 
who ‘brought a new and challenging biblical and theological approach’ that would 
profoundly shape the future development of the NSCC.
552
  Following the 
fragmentation of the SPLA the NSCC launched a Peace Desk in 1992 though the 
majority of the endeavours undertaken by the council focused on relief and aid 
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disbursement.
553
  In 1994 Rev Haruun Ruun from the Sudan Interior Church was 
appointed as Executive Secretary and it was under his leadership, as Chapters Five 
and Six will clearly indicate, that the NSCC cultivated an independent voice from the 
SPLA that increasingly advocated and facilitated the development of peace.   
The NSCC developed in a context where the original SCC had been 
effectively contained by the Government of Sudan to areas located in the north and 
firmly under governmental control.  In terms of church membership the NSCC 
‘follows the same pattern in the north of full membership and participation by 
Catholics allowing for a unified stance for all churches in the South.’
554
  Every major 
denomination including Catholic, Episcopal, Church of Christ and Pentecostal joined 
the NSCC as full council members.  Guided under the carefully worded rubric, ‘SCC 
and NSCC are two expressions of one ecumenical reality,’
555
 the NSCC and SCC 
remained in active communication and when possible joint participation perhaps 
most clearly expressed in the issuance of 
dual declarations such as the decisive 
document Let My People Choose circulated 
in 2002.
556
  Organisationally the NSCC 
differed from the SCC in that the NSCC 
consistently initiated endeavours, built 
programme capacities and then spun those 
programmes into affiliated but separate 
organisations rather than retaining them in 
the council of churches themselves.  This 
was done in order to concentrate on new 
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areas of concern and avoid the SCC pitfall of ‘a hierarchical and centralized 
administration with little devolution of authority.’
557
  Following the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in 2006 the NSCC and SCC remerged into a 
single council of churches primarily based in Khartoum with the majority of the 
leadership stemming from southern Sudanese associated with the NSCC.    
Throughout the 1990s particularly after the appointment of Haruun Ruun as 
Executive Secretary the NSCC increasingly crystallised a voice of independence that 
criticised both the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A.  Disillusionment with the 
SPLM/A grew as human rights violations committed by the SPLA progressively 
became apparent.  NSCC awareness regarding atrocities occurring within southern 
Sudan stemmed from the council’s ability to maintain ongoing connections with the 
grassroots of southern Sudan that primarily stemmed from four related sources.   
First, the NSCC maintained an active radio presence inside south Sudan.  The 
NSCC operated six NSCC Centres geographically spread throughout the south with 
each centre equipped with a radio and accompanying staff who were responsible for 
relaying information to and from Nairobi and the NSCC headquarters.
558
  Connected 
to each Centre was a place of simple accommodation reserved for either visiting 
NSCC staff or for travelling denominational representatives ensuring that the Centres 
functioned as key hubs through which information could be quickly and reliably 
passed onto the outside world.
559
  In addition on 23 December 2000 the ‘Voice of 
Hope’ radio station was launched in Kampala, Uganda.
560
  Funded by the Dutch 
Ministry for Development Cooperation, Pax Christi, the Dutch National Radio World 
Service and the Dutch Christian Broadcasting Company, ‘effective day-to-day 
control of the radio was vested in the New Sudan Council of Churches.’
561
  At its 
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inception some ‘2000 radio sets were circulated among churches and tribal leaders in 
the refugee camps’ and at its height the station broadcast for a total of four and half 
hours spread throughout Saturday to Tuesday.
562
  In 2004 the name changed to Radio 
Nile Broadcasting and though the operation was cancelled in the summer of 2006 
due to a lack of funding the programme operated as an effective voice of civil society 
and the NSCC during the height of both the people-to-people peacemaking process 
and the negotiation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in a format that 
reinforced the role of the NSCC and a southern collective identification with 
Christianity.
563
   
Second and related to the above, the NSCC also relied upon radio networks 
built and maintained by the various church denominations.  For example the PCOS 
employed a fulltime radio operator based in Lokichogio tasked to monitor the 
airwaves, transcribe any incoming messages and relay them to denominational 
leadership based in Loki and in Nairobi.
564
  Due to a cultivated ecumenism and a 
heightened sense of necessitated cooperation the NSCC was able to consistently rely 
on member bodies for the collection and dispersal of reliable information throughout 
the refugee camps and many areas of southern Sudan.
565
  Similarly the NSCC also 
utilised personal relationships with various SPLM/A leaders as a third source from 
which they could cull relevant information.   
Finally, the NSCC also relied on the personal interchange of ‘foot traffic’ to 
and from southern Sudan.  Sudanese travelling to and from Sudan, the refugee camps 
and Nairobi frequently carried with them letters and other forms of personal 
information addressed to either denominational leaders or the NSCC itself.
566
  In 
addition, official NSCC business frequently required staff members to travel into 
southern Sudan for programme observation and mobilisation.  The people-to-people 
peace programme, which will be explored in the following section, was particularly 
staff intensive requiring mobilisers to spend multiple weeks walking through large 
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areas of south Sudan garnering information and support for the peace programme 
allowing detailed examination and dissemination of information related to the NSCC.   
The NSCC was successful in facilitating the road to southern peace primarily 
because it retained consistently strong links with the grassroots of southern Sudan.  
Importantly however the key to this connection was not necessarily direct NSCC 
personnel but the ability of the staff to rely on an expanding pastoral and evangelist 
network that relayed information, sentiments and activities through radio transactions 
and their respective denominations to the NSCC.   Communities within southern 
Sudan faced an array of difficulties ranging from isolation, SPLA control and 
governmental jurisdiction as was represented in the three preceding case studies.  
Kakuma, Khartoum and Oliji form an interlocking basis that demonstrates that 
although the exact influence differs within each context overall churches exerted 
strong impulses toward peacemaking and communal stabilisation regardless of where 
they were located along the continuum of war and social instability.  As 
anthropologist Sharon Hutchinson notes in specific relation to the Nuer but with 
much broader implication, ‘Christianity came to symbolize for many Nuer the 
possibilities of political equality, community development, and self-enhancement in 
the context of an increasingly coercive and stratified nation-state inspired by Islamic 
fundamentalist ideals.’
567
  Christianity grew because it functioned as a force of 
resistance, proffered communal benefits and generated an empowering framework of 
interpretation that created a nascent civil religion diffused throughout southern Sudan 
as was detailed in Chapter Four.  The NSCC therefore generally capitalised on this 
emerging consensus and broad-based church networks the specifics of which are 
analysed in the representative case studies of Kakuma Refugee Camp, Hajj Yusuf, 
Khartoum and Oliji Refugee Camp.  By utilising three different case studies in three 
distinct social and ethnic contexts this thesis allows a limited triangulation of 
information that in this instance points towards the validity of an overarching 
conceptualisation of the church as an effective grassroots mobiliser of peace upon 
which the NSCC built a more national campaign that significantly contributed to the 
national resolution of the civil war as will be explored in Chapters Five and Six.
568
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The NSCC through its ecumenical relationships, nurtured denominational 
cooperation and southern administrative centres was able to effectively function as 
an independent voice on behalf of southern Sudanese Christians, and due to the lack 
of alternative civil society structures of southern Sudanese more generally, even 
when the NSCC did not have direct connection to a specific locale.  That the NSCC 
is credited with exerting a beneficial influence upon the peace process is partially 
indicated by the way in which individuals without NSCC affiliation within the three 
analysed contexts consistently ascribed authority and legitimacy to the role the 
churches played in establishing southern Sudanese peace.  For example Andrew 
Onziga the Programme Manager of Education Access Africa with oversight of the 
NGOs’ activities across northern Uganda commented, ‘the origins of this peace... I 
say was a pressure by the churches on the government and on the SPLA.’
569
  With a 
northern Sudanese perspective and personal involvement with the negotiations of the 
CPA, Dr Taib Hag-Atia the Director of the University of Khartoum Centre for Peace 
and Research expounded: 
[The] SPLM is not a particularly religious organisation.  That was my idea coming from 
Garang.  But the church has a very important influence and the Sudanese are very respectful 
of that denomination.  The Sudan Council of Churches or the New Sudan… through their 
own actions among later SPLA people or southern Sudanese people at large... and through 
their contacts with the international community and the American President I think it could 
be said they were influential in pushing SPLM more and more towards negotiations.
570 
Another individual in Hajj Yusuf commented, ‘during the war of twenty-one years 
the voice of the church was still [speaking] on behalf of the people, their life and the 
suffering.  The church is the one that is speaking on behalf of them.’
571
 
The NSCC was effective in pursuing the road to peace because of its ongoing 
connections to the grassroots of southern Sudan through radio networks and 
ecumenical relationships and because of the spread of Christianity and Christian 
identification as represented in the previously analysed case studies of Kakuma, 
Khartoum and Oliji.  As the NSCC developed it increasingly functioned as a 
repository of grassroots sentiments that it voiced to the SPLM/A and to the 
international community.  These ideals led the NSCC to a more balanced and 
nuanced political position that routinely criticised both the Government of Sudan and 
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the SPLM/A, endeavoured to build reconciliation between militarised southern 
ethnicities following the split of the SPLM/A in 1991 and lobbied the international 
community for greater involvement in the IGAD peace process.  The NSCC 
implicitly recognised that conflict transformation occurs with the strategic targeting 
of three levels of affected population and corresponding leadership: top or elite, 
national or mid-level and grassroots.
572
  The NSCC therefore developed as an 
authentic independent southern Sudanese voice that engaged in a process of political 
reconciliation and peace mediation, internal diplomacy and international advocacy 
and thereby impacted the road to Sudanese peace.   
This chapter will specifically focus on exploring two of the strategies 
employed by the NSCC that accelerated the southern Sudanese peace process.  The 
first section will analyse efforts undertaken by the NSCC after the 1991 split to 
initiate a tactical partnership with mid-level southern Sudanese leaders in order to 
rehabilitate traditional leadership structures and mediate peace and reconciliation 
within the grassroots through the people-to-people peace process.  Towards this end 
section one will examine several initial steps, detail the Wunlit Peace Conference as 
a relevant example, review the implementation of Wunlit and other NSCC initiated 
peace efforts and conclude with an analysis of the influence of NSCC peace-
brokered events on southern communal stabilisation and the national resolution of 
the civil war.  The second section will focus on ways in which NSCC diplomacy 
built upon reconciled mid-level and grassroots constituencies in order to influence 
elite SPLM/A leadership and apply pressure on that leadership to pursue a negotiated 
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A. The NSCC and People-to-People Peace 
 
Initial Steps: Akobo, Yei and Lokichogio  
 
In 1993 a major ethnic feud erupted between two segments of the Nuer, the 
Jikany and the Lou.  A minor fishing incident quickly escalated into outright 
conflagration resulting in numerous deaths, cattle raids and burned villages.  Machar 
attempted to intervene and reconcile the segments but was repeatedly rebuffed.  In 
frustration Machar eventually responded to an offer by the Presbyterian Church of 
Sudan to mobilise a reconciliation initiative.  Personally approached by Reik Machar 
and appointed as the lead coordinating chairman Reverend Matthew Mathiang 
Deang, an ethnic Nuer, began laying the foundation for a course that would radically 
alter south Sudan.  Expanding on traditional approaches to peace building, Deang 
turned to the NSCC as a source of encouragement, support and fundraising.  Under 
Deang’s guidance in 1994 the PCOS hosted the Akobo Peace Conference a process 
that lasted forty-five days and dramatically demonstrated the impact coordinated 
church reconciliation efforts could exert on fragmented and war-wearied south 
Sudan.  As one observer noted: 
Each day’s sessions started and ended with Christian worship led by the Presbyterian church 
leaders.  Reflections on values, appeals to truth-telling, issues of sin, confession, forgiveness, 
and reconciliation were all a part of the Peace Conference.  There was no dichotomy between 
the secular and the spiritual.  Issues of peace included compensation for losses, 
administration of grazing lands and water resources, payment of taxes, reconciliation of 
people, and structural arrangements for implementing a peace agreement, including special 
courts and police authority.
573
 
Spurred by the PCOS’ success at Akobo and a rising grassroots clamour for 
reconciliation between Dinka and Nuer ethnic segments now fully engaged in a war 
of militarised revenge cycles, civilian attrition and Kalishnikov justice the NSCC re-
evaluated its priorities throughout 1995-1996 ultimately deciding to shift away from 
relief towards peace mediation.
574
  Lead by Haruun Ruun, in 1997 the NSCC eased 
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its overtures for reconciliation between John Garang and Reik Machar and with 
uncertainty and potentially great risk engaged in direct conversation with the SPLA.  
Termed the ‘Yei Dialogue,’ the rapprochement between NSCC and SPLA opened 
further the plausibility of NSCC involvement in internal southern Sudanese 
reconciliation and will be more fully discussed in the second section of this chapter.  
One result of this dialogue however was an invitation to thirty-five Dinka and Nuer 
chiefs to travel to Lokichogio and discuss the fragmentation of southern Sudan. 
Drawing together participants from the West Bank region of Bahr el Ghazal 
and Upper Nile 3-11 June 1998, NSCC leadership conscientiously decided to bypass 
upper military echelons and focus on building sustainable peace at a grassroots and 
local level beginning in one of the most severely affected areas, the West Bank of the 
Nile.  Flown into the arid north-western Kenyan town of Lokichogio this meeting 
was the first time area chiefs were able to collectively discuss the situation, shared 
insecurity, mutual grief and possible reconciliation and restoration endeavours.  
Chaired by NSCC leadership, after numerous tense moments and individual 
recounting of inflicted atrocity the chiefs reached a consensus to seek peace and 
signed the Loki Accord detailing steps to end the internal fighting, de-escalate the 
area and pursue a broad inter-communal reconciliation conference.  Demonstrating 
the critical partnership established between the NSCC and local chiefs to jointly 
corroborate in the peace initiative, Inside Sudan recounts the following: 
At one point, Bishop Nathaniel Garang [a Dinka], spoke about the “chair of leadership”.  
With his right hand he lifted a heavy wooden chair and held it above his head, saying “Who 
will help me with this burden?”  He said the chair represented the heavy load the people had 
to carry because of the leadership.  The weight of the chair and his arthritis distressed him, 
but he held it firm and called again in distress.  Many wanted to help, but it was Chief 
William Ruaei, one of the elder Nuer Chiefs, who shouted out the name of his favourite bull 
in praise and called out, “I will help you with your burden!”  They held the chair together and 
slowly lowered it to the floor between them.  This symbolic imagery of reconciliation and 




Wunlit Peace Conference  
 
At first known in circulated NSCC documents only as XXXXX, Wunlit is a 
small Dinka village in Tonj County that did not appear on any known maps.  As the 
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planned site of a major reconciliation initiative between southern communities its 
location was shrouded in secrecy in order to provide an additional layer of security 
from marauding forces and government bombing expeditions.  Telar Deng and other 
NSCC personnel travelled throughout the neighbouring Dinka and Nuer areas laying 
the foundation for peace, inviting participants, forming security contingencies and 
mobilising support.  Matthew Mathiang Deang, hired by the NSCC following the 
Akobo Peace Conference, was intimately involved in this process and described how 
the aim of the Wunlit Conference was that ‘there was fighting between the two 
communities for seven years so the time had come now that we bring the leaders of 
those communities together and they talk about their issues.’
576
   
In addition to mobilising southern communities the NSCC representatives 
also focused on securing SPLA concurrence, a proposition in which ‘there was 
strong resistance from the start from late Dr. John [Garang]’ who ironically, 
reflecting Khartoum policy desired to utilise ‘naked military force in order to subdue 
others rather than having political settlements with the factions that were opposed to 
him.’
577
  Salva Kiir however overcame Garang’s opposition and personally oversaw 
all security arrangements including bringing to justice a group of Dinka raiders who 
had attacked Nuer villages during the mobilisation process.
578
   Reik Machar, now 
openly aligned with the Government of Sudan and forces known as the United 
Democratic Salvation Front, also approved of the conference, encouraged Nuer 
participation and hid the exact location from opposition government forces.  Though 
the conference could not occur without the approval of Machar and Garang, they and 
their related forces played a minimal role in organising the event and during Wunlit 
were consistently sidelined.  Kiir only participated in the opening and closing 
remarks of the ceremony and the organisers of Wunlit refused to let a delegation 
commissioned by Machar address the gathering.
579
  Wunlit, as all other people-to-
people peace initiatives, reflected a process initiated and organised by the New 
Sudan Council of Churches in which commanders would arrange security, local 
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chiefs would primarily negotiate settlement and local church and traditional religious 
leaders would bless the reconciliation effort.     
The West Bank was an area infused with fear, traditional mistrust, hatred and 
ongoing cattle raids.  Success was never assumed and apprehension was high in an 
environment of massive south on south fighting and killing at an unprecedented 
level.  As William Ruei Kuong, one of the traditional priests of the leopard skin 
prayed during the Wunlit conference:  
I speak to you, O God of all.  Our God, with my brothers, this is the land.  We, all of us, we 
Southerners, we are all people of one God.  We have fought each other for many years, O 
God.  I myself have been a great fighter.  My ancestors before me were warriors, and I fought 
fiercely for many years.  We elders know the history of these conflicts.  Formerly we 
observed certain restrictions.  The young men had the right to kill other warriors, but never 
did they kill women or children or elders or young boys.  When I used to go raiding I advised 
people never to kill women or children.  Today, however, we have transgressed, killing 
anyone we meet, young and old, woman and children.  Because of this slaughter God has 
brought us together in this meeting to discuss these things.  It is now many years since we 
have been reconciled and cut away our conflicts, and yet our hostilities still remain.
580
   
In this acrid milieu, two weeks prior to Wunlit the NSCC chartered a plane 
and flew five reputed Nuer chiefs and one designated women’s representative along 
with several church leaders to Dinkaland in early February 1999 as a confidence 
building initiative.  Following a successful visit five Dinka chiefs and one Dinka 
women’s representative travelled back with the Nuer to the town of Leer.  Warmly 
received and given gifts symbolising peace and unification the delegation 
demonstrated to the relevant constituencies that travel to Wunlit across ethnic and 
military division was possible and that for the first time during the second civil war 
grassroots mobilisation could secure peace between traditional southern hostilities 
now fuelled by modern armaments and the divisive politics of the educated elite.   
Over the next two weeks southerners and international observers slowly 
trickled into Wunlit by foot, vehicle and air finding a newly constructed ‘peace 
village’ that consisted of one hundred fifty tukuls for accommodation, a conference 
hall prepared for one thousand participants, a store, fifteen pit-latrines and an 
improved road and airstrip infrastructure.
581
  These preparations had been arranged 
by Mario Muor Muor and reflected efforts by both the local community and 
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interested international parties such as World Vision.  As the conference opened on 
27 February 1999 an era of unparalleled internal southern reconciliation endeavours 
facilitated by the New Sudan Council of Churches was inaugurated.    
The opening ceremony however commenced with a specifically traditionalist 
Sudanese indigenous religious appeal – the slaughtering of Mabior, the white bull.
582
  
As the most prominent elder men gathered to sit and the youth sang and danced 
Mabior was led to the centre and tied to a fixed post.  Increasingly the crowd pressed 
in agitating the tethered bull until silenced by the traditional chiefs and religious 
leaders who pronounced that Mabior would symbolise the desire and seriousness for 
peace and reconciliation.  The crowd quietly murmured its approval and offered short 
invocations of forgiveness ensuring that hearts were prepared and commitment 
solidified.  Several young men from the various conflicting tribes and sub-clans 
emerged from the crowd and approached the bull and after wrestling Mabior to the 
ground one of the youth with a single thrust of a spear pierced the neck of the bull 
beginning the process of draining the blood from Mabior.  As the symbolism and 
solemnity of the moment resonated among the crowd the sacrificial death was 
consummated as the meat was divided among the participants forming the basis of an 
ensuing communal meal.   
Commenting on the meaning and implications of the sacrifice of Mabior on 
the peace process Michael Ouko of the NSCC Peace Desk described: 
There were also traditionalists there.  They came with their bulls to sacrifice, I mean to 
sacrifice to their gods, to shed blood and see.  The killing of the bull was to show that 
anybody who breaks the covenant will die the same way that the bull is being slaughtered.  
So that was a symbolic angle, ritual, and of course it’s not a Christian practice but the church 
gave, they respected the opinion of the other, I mean the traditionalists.  So by virtue of the 
NSCC accepting these traditional practices to partner with and also allowing the Christians to 
take part that gives them a kind of openness of the council to different divergent lines.
583
 
That is while the NSCC was at the forefront of organising and facilitating the peace 
process it understood that success hinged on the personal and communal imbuing of 
a reconciliation morality that would shape and influence southern response long after 
the peace conference was completed.  The NSCC therefore conscientiously worked 
to create an open space that built upon incorporated traditional beliefs and practices, 
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minimised their own overt participation and emphasised the importance of traditional 
chiefs and religious practitioners.   
Over the next days Wunlit shifted to a period of recounting of issues and war 
inflicted damages.  Each of the six Dinka and six Nuer counties incorporated into the 
Wunlit process were apportioned three representatives with an allotted time of ninety 
minutes of dedicated sharing during which they could not be interrupted.
584
  One 
Dinka chief for example shared:  
We have the chief called Mading Manyel who was killed together with his entire family and 
18 cattle camps.  Also 150 people were killed, and 5 of our young women were taken who 
are with them until the present day…  Also, during the rainy season, they came and attacked 
the place of Makuac.  When they came back to attack for the second time they took 
everything, leaving not even a dog or a chicken.  They raided the entire cattle camp.  All the 
homesteads were burned, all of Makuac was burned to the ground.’
585
   
Another, Chief Rec Anyeth Rec lamented: 
People have covered many issues, speaking of cattle raided, people abducted, but I must add 
the following.  A group of people raided my house.  As they came they found my wife in 
labour, and a neighbour had gone to find a midwife to assist.  The wife was inside a mosquito 
net to deliver.  The raiders killed the husband, the midwife, and the woman who was 
delivering, and the new-born baby.  I ask what kind of humanity is that that would kill a baby 
that was about to see the world for the first time?
586
 
For many the articulation of experienced individual and communal horror 
provided the deeply needed catharsis that prepared the ground for reconciliation.
587
  
The organisers of Wunlit understood that ‘a peacemaking process that enables the 
parties to reflect on the spiritual implications of their behaviour… and on their 
destructive actions in general, is likely to lead to a more conducive atmosphere for 
the quest of just and lasting solutions to their disputes.’
588
  Arising out of these 
narratives the Conference Management Team identified six categories of articulated 
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difficulty and following the period of storytelling divided participants into six 
working groups to address the raised issues.  The highlighted categories were:  
• Missing Persons and Marriages to Abductees 
• Reclaiming the Land and Rebuilding Relationships  
• Institutional Arrangements 
• Monitoring the Borders 
• People Outside the Peace Process 
• Extending the Peace to the East Bank of the Nile and Equatoria
589
 
As the conference drew to a conclusion each of the working groups presented 
concrete practical steps that could be officially implemented and continued by those 
present.  These resolutions included the declaration of an immediate and permanent 
ceasefire between Dinka and Nuer in the West Bank region, amnesty for offences 
committed prior to Wunlit, the repatriation of abducted boys and girls and/or the 
legalisation of their marriages including the creation of an Abductee Identification 
Team, the affirmation of free movement and shared commercial enterprises, the 
formation of dry season joint police forces with administrative and judicial oversight 
of grazing and fishing areas, the composition of a Dinka-Nuer Peace Council made 
of county representatives including women representatives and finally, the ongoing 
extension of similar peace conferences throughout south Sudan.
590
    
In a concluding ceremony The Wunlit Dinka-Nuer Covenant was signed and 
thumb printed by each participant as a testimony of reconciliation to each other, 
divinely sanctioned and enacted before God and sealed by a second sacrificial 
slaughter of a white mabior bull.  Wunlit was a process that sought to forge unity 
among ethnic groups directly engaged in a cyclical denigration of destruction by 
building trust between divergent ethnic groups and religious traditions.
591
  As 
Matthew Deang noted, with the engendered ‘openness’ of the conference by the 
NSCC and the participants themselves, ‘people became trusting.’
592
  As individuals 
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began the long trek home following the finalisation of the conference on 8 March 
there was a renewed sense of hope and possibility that in bypassing military 
leadership sustainable peace could be built at a grassroots level and southern 
Sudanese could be reconciled and reunited to face together a larger process of 
establishing political peace, good governance and development.  As one group of 
scholars noted, ‘the reconciliation between these communities that was negotiated at 
Wunlit after eight years of internecine strife marked a change in the dynamics of the 




Implementation and Consecutive People-to-People Peace Conferences 
 
To a remarkable extent the resolutions adopted at Wunlit were implemented 
and carefully monitored by a number of newly formed joint peace councils.  These 
peace councils were ‘instruments for early warning to monitor the agreement and to 
detect or identify any underlying issue that might erupt into violent conflict and find 
ways of preventing it.’
594
  As issues were exposed the councils were empowered to 
mediate local settlements and had access through radio networks to the NSCC and 
outside peace coordinators should escalation occur.  Carrying local efficacy these 
councils stretched across traditional ethnic divisions and incorporated multiple 
communal voices including those traditionally minimised in the public sphere.  One 
council for example was ‘made up with the local chiefs and some women and some 
youths within that committee.  It’s chaired by a Nuer chief called Isaac Abyok and 
then the deputy leader he’s a Dinka chief.  So the churches with some local 
administration are helping them.’
595
  As was envisioned by the NSCC the peace 
councils relied on traditional leadership structures while simultaneously modifying 
those structures by broadening communal participation and intentionally 
strengthening the political rights of women.   
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Though commitment to the negotiated Wunlit peace was tested on several 
occasions infractions were resolved and smaller Wunlit II and Wunlit III conferences 
in 2003 renewed the various agreements, strengthened traditional court systems and 
expanded security so that the West Bank region of Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile 
has remained fairly continuously at peace from southern-southern conflict.  For 
example a May 1999 attack by government forces forced Nuer to flee to the Dinka 
town of Makuac where:  
The Dinka welcome of the Nuer was all the more generous because these Dinka had been 
displaced themselves – by the Nuer now seeking their help.  Chief Lino Madut, one of the 
Dinka who fled Nuer raiders, said Makuac was evacuated by its Dinka residents “during the 
war with the Nuer which lasted from 1993 to 1999.”  He continued, “I’m glad I was in 
Wunlit…. They [the Nuer] devastated Makuac and today we are brothers.  We had a quarrel 
with our brother but the dispute is over.  Today we and they are one.”
596
   
Following the success of Wunlit in reconciling West Bank Dinka and Nuer 
the NSCC turned to forging a similar consensus among the deeply fragmented people 
of the East Bank, particularly among the Nuer.  In August 1999 a number of local 
Nuer military warlords met in Akobo and with NSCC encouragement brokered a 
ceasefire with an amalgamation of forces into the Upper Nile Provisional Military 
Command Council breaking officially from Reik Machar.  The NSCC sought to 
capitalise on this new impetus and hosted the Waat Peace Conference 1-7 November 
following the format modelled at Wunlit.  The composition of the conference did 
differ from Wunlit however it that ‘the main delegates were military leaders and the 
meeting became focused on Lou leadership and military issues, with all the factions 
trying to gain political capital from the event.’
597
   
In addition to signing a number of reconciliation, resource sharing and 
traditional governance strengthening initiatives, Waat also sought to extend the 
people-to-people peace concept in two significant areas.  First, ‘the participants 
elected the Lou Nuer Peace and Governance council to rebuild the entire civil 
administration structure from the bottom up, in theory surpassing what had been 
done at Wunlit.’
598
  Second, following agreement at the Waat Convention, the NSCC 
helped form the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) under the leadership of 
Wal Duany who had been a PCOS facilitator at the Akobo Peace Conference and one 
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of the principal NSCC organisers of Wunlit.  The aim of the SSLM was to encourage 
dialogue among the military factions, facilitate political peace and unity and support 
the principal of southern self-determination through the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) peace initiative, the primary vehicle for 
Government-SPLA mediation.
599
   
Disappointingly however the SSLM quickly deteriorated into another 
alternate and competing military faction involved in human rights abuses.  
Furthermore, ‘Wal Duany’s transformation from a peacemaker to a factional leader’ 
imperilled the neutrality of the NSCC and opened it up to intense criticism from 
SPLM/A leadership of ‘facilitating the formation of a military bloc in the East 
Bank.’
600
  Compounded by the return of Reik Machar to Upper Nile, his repudiation 
of the Government of Sudan, the reformation of a military force under his command 
and ongoing dry season attacks between the Jikany and Gawaar Nuer as one NSCC 
document admitted, ‘by early 2000 it was clear that unity had not been achieved.’
601
   
In May 2000 the NSCC attempted a second Upper Nile people-to-people 
peace conference at Liliir in Dinka Bor county seeking to recapture the success of 
Wunlit by incorporating representatives from all of the tribes living in the East Bank.  
Outright opposition from Machar, adverse weather conditions and an inadequate 
mobilisation effort however resulted in an attendance of only one hundred ten, 
roughly half of the anticipated guests.
602
  Although Liliir failed to negotiate a 
comprehensive resolution several of the smaller groups present were able to achieve 
inter-ethnic reconciliation and in the following year thirteen new primary schools 
were constructed in the Liliir area and five thousand Dinka were repatriated.
603
  Liliir 
also confirmed that at the grassroots level much of the population was disillusioned 
with the current divisive military leadership and open to ongoing attempts to forge 
southern resolution and reconciliation.   
Over the proceeding four years the NSCC continued to host a number of 
peace conferences and peace education workshops with the majority focused on 
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building reconciliation within and between the ethnicities of Upper Nile.  For 
example in July 2001 the NSCC facilitated a peace building conference among the 
Jikany Nuer that addressed inter-sectional fighting, resource sharing and the 
constituting of a ‘one-off special court’ that was immediately confirmed by an 
authorisation from Reik Machar to settle all outstanding cases of inter-tribal 
homicide and murder accusations.
604
  One month later from 27-31 August 2001 the 
NSCC hosted a Jikany-Lou peace conference at Pagak under the leadership of 
Reverend Matthew Mathiang Deang and Reverend John Chuol Duel of the PCOS.
605
  
In 2002 the NSCC organised the Nyal Peace Education Workshop in western Upper 
Nile that included clan chiefs, military commanders, women and youth leaders, local 
church leaders, school teachers and civil authority officials focusing on discussing 
themes related to peace and conflict, peace and human rights, communication in 
peace making and peace and governance.
606
  In December of 2002 Matthew Deang 
also chaired a Gawaar-Lou Peace and Reconciliation Conference.
607
  In 2004 the 
NSCC sponsored the Fangak Peace Conference that drew over six hundred delegates 
and requested ongoing peace endeavours, the construction of schools and the 
development of infrastructure.
608
    
 
Analysis and Conclusion 
 
The New Sudan Council of Churches consistently understood that Wunlit and 
the proceeding people-to-people peace conferences were to function as a catalyst for 
expanding political peace throughout southern Sudan.  As one NSCC document 
elaborated, ‘it is intended that People-to-People Peacemaking will be expanded and 
that justice and sustainable peace will be achieved… by adopting positive aspects of 
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social change that are rooted in a synthesis of traditional, modern and Christian 
values, beliefs, customs that are relevant for application in the Sudanese setting.’
609
  
It was the intention of the NSCC to utilise the people-to-people peace endeavours as 
an embryonic spark to a broader negotiated resolution of the civil war.  Importantly, 
to a certain extent the NSCC was successful in this enterprise.  As Michael Ouko of 
the NSCC Peace Desk noted, ‘Wunlit opened space for, I mean, proved that 
reconciliation is possible, forgiveness is possible… They put a lot of pressure on the 
people to stop unnecessary fighting.’
610
   
The people-to-people peace initiatives occurred in contexts of rampant killing 
and communal devastation.  South Sudan had splintered into competing segments of 
unchecked military competition that scattered communities, ravaged livestock, 
depleted resources and hastened famine.  As one individual noted, ‘you know the 
guerrilla tactics and the guerrilla war… there is no law in the guerrilla. Either they 
kill or you will die.’
611
   
In this caustic environment the New Sudan Council of Churches introduced a 
peace process that renewed hope, demonstrated political possibility, reunited 
grassroots communities and profoundly reverberated in the internationally sanctioned 
political peace process between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A.  
Certainly the NSCC was not alone in attempting to develop local peace initiatives.  
One of the official strategies of the SPLM/A was ‘peace through development’ and 
towards this end they hosted various conferences such as one at Rumbek in Bahr el 
Ghazal in June 2001 that sought to empower civil society to work in conjunction 
with the SPLM/A in the ‘liberated’ areas.
612
  Peace through development however 
never achieved a critical capacity and was often suspected of merely being a front for 
SPLM/A confiscation of local resources.   
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The process created by the NSCC profoundly influenced other indigenous 
and international peace endeavours within southern Sudan.  For example the All 
Upper Nile Peace Conference in June 2003 funded in part by the United States 
Agency for Development and the Government of Italy through the Sudan Peace Fund 
was co-chaired by the former PCOS Moderator Reverend John Gatluok and 
Sudanese Ambassador Philip Obang and was specifically conceived ‘in the context 
of the NSCC facilitated people to people peace and reconciliation process.’
613
  PACT 
International, the primary donor to the Sudan Peace Fund based many of their 
endeavours on the example and inspiration of the NSCC’s people-to-people peace 
initiatives.
614
   
Though the NSCC was the predominant actor in establishing grassroots peace 
processes in south Sudan, an effort that would over time dramatically increase the 
unity of south Sudan and serve as a key component to the negotiated CPA, the 
churches were not alone in securing the implementation of the peace agreements.  As 
one scholar noted: 
It would be a major overstatement to credit the peace process and reconciliation effort only to 
the religious community… It would also be incorrect to think this peace process could have 
occurred without significant contributions from the religious community.  It was the religious 
leaders, both African Traditional and Christian, who represented the beliefs and sentiments of 
the people.  It was also those leaders who carried the power of the symbols and were vested 
with the responsibility of reconciling people with one another and reconciling the people 
with God and the spirits.  Without the work of reconciliation, peace agreements written on 
paper and carrying signatures and thumbprints would be viewed as only documents without 
substance.
615
   
While the NSCC was at the forefront of organising, advocating and 
implementing a grassroots peace process, the methodology employed conscientiously 
endeavoured to ensure that traditional leaders and partners were the primary actors 
during the initiative itself and that the NSCC and affiliated church leaders remained 
visible but secondary contributors.  The people-to-people peace proceedings were 
‘designed not only to address pressing disputes among communities and ethnic 
groups, but also to impart enduring conflict resolution and peace-making skills based 
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upon traditional social structures.’
616
  The NSCC and local church actors were 
critical in engendering a ‘revival of culture… in which communities are solidifying 
and updating traditional law.’
617
  That is the NSCC was the lead agency in 
facilitating a peace process strengthened and implemented by re-empowered 
traditional structures.    
At every level the NSCC consistently pursued peace building mechanisms 
beneficial at the grassroots level even when such initiatives minimised the role of the 
NSCC and promoted traditional leadership.  For example in October 2001 the NSCC 
helped sponsor a seminar funded by the Embassy of Switzerland in Nairobi that 
convened predominant southern Sudanese civil society advocates to discuss the 
codification of a quasi-governmental ‘House of Nationality’ that would officially 
function as the primary vehicle for promoting indigenous conflict mediation and 
resolution techniques through strengthened traditional leaders and structures.
618
   
Within the people-to-people peace process the active incorporation of 
traditional beliefs and practices by the NSCC is perhaps most clearly represented in 
the intentional inclusion of the slaying of the white Mabior bull during opening and 
closing ceremonies.  Traditionally this sacrificial ritual is critical in establishing 
moral authority, divine sanctification and communal accountability in inter-tribal 
reconciliation.  Theologically however for many Christians the assimilation of a 
white bull was potentially problematic.  As one ECS pastor described, ‘we don’t 
know before the cow was brought here what was done to it, what kind of words, 
spellings, what kind of chants were done on the cow before it was slaughtered for 
you to jump on it.’
619
   As a consequence during the ceremony some Christians 
would observe the killing of the bull and then join together to separately pray for 
unity while other participants jumped over Mabior.  The inclusion of this symbolic 
ritual opened the NSCC to theological criticism both from within southern Sudan and 
from some external sources.  In general during the peace conventions there was little 
overt insertion of Christian symbolism or theologically based reflection.  As 
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Matthew Deang of the NSCC admitted, ‘the only difference that was different from 
the traditional, it is the church which was during the opening of the meeting when it 
started with the Christian worship, when they started with the reading from the Bible.  
That is the only difference.’
620
  The primary difference therefore was that it was 
church leadership that instigated, led and facilitated the conference while the actual 
mechanics remained largely religiously indigenous based and conveyed.  From a 
Christian theological standpoint the NSCC could have engaged in a more thorough 
theological reflection and basis for engagement in the peace and reconciliation 
process.
621
   
Politically, however, the broad ecumenism displayed by the inclusion of a 
Mabior bull into the people-to-people peace process proved necessary and effective.  
Chief Charles Reth Kok, a Wunlit participant, admonished, ‘You Dinka and Nuer, I 
caution you to be careful of what you observed in Mabior.  It was very wild.  I have 
come from Akobo, and I have never seen a bull as wild as that bull.  Anyone who 
resumes these conflicts, Mabior will take revenge on him, because he died for our 
reconciliation.’
622
  Responding to the appropriateness of theological criticism Haruun 
Ruun who was at the time of these conventions the Executive Secretary of the NSCC 
responded: 
These people have been killing each other and what will close the gap that yeah this is what 
we can respect?  You don’t take things out and put nothing in its place.  So when people 
came in with their bulls this is what they believe… not just believe, but they practice.  And 
because they believe it and because you may not believe it but because you think or believe 
this is what is going to keep peace you are going to save more lives by doing it.  You got to 
choose.  Do you want more lives to be killed because of bull or do you want to save more 
lives?  Because when you kill the bull and if you look at it, killing those bulls and all those 
things there is no fighting between Nuer and Dinka although the Nuer among themselves had 
some fighting and maybe Dinka in Bahr el Ghazal but there was no fighting that took place 
after that between Nuer and Dinka.  They became the keepers of their peace.
623
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 The inclusion of the representative symbolism invested in the ritualistic 
killing of a white Mabior bull was politically astute and facilitated the overarching 
aim of the NSCC to stand at the forefront of advocating for peace and resolution in a 
manner that empowered grassroots and traditional structures to maintain ongoing 
reconciliation.  Socially and politically a far greater danger to the NSCC was the 
threat of political identification or direct repudiation of one of the numerous military 
divisions.  As one scholar expressed, ‘the Sudanese Church in general have great 
potential to make grassroots peacemaking an effective method for conflict resolution.  
However, this could only be possible if the church remains neutral to the conflict 
especially the South-South conflict.  This is very difficult to maintain.’
624
  There was 
an almost continuous duelling pressure from many of the leading military 
commanders to co-opt the role of the NSCC and so achieve a greater political 
capacity and legitimacy on the one hand, and on the other, to limit and disparage the 
church from infringing on their own political agenda.  The NSCC had to maintain a 
precipitous balance between open engagement with each southern militia and the 
ongoing vocal criticism of the abuse of human rights regardless of the source of that 
abuse.  The continuance of this demanding tension was most explicitly necessary in 
the relationship between the NSCC and the SPLM/A as will be explored in the 
second part of this chapter.  Had the NSCC veered too strongly towards union or 
disavowal with any one of the fragmented southern forces the result would have been 
an immediate loss of authenticity, barred access to factional opponents and increased 
physical danger to church leadership.  The possibility of deteriorating into such a 
dangerous alignment was most acute following the Waat Peace Conference and the 
establishment of the South Sudan Liberation Movement under Wal Duany.  In a 
2000 strategic review several months after the failure of the Waat reconciliation the 
NSCC acknowledged that ‘not all politicians respected the independent role of 
NSCC’ and that there were ‘cases where the church and the politicians were mixed 
up’ so that churches and their representatives needed to be made more aware about 
the critical necessity of maintaining NSCC neutrality.
625
  The people-to-people peace 
process was most effective when the primary focus was on grassroots leadership and 
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constituents and bypassed elite and competing military commanders, and in the end, 
despite several setbacks the NSCC was able to uphold a tested but closely guarded 
commitment to impartiality.   
Through participation in the people-to-people peace process the NSCC 
exerted a direct influence on the overarching peace endeavours, contributed to the re-
unification of south Sudan and helped mediate resolution and reconciliation.  John 
Jok Manyout for example emphasised, ‘the church leaders they are the one who 
make peace in southern Sudan.  The church leaders they are the one who have the 
way forward for the peace negotiation.  They are the one who are bringing different 
groups [and] different groups together.’
626
  Another noted, ‘people are addicted to 
fighting and it has been the major role of church to reconcile people… for example, 
there is reconciliation and unity among the tribes like the one… [in] Upper Nile and 
Bahr el Ghazal and others.’
627
  The NSCC were capable of effectively functioning as 
a southern Sudanese peace broker due to at least two interrelated rationales. 
First, the NSCC consistently remained open to dialogue and joint 
participation with traditional leadership and structures.
628
  At an institutional level 
this is explicitly expressed in the motto of the NSCC: ‘serving all of God’s people.’   
Philosophically undergirding this motto the director of the NSCC peace desk stated:  
We are all equal in God.  We are all created in God’s image… the holistic development of a 
human person is based on the principle that God, even Jesus Christ fed them, he clothed 
them, he gave shelter to them and even gave them refuge.  So we believe, the church believes 
that whoever is tampering with it, with this or whatever government is tampering with all 
these values is against the human rights.
629
   
The NSCC not only stood at the forefront of advocating for the respect and 
development of human rights for all southern Sudanese regardless of religious 
persuasion, the council also led in forging joint tactical partnerships with traditional 
mid-level leadership in order to broaden awareness, deepen indigenous 
conceptualisations and enhance effectiveness.   
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Engagement with traditional patterns of reconciliation influenced NSCC 
methodology and, in a context of societal breakdown and pervasive ethnically 
aligned attacks, allowed the NSCC to inherit a traditional mantle of religious 
peacemaker.  Southern Sudanese have long looked towards religious leaders such as 
priests of the earth to dissolve feuds in part because ‘in such rites the priest of the 
earth stands between the groups involved and in this sense he may be thought of as 
outside each.  From one perspective he may be said to transcend all groups and 
thereby partake of all, but from another perspective he may be said to conform 
properly to none.’
630
   By depending on ‘persuasion and consensus rather than on 
coercion and dictation’ NSCC peace facilitators functioned as ‘in Dinka terms, “a 
man with a cool heart”’ capitalising on the nature of Christianity as a religion 
exponentially expanding at the grassroots level, affiliated with and open to all 
ethnicities and thereby critically transcending the conflicting parties.
631
  The ability 
of the NSCC to remain connected but transcendent increased Christian identification 
and affiliation and created an inherent willingness and trust among many southern 
Sudanese to turn towards the church as a central custodian of peace.   
The religio-nationalistic tendency of the contemporary war further enhanced 
the ability of the NSCC to extend southern resolution.  Christianity inherited a 
‘position which is, on average, most different from that of relevant outgroup 
members and least different from that of other ingroup members.’
632
  That is due to 
the recent history of south Sudan Christianity was perceived as a counterbalancing 
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force to Islam and although significantly different, in terms of societal interaction, 
related to the concerns and methodology of traditional religion.   
Perceived as a hostile force to Islamic domination, neutral towards internal 
southern demarcations and transcendent to any one southern ethnicity, Christianity 
retained one other significant continuity with traditional religious practices of 
reconciliation by functioning as a point of mediatory access between disillusioned 
grassroots communities and upper level military echelons.  Practitioners of 
indigenous peacemaking were successful in part by relying on a belief that 
individuals submitting to mediation could do so ‘without loss of dignity where he 
would not have given way to his opponent.’
633
  Among many southern Sudanese 
there was a latent belief that the churches would not violate the trust accrued in 
conciliation and that suggestions from a non-aligned source of spiritual legitimacy 
could be implemented without forfeiting hard-earned positions and respect.  In a 
context void of almost any positive civil society participation the NSCC generated a 
politically safe open space for greatly needed dialogue and deliberation. 
The second significant rationale behind the success of the NSCC’s initiation 
of the people-to-people peace process relates to the pervasiveness of an open desire 
for peace by many of the communities.  As the collateral damage of the 1991 SPLA 
split grew increasingly clear and the loss of southern lives dramatically multiplied, 
war weariness descended on southern Sudan fuelling discontent with the educated 
southern elite directing the internal attacks coupled with a subsequent desire to 
reconcile fragmented relationships.  This was clearly articulated during the Wunlit 
proceedings.  Dinka Chief Bol Giir Thiik for example decried, ‘why do we struggle 
for power before we have achieved anything…  We went to the bush to fight the 
enemy, but we have taken the arms we acquired in war against ourselves.  We are 
killing ourselves unnecessarily.’
634
  Echoing this sentiment one Nuer participant 
admonished, ‘we civilians, let us separate ourselves from the soldiers, and refrain 
from looting…  Let us stop seeking after cattle, for, if we obtain peace, then we will 
                                                 
633
 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political 
Institutions of a Nilotic People (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), 164.  In conflict situations religious 
actors can ‘[reduce] the vulnerability of rulers and governments on each side to accusations of 
weakness.’  Edward Luttwak, “The Missing Dimension,” in Religion, The Missing Dimension of 
Statecraft, eds. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
17.   
634
 Chief Bol Giir Thiik, available from http://southsudanfriends.org/wunlit/day3.html; Internet; 
accessed on 16 November 2007.   
   197
have our cattle; we will cultivate and make good use of our land.  If conflict 
continues we will end up with nothing.’
635
  While the NSCC did not generate the 
desire for peace, it did shape mechanisms for channelling that desire into concrete 
actionable results.   
Building upon continuity and participation with processes of traditional 
resolution and capitalising on an inherent longing for reconciliation the NSCC 
through an initiation of the people-to-people peace process significantly impacted the 
southern Sudanese road to peace in three predominant ways.  First, the peace 
conventions themselves functioned as an arena of protest and an instrument of 
grassroots appraisal.  Douglas Johnson notes, ‘the process begun at Wunlit has given 
public opinion a forum in which it can be expressed and brought to bear on local 
commanders and political leaders.’
636
  Prior to Wunlit there was little 
acknowledgment or consultation with grassroots constituencies and creating such a 
platform forced new directions and agendas within southern Sudan.  In the long run 
the corrective shift initiated at Wunlit and carried by the numerous other people-to-
people peace conferences would force a greater commitment on military leaders to 
pursue peace, remove a layer of insulation from the autocratic tendency of the 
SPLM/A and empower grassroots civil society as active stakeholders in communal 
solidarity and the overarching construction of the resolution of the civil war.  The 
majority of the other initiatives directed at addressing these areas in southern Sudan, 
whether indigenous or international, trace their conceptual and methodological origin 
to Wunlit, the prior Akobo Peace Conference and the primacy of local church actors.  
The manner in which this process specifically relates to the more subtle impact of the 
NSCC on the leadership of the SPLA will be more thoroughly detailed in the 
proceeding section.  In summary however, greater than any other single institution, 
movement or event in southern Sudan, the people-to-people peace process as 
conceived and facilitated by the NSCC demonstrates the ‘relinkage of mobilized 
religion to everyday problem-solving in the context of the pluralistic reconstruction 
of civil societies.’
637
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The second primary impact of the church initiated peace mediation was the 
enhanced rehabilitation of unity within southern Sudan.  With early success much 
though certainly not all of Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal remained committed 
behind SPLA leadership.  Post 1991 however, support quickly fragmented into 
competing segments focused on gaining predominance through elimination of 
potential rivals rather than a joint opposition to the Government of Sudan.  The 
government continually manipulated and extended these divisions as a strategic 
objective.  Prior to Wunlit every attempt, including those pursued by the NSCC, to 
reconcile the military factions faltered and failed.  Wunlit dramatically and 
permanently altered this alignment as it bypassed military leadership and engineered 
a peace process secured by grassroots participants committed to its perseverance 
regardless of the shifting military allegiances.  At first it was unclear even to NSCC 
leadership the extent to which this strategy succeeded.  Telar Deng observed, ‘the 
church actually did play a big role.  What I am arguing… at the time… I didn’t know 
how powerful you know that influence was… a lot of church people did not know 
how influential they were as a church.  So that was my perspective during the period 
when I was doing the people-to-people process.’
638
  Although the NSCC only 
publicly supported the goals and never outright endorsed the SPLA itself and 
although some of the individual people-to-people conferences proved only limited in 
their immediate success, one of the primary results of all of the various conventions 
taken together was a reuniting of southern Sudan at the grassroots level behind a 
single cause: self-determination as mediated by the SPLA through the IGAD 
platform.  As is clear in the Darfur conflict, the potential likelihood of political peace 
primarily internationally negotiated in a context of multiple political goals and 
agendas remains relatively low.
639
  The people-to-people peace process instigated 
and navigated by the NSCC overcame these divisions, unified southern Sudan and 
substantively furthered the road to peace.  Without people-to-people and the 
mediation of the NSCC it is unlikely that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
would have been signed and though it remains tenuous at best, maintained.  The 
Minister of State for Presidential Affairs South Sudan described, ‘Khartoum realised 
that the southerners are closing ranks and coming politically united with one agenda.  
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With one agenda it became a catalyst behind the scenes for the negotiations.  That is 
how one can sum it up, how the people-to-people actually helped.’
640
  That is as the 
southerners increasingly turned towards the church as a central component of 
community maintenance and welfare, the NSCC reciprocated as the forefront 
advocate for southern peace and reconciliation in a methodology that united the 
grassroots behind the official political participants thereby empowering the 
efficaciousness of the resultant peace process.   
Intricately related to the above, the third impact of the New Sudan Council of 
Churches people-to-people reconciliation process was the fostering and nurturing of 
an overall peace conducive environment within southern Sudan.  As John Kong 
observed the, ‘church is the one who brought this peace because in the first place 
they are the ones who went to different areas in south or in Sudan also to mobilise 
people about how peace can come to Sudan…  After that, they negotiate and [then] 
the world put his hand on that.’
641
  By exerting pressure on SPLA leadership to 
increase civil society participation and accountability and increasing the reunification 
of southern Sudan, people-to-people functioned therefore as the bedrock peace 
platform utilised by IGAD.   
Though integral to the construction of the CPA, without the IGAD process it 
is important to note that it is unlikely that the people-to-people peace events would 
have ultimately succeeded as a standalone effort. Their primary function was the 
internal reunification of southern Sudan and an enhanced environment that pressured 
and expedited political peace.  Furthermore within the people-to-people conferences 
themselves, though perhaps necessary at a political level, the granting of official 
amnesty to offences committed prior to the convention ensured that the NSCC would 
be unable to offer rituals addressing the holistic incorporation of a moral 
responsibility towards the individuals lost during the southern conflict.
642
  It is 
unlikely that southern Sudan will fully recover from the civil war until a process of 
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collective memorialising with established subsequent ethical responsibility occurs.
643
  
Within this arena the absence of church reflection, especially from the NSCC, is 
lacking and detrimental.   
In addition to the above it is noteworthy that in the continuum with traditional 
peacemaking maintained by the NSCC it is unlikely that reconciliation will remain 
permanent.  Similar to peace mediated in Kakuma Refugee Camp, explored in 
Chapter Two, resolution addressed unification in the light of a greater common 
enemy without establishing deeper reflections and bonds that supersede divisive 
politics of ethnicity.  Though it is perhaps difficult to overstate the importance and 
the positive effects of the people-to-people peace initiatives at every level – 
politically, socially, economically – and in the furthering of the official peace process 
leading to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it is unclear that 
negotiated settlements will extend beyond the interim period leading to the vote for 
self-determination.  In many important respects southern Sudan remains tenuously at 
peace and deeply divided socially and in such an environment it is unfortunate that 
the NSCC is no longer actively pursuing a mandate of reconciliation.  With the 
signing of the CPA and the cessation of open hostility the NSCC could have 
transitioned from a reactive response of resolving conflict to a proactive stance of 
genuine reconciling unification.   
Nonetheless, in terms of furthering a beneficial resolution for southern 
Sudanese in the context of the second civil war, the role of the NSCC in peace 
mediation was critical.  The people-to-people peace process opened venues of 
accountability and pressure from the grassroots on the SPLM/A, navigated internal 
southern unification and encouraged an overarching environment conducive to 
political peace.  While the role of Wunlit and the people-to-people peace events has 
been recognised, the role of the NSCC in instigating and facilitating this process has 
often been neglected.
644
  For example, Jacqueline Wilson, a Senior Programme 
Officer with the United States Institute of Peace stated: 
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I don’t know the genesis of Wunlit.  I mean when I look back on it, it seems like it came 
from a new tribal communities or the tribal leaders but how they made that leap from fighting 
against each other to coming together to have a conference you know um, and again at the 
beginning it sounded like just bringing the Nuer to Dinkaland and ensuring them that they 
were going to be safe at this conference was a huge achievement and certainly when you look 
at the distances and the challenges of infrastructure in southern Sudan it, you know it boggles 
the mind… I mean it is a huge ordeal just to get them to where they were going so that is a 
major, major accomplishment but I don’t know how it started, whose idea it was.
645
 
At the same time Wilson also noted that from her perspective the foundation for the 
CPA ‘[goes] back to the Wunlit Peace Agreement back in 1999 that brought the 
Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk together.  Certainly that agreement… really made it a north-




The split of the SPLM/A in 1991 eroded many of the military gains garnered 
in the civil war by southern Sudanese and threatened to permanently fracture south 
Sudan in pervasive ethnic warfare.  As south-south conflict escalated and thousands 
of civilians were killed or forced to refuge the New Sudan Council of Churches 
transitioned from a relief organisation to a movement greatly concerned with the 
development of southern reconciliation.  As the southern community increasingly 
turned toward the NSCC the council functioned at the forefront of establishing a 
grassroots mechanism that was built upon traditional approaches and successful in 
fostering resolution behind the military commanders and political leaders.  The 
reconciliation navigated by the NSCC through the people-to-people peace process 
provided an impulse for national resolution and a mediatory platform.  As Michael 
Ouko of the NSCC Peace Desk noted: 
It provided the foundation for peace…  [It] gave a platform where values and principles for 
true reconciliation and forgiveness were built and therefore relating it now to the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, this was based on the same principles.  So but you know 
before people were very adamant and they did not trust among themselves.  They were even 
doubting whether, first of all, to start with the late Dr. John Garang would come together 
with Machar and they were really doubting about it.  But the church opened their eyes that 
reconciliation and forgiveness is possible.  But that one built into another step.  Can we talk 
to our brothers in the north?  But remember that it started from a very small level with 
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B. The NSCC and the SPLM/A 
 
On 28 January 2006 a small quadrant of former SPLA soldiers who had been 
officially inducted into the newly installed Government of Southern Sudan Army 
decided without notice to disarm a section of Lou Nuer in Upper Nile.
648
  Local 
community members perceived the exchange as an attack especially when the 
soldiers began to physically beat some of the women and children at a water pump 
for communal failure to produce armaments.  The situation quickly erupted as the 
Lou responded with gunfire and a counteroffensive that left thirty government forces 
and twelve community members dead.  Fearing possible escalation southern 
Sudanese government officials immediately contacted the PCOS requesting their 
intervention.  Receiving a rapid response grant from PACT-Kenya three PCOS 
leaders began an arduous journey to reach the area and stress to government officials 
the inappropriateness of their action for failing to give proper notification after the 
dry season ended.  To the community, the church leaders were to relay that this was 
an act instigated without oversight and that Lou were not being isolated for further 
attack.  According to Paul Buol it was bad politics, bad decisions and bad leadership 
that now the church was being called to smooth out.
649
  Though it was not possible to 
ascertain the result of the PCOS mediation, the above highlights two relevant themes: 
the reliance of southern Sudanese officials on church leadership as mediators and 
reconcilers and second, the ability of the church to function as a trusted central 
conduit of grassroots concerns and pressure on southern military and political 
commanders.  The second section of this chapter will examine the SPLM/A 
perspective on religion, the turning point in NSCC-SPLM/A relations and an analysis 
of NSCC influence that will establish the degree to which NSCC diplomacy in 
relation to the SPLM/A channelled grassroots sentiments, prompted SPLM/A change 
particularly in connection with John Garang, and thereby influenced communal 
stabilisation and national resolution.  
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SPLM/A and the Religious Quandary 
 
Founded in Ethiopia in 1983 under Marxist principles John Garang and the 
SPLM/A consistently functioned with a secular ideology pursuing a united and 
democratic secular ‘New Sudan.’  The aims of the SPLM/A were clearly articulated 
in a 22 March 1985 speech by Garang: 
1. We are committed to the liberation of the whole Sudan, and to the unity of its 
people and its territorial integrity. 
2. We are committed to the establishment of a NEW and democratic Sudan in 
which equality, freedom, economic and social justice and respect for human 
rights are not mere slogans but concrete realities we should promote, cherish and 
protect. 
3. We are committed to solving national and religious questions to the satisfaction 
of all the Sudanese people and within a democratic and secular context and in 
accordance with the objective realities of our country. 
4. We stand for genuine autonomous or federal governments for the various 
regions of the Sudan.
650
 
As a result of this perspective the SPLM/A consistently eschewed the 
utilisation of religion in the public sphere and sought to incorporate all of the 
ethnicities and marginalised minorities behind its banner.  Though remaining 
relatively numerically small the SPLM/A did include practicing committed Islamic 
participants, particularly from the Nuba Mountains.
651
  For Nuba who had been 
previously considered by the Government of Sudan as potential Islamic partners, the 
result of this allegiance was catastrophic bordering on targeted ethnic cleansing, 
reinforcing to SPLM/A leadership the critical necessity of curtailing religious 
identification and cooperation.
652
  As Sharon Hutchinson describes, ‘Garang and 
Machar have been fighting against the fusion of political and religious practices 
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advocated by the national Islamist government in Khartoum.  Both men are also 
intent on undermining, if not destroying, any mediating institutions standing between 
themselves and the loyalty of their recruits.’
653
   
This ideological stance however became increasingly difficult to sustain as 
the civil war progressed especially after the 1991 fragmentation.  At the grassroots 
level Christian identification was spreading at a rapid acceleration and it carried with 
it messages of personal redemption and transformation, reinterpreted hope, broader 
meaning beyond the struggle for a united Sudan, symbols and process of peace, 
resuscitated patterns of traditional leadership and morality and perhaps most 
poignant, enacted holistic human rights.
654
  It was impossible for SPLM/A leadership 
to curb the enthusiastic dissemination of lay evangelists composing songs, planting 
churches and ministering among SPLA soldiers with prayers for courage and 
forgiveness.  The spread of Christianity implicitly and explicitly challenged SPLM/A 
practices and ideology.  The SPLM/A leadership sought to adapt to this changing 
situation by in part co-opting and moderating the NSCC with SPLM/A priorities.  Dr. 
Samson Kwaje, a member of the SPLM/A National Executive Council, stated for 
example, ‘the people of Sudan expect the Church to play a significant role in our 
present struggle for freedom and justice.  One of our immediate problems is the fact 
that the SPLM does not have public relations offices everywhere to help explain or 
keep the public aware… The Church can play a big role here by assisting us.’
655
  
SPLM/A leadership certainly expected and believed that the NSCC would function 
as a ‘spiritual wing,’ an auxiliary furthering SPLM aims as directed by the Executive 
Council. 
By the middle of the 1990s however, the NSCC was increasingly crystallising 
a message of SPLA criticism that deeply resonated with the southern Sudanese 
populace.  SPLM/A leadership came to regard ‘the New Sudan Council of Churches 
as a competitor, not only among the Southern Sudanese, but also within the 
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international community.  They viewed the NSCC as a haven for dissidents.’
656
  The 
Director of the NSCC Peace Desk stated:  
It was not our view to support the SPLA because even SPLA were committing certain 
atrocities which were against the NSCC values in human rights.  There were some mistakes 
that were made by the SPLA and we stopped and told the SPLM, “no you are wrong here and 
this one can’t happen.”  So I will say that NSCC of course it valued it [SPLA] being in the 
southern Sudan and [because] the SPLA was also in the south somebody might conclude 
philosophically that NSCC was supporting the SPLA but I will argue that in my experience 
the NSCC was… a credible institution that could not be kept silent on the areas that were 
being committed by the SPLA because it was from the south.  They never did that.  Even the 
problems that were caused by the SPLA they highlighted them.
657
 
As the NSCC grew in political clout and capability it intentionally identified 
with the widespread sentiments of a disenchanted grassroots and channelled those 
criticisms to the SPLM/A leadership.  Despite propaganda attempts by the 
Government of Sudan and closely aligned external organisations to discredit the 
NSCC as little more than ‘an apologist’ with a ‘marked reluctance to criticise the 
SPLA,’ the NSCC while never repudiating the overarching aim and validity of the 
SPLM, stood as a bulwark against the excesses and abuses conducted by the 
SPLA.
658
  Over time the NSCC was able to mobilise national and international 
resources to pressure the SPLA to modify its practices and shift its political 
aspirations towards the right to self-determination.  Criticism created a tense 
relationship that hardened into mutual respect and shared suspicion.  Stephen Tut 
observed: 
The SPLA saw the church as a force to reckon with.  They see the church as a body that was 
more popular than the SPLA.  They think the church was not really supportive of the SPLA 
because of the previous concept of SPLA being a Leninist, being a Communist, being a 
Socialist.  Those differences between them and the church were there.  And then there were 
also some personal differences maybe in the administration of the church and the leadership 
of maybe the SPLM, John Garang as a person and Haruun [Ruun] as a person in the NSCC…    
Also it could be rivalling of the leadership of whom each of the parties between the church 
and the SPLA was trying to get the community behind them.  You see?  The church was 
rallying the people behind it, the SPLA was thinking people must rally behind it including 
the church, because they wanted the church to come under them and not live 
independently.
659
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Throughout the early and mid 1990s the SPLM/A rebuffed efforts by the 
NSCC and other church organs to attempt to mediate reconciliation between the 
SPLA and other military factions.  Similar to other African governments, the 
SPLM/A viewed civil society institutions, particularly the NSCC, ‘warily as political 
challenges… (1) because they constitute a network of resourceful organizations that 
are growing more autonomous of the state, and (2) because they have the potential to 
change state-society relations.’
660
  Recognising the limitation of a strained 
relationship Haruun Ruun shifted NSCC policy during 1995-1996 and transitioned 
from encouraging reunification between the SPLA and other military factions to 
reconciliation between the NSCC and the SPLA.  Though Garang sought to undercut 
these efforts, growing estrangement between the SPLA and the general southern 
Sudanese populace and mounted grassroots pressure eventually forced Garang to 
accept the NSCC overtures for dialogue.  This reversal in policy would mark a 
turning point in NSCC-SPLA relations, increase NSCC political access and authority 
and influence future peace developments. 
 
The Yei Dialogue  
 
Particularly after the 1991 split the SPLA increasingly found itself on the 
opposite side of popular sentiment.  Fighting a number of aggressive though un-
decisive campaigns that at times resembled little more than ethnic retaliations, 
dissatisfaction with the SPLA permeated large swaths of southern Sudan.  Ruling by 
military decree while promoting and promising democratic governance the SPLA 
was resistant to criticism and change.  Stephen Tut for example levelled: 
People were frightened.  You can’t say anything about the administration of the SPLA.  You 
can’t say anything about the SPLM.  You can’t say anything about the human rights record.  
And that was false, you see?  If you came up to liberate the people you are liberating them 
because they were not getting their rights otherwise you are liberating them out of what?  Out 
of injustice.  And when you are liberated you must lead by example, you must show the 
example that there must be justice for all. And the SPLA was not seen that way.  They were 
seen well, there were some inhumane practices, and then there were some injustices in the 
movement but [they say] let us wait until after the liberation is over and then those things, 
those questions can be raised.  You don’t wait for human rights… Even they went as far as 
some people were shot, they were [shot by] firing squad, and when somebody raise his hand 
and say I have a complaint, they say… later on you can raise your complaint.  If you have 
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been shot dead how do you raise your complaint after death and you are dead?  That was the 
approach of the SPLA.
661
 
Another group of undisclosed political opponents charged that in the SPLA, 
‘everybody is prohibited from moving from place to place.  No freedom of speech.  
Justice and equality are absolutely alien to the movement.  There is widespread 
imprisonment and killing without trial.  The running of the affairs in the movement is 
based on his whims.’
662
   Though frustration was rampant throughout southern 
Sudan, it was particularly present in Equatoria.   
During Anya-Nya I, the first civil war, the region of Equatoria fielded some 
of the most committed and vociferous political and military combatants.  
Disillusioned by the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and the subsequent political 
jockeying much of Equatoria remained deeply sceptical of John Garang and the 
SPLA based in Ethiopia.   Throughout the early and mid 90s as the SPLA expanded 
its reach and capacity, in Equatoria it frequently found itself forced into positions of 
occupation rather than liberation.  Andrew Onziga voiced the view of many 
Equatorians driven into Ugandan refuge, ‘the Sudanese refugees in West Nile took 
refuge here because of atrocities of SPLA.  Some of them have never seen an Arab.  
Some are right here because the SPLA looted their property, they raped their girls, 
killed their sons… They will be sincere to tell you that they hated SPLA.’
663
  
Another pastor in the area noted that indeed Equatorians, ‘they hate the 
movement.’
664
   
Recognising the untenable nature of this position and the growing importance 
of the NSCC, John Garang reluctantly agreed to a dialogue 21-24 July 1997 in 
Kajiko, Equatoria.  Acting as chairman of the Dialogue ECS Archbishop Joseph 
Marona reflected on the convening of the meeting: 
There were so many disagreements.  The church was against what they [SPLA] were doing 
of robbing people, killing people, burning houses and so on, like raping and all this.  So the 
church stood against these acts.  So they found it difficult and they said unless we come 
together with church leaders and talk together we may look at each other as enemies.
665
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During the proceeding, grassroots constituents, church leaders and members 
of the SPLA were given a neutral space to safely voice criticisms and experienced 
atrocities.  One of the participants recounted: 
Commanders were there… and people talked openly to them because this is now an issue of 
life and death.  Please if you continue with this your government will not be accepted by the 
people.  You are meant to serve these people and you cannot run around and become the 
enemy of the people. Some of these people have never seen the Arab and have never seen the 
evils of the Arab.  They have only seen the evils of the SPLA. They were told right in front to 
the commanders.  They were given details, examples, this thing happened here involving so 
and so and so and so.  People have died here, people have been raped, others have been tied 
on trees and died on the tree and so on.  These are done by the SPLA… You commanders, 




Archbishop Marona remarked, ‘I told Garang, I told him that we have come together 
to talk about unity, loving ourselves, to become one to work together.  Without 
church the movement will find it difficult but if we work together it will be good.’
667
 
Haruun Ruun offered a lengthy rumination on the rationale behind the 
NSCC’s instigation of the Yei Dialogue and the context of the meeting itself: 
Some people thought I was crazy and mad.  And I said no, but some people did not see it 
because the grievances and the division and the hatred was so deep people did not believe it 
would work.  So we pushed for it and indeed Garang was against it very much.  He did not 
want it.  But… very reluctantly he agreed.  So we said okay if you do it you will have to 
come to the south and open it if you cannot stay for the whole thing.  It was another hurdle 
but at last he agreed to come… At the beginning it was tough because the meeting started 
and the movement came in with armed soldiers.  So between every two people there was a 
solider with a gun so people felt intimidated.  We went to Garang and [said] this may not be 
of help because we want reconciliation and many people cannot speak then we are not going 
to negotiate with him.  To his credit he said fine and the next day there were no soldiers 
around with guns… The meeting started and because of tension and bitterness and so forth 
they were hesitant about who should start.  They said let the church people start and the 
church people said let the movement start.  But after awhile the church people stood up and 
they gave their grievances… And at the end they [the SPLA] got up actually, they got up and 
also they gave their own side of the coin.  You as a church yes what you are saying is true.  
Women are being raped, people are getting killed and church leaders have been mistreated 
and so forth but we [were] never taught as teachers the moral thing because you as the church 
that is your responsibility.  Our soldiers should be taught by you, but you know that we are 
more of a tribal church.  Everybody lines up with his own tribes… You have never had a 
moral standing.  Anyway on and on, to make a long story short, in the end they said fine what 
do we do now?… Let us have a distribution of trust.  We as a movement of course we are on 
our own we will continue to fight.  And you as a church take responsibility to reconcile, 
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At the end of the conference the NSCC and the SPLM/A signed a joint 
declaration that served as an official rapprochement between the two movements.
669
  
Specifically, in the Yei Declaration the SPLM/A endorsed the NSCC as the prime 
agency for internal southern mediation and reconciliation.
670
  It furthermore 
requested that the churches provide itinerant chaplains to travel with the soldiers of 
the SPLA.  Although it certainly did not overcome the immense suspicion that had 
been generated, the Yei Dialogue allowed the SPLM/A to clear the air, rehabilitate 
its image and begin a process of increasing support throughout Equatoria that was, 
for example, politically and militarily sealed in the Nairobi Declaration on Unity 
between the SPLM/A and the Equatoria Defence Force in 2004.
671
  In many 
important respects the Yei Dialogue allowed freedom of speech among the general 
population for the first time, provided an opening for civil society to engage the 
SPLM/A, enabled a process of internal reconciliation led by the churches and 
confirmed that the NSCC was the prime conduit for the application of grassroots 
pressure on the leadership of the SPLM/A.   
The Yei Dialogue marked a turning point in the relationship between the New 
Sudan Council of Churches and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army and 
yet even still, following its conclusion their relationship remained at best tenuous.  
Friction remained between the NSCC and SPLA over perceived roles and 
expectations in addition to complaints of abuse.  The SPLA expected the church to 
mimic the role of religion in the north – supportive with strong international financial 
links – while the NSCC expected greater inclusion of civil society and the immediate 
implementation of democracy and good governance by the SPLM.  Though Garang 
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had authorised the Yei Declaration calling on the NSCC to engage southern 
reconciliation endeavours, as was demonstrated in the first section of Chapter Five he 
personally resisted Wunlit and the proceeding people-to-people peace initiatives.     
The NSCC continued to develop and exert its own authority especially as it 
related to functioning as a reflective source of critical accountability to the SPLM/A.  
Responding to a query regarding their relationship, Joseph Marona stated, ‘I cannot 
tell you the right thing why they [SPLM/A leaders] have recognised the church 
leaders because church talks to them courageously.  Don’t do this, don’t do this, do 
that, love the people, you have taken arms to protect them.  But if you mistreat them, 
kill them, then the taking arms to protect them will be meaningless.’
672
  Joseph 
Marona, Haruun Ruun, Matthew Mathiang Deang, Telar Deng and many of the other 
prominent church leaders were granted personal access to Garang and his closest 
advisors and regularly utilised that ability to convey messages of personal 
accountability and immediate implementation of human rights and good governance.   
At an institutional level the NSCC continued to advocate and press for a 
broader inclusion of civil society in the governance of south Sudan and the 
negotiation of a north-south peace agreement even when this was in direct opposition 
to the SPLM/A.  For example in June 2001 the NSCC 
convened a consultation dubbed Strategic Linkages in 
Kisumu, Kenya that though boycotted by the SPLA, 
‘involved a broad spectrum of civil society, politicians, 
intellectuals and traditional leaders’ in which the NSCC 
‘asserted its independence from the SPLA, and 
participants called for its continued role as they forged 
agreement around a political agenda for the south largely 
focused on self-determination.’
673
  The following year 
the NSCC in cooperation with the SCC coordinated a 
similar civil society forum drawing over one hundred 
participants with an aim ‘to deliberate on priorities and 
practices for promoting good governance and 
reconciliation to achieve a just and lasting peace for 
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Sudanese peoples.’
674
  Though the NSCC was certainly not alone in organising 
conferences and deliberations on expanding the internal participation of civil society, 
in southern Sudan it was the most consistent and predominant actor.
675
   
Interestingly, as Christian communal identification accelerated, the NSCC 
grew in authority and legitimacy and as his contact with international church 
representatives increased, John Garang appears to have undergone a personal 
transformation and re-evaluation of Christianity.  As one noted anthropologist 
observed, ‘it is worth mentioning that John Garang, who was a committed secularist 
at the start of the war [in 1983], has reportedly been combing the Bible in recent 
years in the hope of divining the war’s outcome.’
676
  With a prophetic overtone, in 
his speech at the official signing of the CPA at Nyayo Stadium in Nairobi in 2005 
John Garang stated:  
I want in conclusion to quote, in terms of this inclusiveness, the gospel according to St John, 
that says in St John Chapter 14, Verse 1 and 2: Do not be worried and upset, Jesus told them, 
believe in God and believe also in me.  There are many rooms in my father’s house and I’m 
going to prepare a place for you.  I would not say [it] if it were not true.  So I say to all 
southern Sudanese on the occasion of this signing of this comprehensive peace agreement, 




The inclusion of the above scripture in Garang’s speech was repeated during 
interviews by a number of individuals on multiple occasions and certainly highlights 
the overarching influence of a nascent southern Sudanese civil religion and the deep 
impact of Christianity on the consciousness and politics of the leader of the secularly 
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Analysis and Conclusion  
 
The New Sudan Council of Churches consistently engaged in direct 
diplomacy with the leadership of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in 
order to voice important criticisms, support the expansion of civil society and 
advocate for measures of human rights, good governance and peace building.  
Despite claims to the contrary the NSCC did not shy from highlighting grievances 
committed by the SPLA and encouraged SPLM democratic governance in the 
liberated areas.  In this way the NSCC served as a source of accountability mirroring 
popular sentiment and forcing the SPLM/A to change and adapt to southern political 
demands and aspirations.   
Significantly this disapproval of the SPLM/A as expressed by the NSCC was 
articulated in a context of autocratic military control.  Especially in the early years of 
the civil war the SPLA did not hesitate to imprison or otherwise detain political 
dissidents including church leaders.  As Christianity grew in importance the outright 
targeting of church leaders diminished and in general, the NSCC was able to 
moderate some of the more repressive tendencies of the SPLA leadership.   At the 
same time the NSCC was unable to establish complete independence.  A working 
relationship and at least tacit approval from the SPLA was imperative to the 
establishment of NSCC people-to-people peace initiatives.  Even after the Yei 
Dialogue direct confrontation required tact and a certain amount of diplomacy.  For 
example Archbishop Joseph Marona commented that in conversations with Garang 
he frequently couched his criticism in Biblical stories and language: 
I said enough is enough because the blood of the innocent people are shedding a lot. The 
earth is complaining.  The earth is complaining because the war is fought.  I talk to him about 
Abel and Cain that very simply, Abel was killed by his brother but God knew.  When God 
knew that Cain had killed Abel he said even if he was afraid of denying it God said the blood 
of your brother is complaining to me.  It was difficult to hide it.  So I told him these difficult 
stories in the Bible.
678
 
The NSCC and representative church leaders had to sustain a careful balance 
between maintaining institutional independence and corresponding capabilities to 
offer meaningful criticism without completely alienating SPLM/A leadership. 
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The NSCC was effective in retaining this delicate balance by in part 
transcending individual political parties and ideologies.  The NSCC never denied the 
right of the SPLA to militarily stand for marginalised Sudanese or to advocate for a 
greater political inclusion of southern Sudanese at the national level.  In particular 
the NSCC lamented the split of the southern resistance movement in 1991 and 
despite its own complaints, refused to endorse or shift support to other political 
factions.  The NSCC envisioned that southern political reconciliation would occur 
under the banner of the SPLM and consistently worked accordingly.  The at least 
implicit support of the aims of the SPLM/A is clearly seen in the ambivalent name of 
the NSCC.  The overarching political goal of the SPLM was the creation of a ‘New 
Sudan.’  In this context it is equally possible to read the name of the southern 
Sudanese council of churches as either the ‘New’ Sudan Council of Churches or as 
the ‘New Sudan’ Council of Churches.   
The relationship between the NSCC and the SPLM/A remained somewhat 
ambiguous.  While the SPLM/A resisted efforts by the NSCC to expand its agenda 
and thereby encroach on its political terrain, the NSCC refused to directly and 
ultimately repudiate the SPLM/A as a movement or outright endorse its propositions 
or behaviour.  As the SPLA sought to establish military control and victory the 
NSCC worked to ensure that SPLM political governance achieved the aim of 
democracy it espoused, that southern Sudan would remain united so as to increase 
the potentiality of a beneficial national resolution, the influence and role of human 
rights and civil society was expanded in order to facilitate communal stability and 
that the SPLM would maintain an active engagement with efforts of peace mediation.   
Although the NSCC sought to broaden ‘the movement’ to include civil 
society partnerships it is important to note that in this respect the NSCC was only 
partially successful.   The NSCC convened a number of conferences, actively 
promoted an ecumenical networking among various members of civil society and 
worked to rehabilitate traditional patterns and processes of governance.  These 
endeavours resulted in a deepening consciousness among southern Sudanese about 
the legitimacy of human rights and the desirability for democracy that in itself was 
an implicit challenge and resistance mechanism to the SPLA.  With communal 
stability benefits at the grassroots level, these initiatives did not however result in an 
institutional re-ordering as clearly seen in the exclusion of civil society participants 
from the IGAD peace agreement.  
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More efficacious, the NSCC stood as a bulwark against SPLA abuses and 
excesses, identified with grassroots sentiments and concerns and through effectively 
conveying that perspective pressured the SPLA to pursue peace.  Michael Ouko of 
the NSCC expounded:  
You know that what they were addressing they were not cooking these things.  These things 
were being reported by the people themselves.  The church was there, was seeing these 
things, and reporting those things to the NSCC.  So it was not the NSCC imagining what was 
happening.  So we could tell them [the SPLA] this is the letter, there was even proof these are 
the core issues we are receiving from the people so you have to stop it…  So, that’s why the 
SPLM also found it very difficult to challenge the NSCC because these issues were very 
genuine.
679
   
For southern Sudanese the most important concern was the establishment of political 
peace and towards this end NSCC facilitation was effective in two primary ways. 
First, as the people-to-people peace process galvanised support and resolution 
at mid and grassroots levels, pressure was applied on John Garang and the elite 
echelon to accept political reconciliation with other southern factions.  As one 
scholar noted, ‘the “people-to-people” peace process contributed considerably to the 
peace agreement between John Garang and Reik Machar in early 2001.’
680
  Matthew 
Mathiang Deang described, ‘unity within the SPLM was brought about by all these 
small conferences.’
681
  At the Nuer Fangak Peace Conference regarding John Garang 
and Reik Machar it was declared, ‘the merger between the two movements was in 
fact a great achievement to all peaceful initiatives carried out in the past by the 
NSCC with its partners and will pave ways for the future peace dialogues at 
grassroots as well as at the political levels.’
682
  Garang had resisted all attempts at 
reconciliation with Machar and it was ongoing NSCC pressure that finally created an 
environment conducive to facilitating the reunification of their two respective 
movements.  Though the merger of their forces remained fragile the reconciliation 
increased the military capacity of the south, especially in the area of the oil fields.
683
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Furthermore, it enabled the SPLM to stand as the representative of south Sudan, 
united around definitive and concrete desires and therefore capable of implementing 
a peace agreement negotiated with the Government of Sudan.  The unity of the 
SPLM/A during the final stages of the IGAD peace process was critical and much of 
that unity rested on a framework erected and pushed by the NSCC.   
Second and directly related to the above, NSCC pressure ensured that John 
Garang would legitimately pursue peace through the IGAD process.  Garang and 
other elite military commanders had a vested interest in continuing to wage war until 
a military victory could be assured, a possibility with only a dim potentiality.  The 
NSCC conveyed to John Garang the deep war weariness of south Sudan, the growing 
disillusionment of military strategies enacted by the SPLA and the need to remain at 
the negotiating table.  As one individual observed, ‘you know turning somebody to 
see the evils of war and to see those atrocities as an evil and begin to search for a 
different way is a very difficult thing to do.’
684
  The NSCC focused on dialogue, 
negotiation and reconciliation and pressured the SPLM/A to utilise these measures as 
primary strategies.  The NSCC viewed the IGAD securing of peace through 
arbitration an ultimate vindication especially as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
included a protocol resisted by John Garang and the international community but 
vociferously advocated by the NSCC: the right to self-determination.  The manner in 
which the NSCC pressured both the international community and John Garang to 
include this right in the CPA will be explored in the following chapter.  Though 
Sudanese government officials and external groups frequently called on Garang ‘to 
think of peace,’ the NSCC as an internal southern agency deeply connected to the 
southern populace carried a tremendous political currency and utilised that currency 
to press for commitment to the IGAD peace process with the implicit threat of 
grassroots realignment.
685
  It is important to note that thus far research has primarily 
focused on the influence of the church on elite SPLM/A leadership.  It is unclear the 
extent to which the NSCC, local churches or individual chaplains influenced or 
modified local formations of the SPLA.  More research is needed in this area.  At an 
elite level, however, NSCC acted as an important and unparalleled central conduit of 
grassroots pressure on the SPLM/A leadership, challenged and influenced John 
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Garang, supported the political reunification of southern military factions and 
mobilised commitment for the IGAD peace process.  As the Director of the 
University of Juba Centre for Peace and Development described, ‘the church had 
much role to do in pushing pressure on the SPLA.’
686
 
As disillusionment with the SPLA deepened and the capacity of the NSCC 
grew, the southern Sudanese grassroots increasingly turned towards the NSCC with 
complaints and criticisms.  By the end of the 1990s the NSCC had crystallised its 
political objectives, developed a message of peace that resonated with the majority of 
southern Sudan and was functioning as the primary internal agent for change in 
relation to the SPLM/A.  Though the NSCC remained relatively small in terms of 
personnel and did not have the resources of government offices or military factions, 
the ability of the NSCC to flexibly identify itself with multiple ethnicities and 
constituencies enabled the council of churches to develop political clout and pressure 
on the basis of a unifying mobilisation and alignment of southern Sudan.
687
  That is 
the NSCC strategically initiated a partnership with mid-level leaders that saw the 
rehabilitation of that leadership within traditional structures and the ethnic 
reconciliation of the grassroots populace and utilised the re-engendered unification as 
a tool of applied pressure on the elite leadership of the SPLM/A.  In this way the 
NSCC stood at the forefront of organising southern reconciliation and was the central 
custodian for advancing civil society, advocating for human rights and good 
governance and applying elite pressure on the SPLM/A to pursue peace.  As one 
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Chapter Six 
International Advocate: The New Sudan Council of Churches and 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
 
‘Christians say they are away from politics but in my opinion I think God is the first 




‘The church is an indigenous body there but its voice can be made louder if it is in 





Representative of the majority of southern Sudanese one Nuer pastor 
responded to a question regarding the importance of peace-building in the mission of 
the church, ‘I think reconciliation first is the most important…  You cannot preach to 
them when they are quarrelling… You cannot tell them before they have peace in 
their hearts.’
691
  The New Sudan Council of Churches reflected this grassroots 
sentiment stating that their goal was ‘to strive to bring about reconciliation, justice, 
and lasting peace in the Sudan ensuring stability and enhancing justice in economic, 
social, religious, and political establishments through peoples’ participation, 
lobbying and advocacy work.’
692
  As was demonstrated in Chapter Five the NSCC 
employed two efficacious internal strategies to help facilitate and expedite the 
political peace process.  First, the NSCC stood at the forefront of initiating 
partnerships with traditional mid-level leaders, re-engaging their communal authority 
and organising grassroots reconciliation and participation through the people-to-
people peace process.  Second, the NSCC functioned as the central conduit through 
which a reunified southern Sudanese populace lobbied and exerted pressure on the 
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elite leadership of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army to implement 
practices of good governance, reconcile with other military factions and legitimately 
pursue negotiated peace with the Government of Sudan.  There was however a third 
strategic tool utilised by the NSCC in furthering the peace process: international 
advocacy. 
In Addis Ababa in 1972 it was the Sudan Council of Churches partnered with 
the World Council of Churches and the All Africa Conference of Churches that 
organised, facilitated and brokered the peace agreement ending Anya-Nya I, the first 
civil war.  Thirty years later in Sudan the churches were no longer in a position to 
directly engage in a political brokering of a north-south peace agreement.  
Recognising the opportunity offered in international solidarity, particularly as related 
to the maintenance of a sanctioned peace process that could direct significant 
pressure towards both the SPLA and the Government of Sudan, the NSCC pursued 
beneficial international partnerships with regional governments as well as those in 
Europe and America, NGOs and church actors.  Chapter Six will focus on 
international advocacy, the third strategy utilised by the NSCC.  Specifically, this 
chapter will explore the relationship between the NSCC and the regionally based 
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace process, European and 
American involvement, the inclusion of the right to self-determination in the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and an analysis of the overall impact of the 
NSCC on the peace process.  Coupled with reconciliation and internal SPLA 
pressure, the efforts of the NSCC to stand behind international advocacy campaigns 
proved critical to facilitating the road to Sudanese peace.   
 
Regional Advocacy: The NSCC and The Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development Peace Process 
 
In 1986 the governments of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and 
Uganda decided to develop a regional approach for addressing the persistent 
problems of drought and desertification dubbed eventually the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD).
693
  Recognising that issues of food scarcity is 
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particularly relevant in contexts of political instability and regional insecurity, in 
1993 an IGAD sub-committee on Sudan was initiated and tasked with facilitating a 
regionally sanctioned peace process amenable to both the Government of Sudan and 
the SPLM/A.
694
  In 1995 the United States (US) government arranged a western 
support group for IGAD comprising the governments of the US, Sweden, Italy and 
the Netherlands and known initially as the ‘Friends of IGAD’ and after 1997, the 
IGAD Partners Forum.
695
  After securing an initial breakthrough in 1994 with an 
agreed Declaration of Principles (DOP) by both the SPLM/A and the Sudanese 
government, the IGAD peace process lay fairly dormant and ineffective until 
2002.
696
  With the appointment of Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo as the Special 
Envoy for Sudanese Peace, a renewed engagement by the United States
697
 and a 
more conducive southern Sudanese political and peace-building context due to the 
reunification and internal lobbying advanced by the NSCC, in 2002 dialogue 
commenced in the Kenyan town of Machakos reached a ‘remarkable breakthrough’ 
in the stalled peace process.
698
  Two years later in Naivasha a final peace protocol 
was signed that incorporated multiple security and political arrangements between 
the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan paving the way for an official 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed 9 January 2005.
699
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Though the signatories of the CPA included only those of the SPLM and the 
Government of Sudan, reflective of their primacy in the actual negotiations, IGAD as 
a process was impacted by the NSCC in four important ways.  First, NSCC advocacy 
maintained contact with the governments of Kenya and Uganda in order to press for 
their ongoing commitment to the IGAD peace forum.  Father Joseph Garzi the 
Catholic Bishop of Tambura and Yambio described how the churches initially 
engaged in this process: 
We sent a delegation to the United Nations in America.  We sent two Bishops with our letter 
of appeal that the war should end, that they should stop the war.  And Boutros Boutros Ghali 
who was back then the Secretary told our Bishop if it is a question of religious persecution in 
the Sudan you better go to Rome and tell the Pope, don’t tell me.  This is none of our 
business.  Or otherwise if you want to talk about this go back to Sudan and get in touch with 
the government of the borders neighbouring you and then convince them to take up your 
case.  They can be the one that can bring it to the United Nations, not the church leaders.  So 
this is how we linked up.  When we came in and told them [the governments of Kenya and 
Uganda] then they worked out to make that IGAD process.
700
 
In 1992 or 1993 Garzi and a member of the ECS visited President Museveni in 
Uganda and with the Secretary of the National Council of Churches of Kenya 
(NCCK), on two separate occasions Garzi visited with President Moi of Kenya.  In 
his meeting with President Museveni Garzi communicated: 
His county is full of us, the refugees… Has he ever gone to the camp to see what is 
happening there and how much our people are suffering?  Does he not get very concerned 
about this?… It might affect his country also adversely, why not do something about it?  So 
in fact he said, “Okay, I will see my colleague the President of Kenya and then we shall see 
what can happen.”  And that is how they brought in the other [IGAD].
701
 
Though it is hyperbolic to claim sole credit in instigating the shift in IGAD 
methodology from drought and desertification to peace building, churches did 
maintain regular contact with governmental leaders in Kenya and Uganda lobbying 
them for support and involvement and were certainly an important force in enlisting 
Ugandan and Kenyan peace mediatory participation.
702
  A statement prepared by the 
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 Despite querying a number of individuals, political observers and IGAD participants, none claimed 
to understand the shift in IGAD away from drought and desertification to peace building or who or 
what initiated that change, a transformation that did occur in 1992-93.   
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Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed the importance of NSCC involvement 
stating:  
We are grateful for the assistance the Church has provided from relief and rehabilitation to 
development, education and some aspects of governance.  We urge you to continue with the 
participatory grassroots peace keeping models… We take note of the Churches’ concern 
towards the peace process especially that the DOP should be the foundation of negotiations.  
It is particularly important that the Church has recognised the need for humanitarian access to 
marginalised areas and the importance of projects of mine awareness and demining.  This 
acknowledgement has greatly enhanced the role of the Church as the sub-region intensifies 
efforts for peace.
703
   
The above statement highlights three related areas of important influence: the role of 
the NSCC in grassroots reunification and peace building, the ability of the churches 
to convey to outside institutions the needs and humanitarian access points of south 
Sudan and the churches’ commitment to advocating for a peace process that forced 
both parties to build upon already agreed principles instead of allowing either 
participant to renege and negotiate an initial starting point more to its particular 
ideology or benefit.  Lasting over a decade the IGAD peace process required 
encouragement with regional governments needing ongoing pressure in order to 
ensure their participation.  Lobbying conducted by the NSCC in Uganda and Kenya 
substantively helped ensure the critical involvement of their respective governments 
in addition to an overarching commitment by all interested parties to maintain as the 
basis for negotiation the DOP, an agreement only hesitantly accepted by both the 
SPLM and the Government due to its inclusion of a mandated southern Sudanese 
right to self-determination.  With strong links to both the grassroots of south Sudan 
and to neighbouring church institutions the NSCC consistently worked to lobby and 
encourage regional accountability and participation in the IGAD peace process.
704
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Second, as was more fully explored in Chapter Five, the NSCC helped 
empower the effectiveness of the IGAD process by facilitating an environment 
conducive to peace building within south Sudan.  The IGAD Secretariat for Peace in 
Sudan recognised the importance of conducting grassroots consultation with the 
southern Sudanese population in order to incorporate their perspective into the 
process.  Though IGAD did host several grassroots conferences towards this end they 
were unable to organise regular or geographically diverse grassroots conventions.  
Instead following one such commissioned endeavour in 2001 it was recommended to 
the IGAD Secretariat in a section on ‘strengthen[ing] southern unity,’ that IGAD 
‘conduct more agreements like Wunlit, as a starting point for broader unity’ and 
‘strengthen and encourage the “people to people’s peace process.”’
705
  The report 
also recommended that IGAD international partners ‘increase the capacity of NSCC’ 
in order ‘to ensure that churches are involved in peace negotiations in the refugee 
camps and in Sudan.’
706
  That is IGAD recognised the importance of the people-to-
people process as the basis for generating both southern unity and peace with the 
Government of Sudan and due to the geographical diffusion of the church, an 
instrument of greater connectivity and participation.  In the midst of a ‘forgotten war’ 
the IGAD Forum directly relied upon the NSCC to establish southern peace and 
reunification.
707
  Even the Government of Sudan recognised the importance of the 
NSCC in empowering a southern Sudanese environment conducive to peace building 
as explicitly evidenced in an official statement from Sudanese Ambassador David de 
Chand: 
We would like to appeal to IGAD and the Church to remain firm and continue to assist the 
people of Sudan to achieve peace.  We know the Church can play a major positive role in 
creating a conducive atmosphere to the parties to the conflict so that trust and confidence 
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Third, invested with religious symbols and authority in a context of nascent 
civil religion, the involvement of the NSCC in the IGAD process as official 
observers granted the endeavour a greater sense of validity for many southern 
Sudanese.  One group of scholars claimed, ‘the NSCC, merely by its existence and 
its presence and moral support for the peace talks, gave a legitimacy to the process 
that would not otherwise have existed.’
709
  In addition to its religious overtones the 
NSCC conscientiously sought to broaden and represent civil society as a whole.  In a 
context devoid of most opportunities for participation or even the development of 
civil society, the inclusion of the NSCC in its presence and advocacy stood for a 
commitment to negotiated resolution and the necessity for building support and 
incorporation of civilian, non-military sources.
710
  As the Speaker for the Parliament 
for the State of Western Equatoria noted, the ‘church was meeting at high levels 
making pressure on the two governments and even IGAD.  I could say that the 
church played a very high level.’
711
  
Fourth, international NSCC advocacy helped secure the ongoing engagement 
of European and American IGAD partners, involvement that was critical to the 
securing of political peace.  Responding to what caused the participation of the 
Government of Sudan in the IGAD peace talks former Member of Parliament 
Thomas Melut described, ‘the international pressure. The international pressure 
realised that the war you see [would] not end unless of course the Government of 
Sudan and the rebels under John Garang were pressured to talk peace.’
712
  Knowing 
that ‘in addition to their own solidarity, a decisive expression of solidarity from 
others… becomes a critical step,’ the NSCC established international focal points 
through which they channelled relevant information to both partner churches and 
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respective governments.
713
  With intimate involvement in both the 1972 Addis 
Ababa Agreement and the contemporary SCC context Samuel Nwaylo Ador stated:  
The churches were more proactive [this time] than they were in 1972.  I am not diminishing 
the role the church played in 1972 but I am putting it into context.  But in the 1972 context it 
was the World Council and the AACC and the Sudan Council of Churches, okay.  We did 
not have missions going out to African countries to advocate on behalf of Sudan.  There were 
no missions to the Arab world as we did this time.  There were no missions to Europe as we 
did also during this period…  There was much more work done this time by the churches to 
push the two sides to the roundtable to talk peace.
714
 
In addition to the regular disbursement of information through the various 
focal points the NSCC sought to promote international involvement in securing 
Sudanese peace in a variety of governmental outlets and relationships.  For example, 
‘in March 1993, Bishop Macrom Max Gassis, the Bishop of El-Obeid, addressed the 
UN Commission on Human Rights, giving an account of human rights violations and 
religious discrimination and calling upon the international community to take a more 
active role and work towards putting an end to the regime’s violations.’
715
  In 1999 
the NSCC claimed that the Executive Secretary developed advocacy relationships 
with US Senator Bill Frist, Advisor to the White House John Prendergast, the US 
Agency for International Development, British Charge D’affaires in Khartoum Bill 
Ridout, the British Foreign Office in London, UN Special Envoy to Sudan Tom 
Vraalsen, and the Ambassadors from Switzerland and Norway.
716
  The combination 
of these various advocacy endeavours according to Bishop Daniel Deng was that ‘the 
church was involved this time to push the two parties to come to negotiation together 
with the other parties like IGAD and European Union and America.’
717
   
Involvement of international partners was critical to the establishment of 
peace through the IGAD process as stated by Matthew Mathiang Deang: ‘this peace 
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came because of influence of the international community, the Americans, the 
Norwegians, the British.’
718
  International engagement ensured that pressure would 
be applied to the Government of Sudan to negotiate the CPA in good faith.  Dr. Taib 
Hag-Atia noted, ‘they [the Government] are clear enough to see that they should 
engage in negotiations and they hoped that the negotiations will go on forever.  And 
it could have been, it could have gone on but for IGAD and the friends of IGAD and 
everybody who pressured them and pushed them to sign it.’
719
  The NSCC 
understood that applying legitimate pressure on the Khartoum government was 
beyond their capacity and that governmental agreement would occur only if backed 
by the application of international pressure.  The NSCC therefore worked to facilitate 
awareness about the situation of southern Sudan and through advocacy convince 
international governments to sanction or otherwise pressure the Government of 
Sudan.  In this respect NSCC strategy was largely successful.  Political observer Dr 
Abednego Akok Kacuol claimed that the Government of Sudan agreed to the CPA 
primarily because of international involvement, ‘the Government found out that there 
was no other outlet unless they sign peace agreement with the SPLA to relieve them 
from the international pressure.  There was no other card to use only to sign peace.  
Otherwise they were going to suffer from the international sanctions proposed.’
720
  
Another group of scholars observed, ‘contributing to the peace momentum was the 
passage of the Sudan Peace Act by the US Congress in October 2002… The Sudan 
Peace Act afforded more sticks than carrots to the Sudanese government.  While 
keeping up the pressure, however, it also held out the possibility of the normalization 
of relations.’
721
  The NSCC understood that international pressure was critical to 
ensuring good faith participation by the Government of Sudan and therefore viewed 
international advocacy at both regional and European and American levels as a key 
component to securing the establishment of peace.
722
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It is important to note that during the negotiations of the CPA the NSCC was 
present as observers, not participants.  The NSCC was not involved in direct 
mediation between the SPLM and the Government of Sudan.  The influence of the 
NSCC on the IGAD process was more indirect and multidimensional.  Though the 
CPA only included the signatures of the SPLM and the Government of Sudan it was 
a regionally organised process that was successful due to augmentation by both 
internal Sudanese developments and external governmental support.
723
  The NSCC 
recognised the importance of both of these venues and to varying degrees of success 
stood behind peace building and advocacy endeavours in both of these areas.  From 
the very beginning it was the New Sudan Council of Churches and related church 
bodies that pushed the governments of Kenya and Uganda to establish an acceptable 
venue for peace negotiations.  The NSCC continued to lobby these governments, 
extol the importance of IGAD and channel information either directly or through 
established focal points to an international audience.  Re-engagement of the United 
States after 2001 greatly strengthened the legitimacy and potentiality of the IGAD 
process and was itself the result of collaborative international church partnerships 
advanced in part by the churches of south Sudan.   
 




In a high rise building in downtown Washington D.C. Ezekiel Gatkuoth, the 
Head of the Government of Southern Sudan Mission to the United States 
commented, ‘President Bush was pretty strongly involved with this [peace]… He 
was very much involved because he was mobilised by the Christian community here 
in the US.’
725
  Gatkuoth continued that it was the NSCC that stood behind the 
mobilisation of US constituencies on behalf of south Sudan: ‘the [Sudanese] church 
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played a role in keeping the faith and also in mobilising the Christian community to 
let them know that we do have a problem in the south.’
726
  US involvement post-
2001 was critical to the signing of the CPA and reflected a substantive change in 
approach to Sudan.  This shift and re-engagement of US policy developed 
predominately from the merging of a broad based US coalition that was itself a 
partial extension of NSCC international advocacy.
727
    
Throughout the 1980s out of Cold War security concerns the United States 
‘invested heavily’ in the Government of Sudan giving over $1.5 billion to the 
government.
728
  Following the 1989 regime change and the advent of the National 
Islamic Front, however, US policy shifted towards isolation and containment.  The 
Clinton administration primarily relied upon a policy of international sanctions
729
 
that hindered Khartoum but failed to ‘significantly weaken’ the NIF’s grip on power 
or the civil war.
730
  After initially following a similar course the attack on 11 
September 2001 opened President George W Bush to a divergent course.
731
  Sensing 
an important political opportunity for improving its image and financial capability 
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the Government of Sudan almost immediately volunteered information regarding 
Osama bin Laden and began to cooperate closely in the area of terrorism while at the 
same time, President Bush ‘developed a policy of supporting a negotiat[ed] 
settlement of the North-South conflict.’
732
  Building upon an emerging evangelical 
engagement with US foreign affairs and latent Wilsonian tenets upholding an 
intentional spread of American democratic values, two primary groups converged to 
force President Bush to adopt a strong position of pursuing a negotiated peace 
through the IGAD forum.
733
  Both of these groups at least indirectly connected with 
NSCC international advocacy.   
Based primarily in the Washington D.C. area the first group was a loose 
association of individuals connected to various think tank organisations such as the 
Institute on Religion and Democracy and the Hudson Institute.  Though a number of 
individuals were involved three stand out as predominant: Nina Shea, Michael 
Horowitz and Faith McDonnell.  Connected to the US Commission on International 
Religious Freedom, Shea maintained close contact with the Sudanese Catholic 
Bishop Macram Max Gassis who throughout the 1990s resided in the US due to 
Sudanese governmental targeting, his vocal opposition to the government and his 
consistent access to brief key church and governmental leaders in the US about the 
Sudanese situation.
734
  Intrigued by the lack of awareness surrounding Christian 
persecution Horowitz, a practicing Jew, began researching and ‘realised that Sudan 
was the worst place where any Christian persecution was taking place with the worst 
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excesses of radical Islamic violence and fascism were manifest.’
735
  That is, 
Horowitz’s advocacy involvement stemmed in part from a deep motivation to 
specifically help and redress the plight of Christians in south Sudan whom he viewed 
as the principal representatives of a broader phenomenon.  McDonnell had the 
deepest and most consistent connection to church leaders in south Sudan and 
founded the US based Church Alliance for a New Sudan.   
Around 1997 Shea, Horowitz and McDonnell began to build a coalition that 
regularly met to generate strategies that would shift US policy towards engaging a 
negotiated peace process for southern Sudan.
736
  Over the next eight years the 
coalition grew to include evangelical Christians, leaders of the African American 
community, Jewish leaders, and both republican and democratic congressional 
representatives.  The US Consul General in Juba described the coalition as ‘strange 
bedfellows’ that remained divided on every issue ‘except the Sudan.’
737
  The 
coalition engaged in a variety of activities ranging from media publications and 
corrections,
738
 testifying at congressional hearings,
739
 generating letters to Presidents 
Clinton and Bush,
740
 facilitating student conferences, organising protest rallies, 
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encouraging divestment campaigns and orchestrating the passage of the Sudan Peace 
Act signed into law 21 October 2002.
741
  Within these activities, there were three 
important ways in which the coalition was impacted by advocacy advanced by 
southern Sudanese churches.   
First, southern Sudanese church leaders were heavily involved in personally 
lobbying congressional representatives and key US Christian leaders.  It is important 
to note that though NSCC strategy proposed such activity, limited resources meant 
that Sudanese were often reliant upon hosting by international partners.  In this 
respect the Institute on Religion and Democracy was critical in helping facilitate 
congressional visits by a number of Sudanese church leaders including NSCC co-
founder Episcopalian Bishop Nathanial Garang, Reverend John Dau, Episcopalian 
Bishops Boulin Dali and Peter Mundi, Telar Deng of the NSCC peace desk, and 
Catholic Bishop Paridi Taban.
742
  Reflecting on the importance of these visits in 
securing US support Faith McDonnell concluded:  
I think it is very important.  I think that the members of Congress and the members of the 
administration needed to hear from people from the area to know what was really going on.  I 
know that it has been very helpful in getting hearings on Sudan.  And over the years you 
know we will have a meeting and a Congressman and a Senator will say well we need to 
have a hearing on this and then it happens and that leads to other things… So I think the 
church and the people of Sudan played a very important role.
743
 
Ezekiel Gatkuoth, the chief representative of the government of southern Sudan in 
the United States confirmed the above stating, ‘Bishop Paridi Taban he is a very 
influential person.  He is a Catholic person.  And there is Nathanial Garang, he is an 
Episcopal Bishop.  They are very influential people.  They have friends like Faith 
McDonnell who is also connected here in Washington… Without her I don’t think 
we would be here.’
744
  Given the proclivity on Capital Hill to perceive African affairs 
as relatively unimportant, in this area ‘the potential for influencing Congress is 
especially great.’
745
  The NSCC and connected church leaders exploited this opening 
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pressing for US involvement and lobbying for negotiated peace favourable to 
southern Sudan.   
Second, in addition to advocacy visits church leaders were afforded 
opportunities to officially submit their positions through congressional hearings.  For 
example on 27 May 1999 Mark T Ajo presented a highly personal account stating, 
‘my own sister Mary and her daughter Pierina died from starvation.  My nephew 
Philip died at the hands of the government forces together with hundreds of other 
southern civil servants.  We were never given Philip’s remains to see and bury with 
dignity according to our tradition.’
746
  Ajo continued, ‘I am therefore appealing to 
you the leaders and government of this blessed, powerful nation to help us in our 
struggle for survival and faith.’
747
  In a February 2000 hearing Bishop Macram 
Gassis, who several years earlier had been the first person to ever testify before the 
US Commission on International Religious Freedom,
748
 commented, ‘I have tried 
time and again to tell the world that the National Islamic Front regime in Khartoum 
has been and is conducting a campaign of genocide aimed at exterminating the 
Christian, African, and non-Arab populations of Sudan in order to establish a 
uniform Arab-Islamic fundamentalist free state in the heart of Africa.’
749
  Gassis 
concluded, ‘come and save us.  We are not asking you to carry our cross. Each 
person has to carry his own.  We are asking you only to help us carry it.’
750
   
Third, understanding the critical importance of communication southern 
Sudanese churches helped supply consistent firsthand information that the US 
coalition relied upon.
751
  For example in September 1999 Michael Horowitz enclosed 
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in an email to the Sudan coalition an ‘Appeal of the Catholic Bishops of Eastern 
Africa for Peace in the Sudan’ that denounced specific Sudanese governmental 
actions and called on the international community to ‘take decisive measures to put 
an effective end to the war’ and ‘fully support the IGAD Forum.’
752
  Though church 
sources were certainly not the only place members of the coalition received 
information, churches consistently funnelled pertinent information pressing for the 
US furtherance of the Sudan peace process facilitated by IGAD.
753
  The coalition 
directly linked with NSCC peace participation advancing through Senator Sam 
Brownback’s office a bill that increased funding the US Agency for International 
Development granted to the people-to-people peace process.
754
  Together the US 
coalition and NSCC church advocacy worked to secure US involvement forcing 
‘both the executive, especially the State Department and the White House, and the 
legislative branches of the US government to pressure the government of Sudan to 
improve the human rights situation, grant humanitarian access to famine-stricken 
areas, and to seek peace in good faith.’
755
  As Faith McDonnell stated, ‘we’ve 
worked with a lot of the leadership of the New Sudan Council of Churches.  We’ve 
tried to publicise things that they have done.  For instance, I think the New Sudan 




Overlapping with the above was a second group representative of the 
widespread concern for south Sudan carried by the US grassroots populace: The 
Ministerial Alliance of Midland, Texas.  Hometown of President George and Laura 
Bush, Midland is a mid-size community in West Texas with an economy heavily 
based on oil.  Reflecting an active spirit of ecumenism the Ministerial Alliance 
involved Pentecostal, Baptist, Methodist, Catholic, Presbyterian and Episcopalian 
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churches meeting regularly for prayer and Bible study.
757
  The Secretary of the 
Alliance was Deborah Fikes and in 2001 Fikes was selected to organise the national 
observation of the International Day of Prayer for the Persecuted Church slated to 
meet that November in Midland.  Through this effort Fikes was introduced to Faith 
McDonnell who with deep ties to the churches of south Sudan convinced Fikes to get 
involved in pressing for southern Sudanese peace.
758
  Fikes in turn convinced the 
Alliance, which without any real concrete connections decided ‘to stand with the 
people in southern Sudan [and] the church in southern 
Sudan.’
759
  Members of the Alliance began flying to 
Washington D.C. and arranging meetings with the State 
Department and the Sudanese Embassy quickly 
transitioning into a key ally in the peace process.  At 
the same time Deborah and her husband Stan built a 
relationship with a Sudanese Episcopalian Bishop who 
helped connect Fikes to SPLA leader John Garang and 
IGAD negotiator Lazaro Sumbeiywo.  Throughout the 
following two years Fikes received regular private 
updates from church sources inside of south Sudan, 
Garang and Sumbeiywo
760
 that provided details utilised by the rest of the US 
coalition.
761
  The Midland Alliance generated a widely circulated open letter to the 
Government of Sudan delivered through the Sudanese Embassy,
762
 private 
                                                 
757
 Jerry Max Hilton, former pastor of First Presbyterian and President of the Midland Ministerial 
Alliance, interview with author, 12 January 2007, Midland, Texas.   
758
 Deborah Fikes, former secretary of Midland Ministerial Alliance, interview with author, 12 
January 2007, Midland, Texas.   
759
 Jerry Hilton, interview with author, 12 January 2007.   
760
 Sumbeiywo not only offered regular updates about IGAD he passed to the Alliance personal and 
private prayer requests.  Sumbeiywo also utilised information garnered from the US coalition to 
strengthen his negotiating position including meetings with US Special Envoy John Danforth.  Lazaro 
Sumbeiywo to Deborah Fikes, 21 July 2003, Electronic Mail, transcript, Hudson Institute Archives, 
Washington D.C.   
761
 Deborah Fikes, interview with author, 12 January 2007.   
762
 Ministerial Alliance of Midland, Texas Open Letter to the Government of Sudan, 7 March 2003, 
Hudson Institute Archives, Washington D.C.  The Embassy responded via letter stating, ‘propaganda 
is a feature of all conflicts, and particularly civil war… Please take the time to listen to both sides in 
what is a very complicated situation and accept our invitation to visit our country.’  Ambassador 
Khidir Haroun Ahmed to Ministerial Alliance of Midland, Texas, 16 April 2003, Hudson Institute 
Archives, Washington D.C.  In addition, when the Vice President of Sudan visited the US he 
personally telephoned Jerry Hilton as a ‘courtesy call.’  Jerry Hilton, interview with author, 12 
January 2007.   
Figure 25 – Oil Rig outside 
Midland, Texas 
   234
correspondence with First Lady Laura Bush
763
 and communication to John Garang 
regarding the need for the SPLM to legitimately pursue a negotiated settlement.
764
  
Garang appears to have developed a special rapport with Deborah Fikes sharing 
prayer requests with her and visiting her in her home in Midland.  The Ministerial 
Alliance gave a Life Application Bible to Garang with his name engraved on the 
cover that found its way to Garang’s hotel room during the Naivasha peace talks and 
according to Fikes:  
[Garang] was not a choirboy… But I really believe that something happened in John 
Garang’s personal life.  And the day he was killed in the helicopter crash, the day he died… I 
received an email from him...  It said Dear Sister Deborah I wanted to thank you for all your 
prayers for me, my wife, our country and I wanted you to know that I used the Bible that you 
gave me at the [Vice Presidential] inauguration, love John.
765
   
Proving a critical component to engaging US involvement in Sudan, Deborah Fikes 
in particular and the Ministerial Alliance in general were impacted by southern 
Sudanese church advocacy in two important ways.   
First, the Ministerial Alliance utilised southern Sudanese church leaders to 
convey private diplomatic messages to and from John Garang.  Deborah Fikes for 
example noted to Michael Horowitz: 
Our director, the Bishop, from Sudan is staying with us while in the States and he will deliver 
a message to Dr. Garang for us on some suggestions for the current status of the north/south 
agreement… The Bishop gave me some very good information and said our approach would 
work and he would share it with Garang ASAP.  I will give you more details later and just 
keep it quiet for now.  The Bishop told me once again how our letter to Garang had saved the 
day at that time in the peace negotiations.
766
 
The Alliance also received information that was generated and communicated by 
southern Sudanese church leaders to Sumbeiywo such as a meeting in June 2003 
where church leaders met with Sumbeiywo and pressed him on several points related 
to IGAD negotiations including security arrangements during the interim period, 
status of sharia in Khartoum, issues regarding Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Southern 
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Blue Nile, power sharing, wealth sharing, the interim constitution and government 
and the right to southern Sudanese self-determination.
767
  Second, as is illustrated in 
the above, the Midland Alliance relied on Sudanese church leaders as sounding 
boards to test strategic propositions and garner accurate and detailed information 
about the situation in south Sudan.   
 Thus far analysis has primarily focused on the role of church advocacy within 
the United States but often international lobbying occurred closer to home.  For 
example, ‘on his pastoral trips to Sudan’ Bishop Macram Gassis personally took 
‘religious leaders, human rights activists, and congressional staff members, flying 
into unsecured areas under threat from attack by Khartoum military.’
768
  In 1992 it 
was an invitation from the New Sudan Council of Churches that first brought the 
NGO Christian Solidarity International to Sudan and convinced its Director John 
Eibner of ongoing slave abductions.
769
  Christian Solidarity International quickly 
became the most prominent advocacy group working on behalf of slave redemption 
and generated an immense amount of international media attention on behalf of south 
Sudan.  In addition, on a number of occasions the NSCC received various 
delegations including arranged meetings with the US Special Envoy on Sudanese 
Peace.
770
  The NSCC also built bilateral relationships with embassies based in Kenya 
and with various organisations working for their respective governments.
771
  For 
example before the US Institute of Peace had any local partners or representatives 
attached to Sudan, the Director had already met southern Sudanese religious leaders 
and established contact with the NSCC.
772
 
US involvement as an active IGAD partner was critical to the signing of the 
CPA and despite claims to the contrary was not merely an extension of US oil 
exploration politics.
773
  Engagement stemmed from a much more personal 
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commitment by President Bush who appointed close friend and well known ordained 
Episcopalian priest John Danforth as Special Envoy.  President Bush’s commitment 
was a result of a broad based coalition that coupled Washington based activists with 
grassroots concerns most especially from the Ministerial Alliance of Midland, Texas.  
Though it would be an overstatement to credit the development of this coalition 
solely to the NSCC, at the same time the US coalition was deeply influenced, 
motivated and informed by southern Sudanese church leaders.  Equally important 
although the NSCC as an organisation had a policy of international advocacy and 
was directly engaged in such activities much of the lobbying conducted in the US 
was enacted by individuals affiliated but not directly employed by the NSCC as an 
institution.  The NSCC did not so much generate international developments as it 
stood behind a vigorous campaign to forge relationships, increase awareness, 
disseminate information and lobby for active international involvement in the IGAD 
peace process.  In this context the NSCC strategy was highly successful. 
In general, NSCC benefited from a civil war oversimplified and ‘portrayed in 
the Western media as a struggle between Islam and Christianity.’
774
  That is 
Christians in southern Sudan came to symbolically embody advocacy on behalf of 
‘persecuted Christians’ even when US activists had little actual connection to 
southern Sudanese Christians.  Specifically, NSCC and southern Sudanese churches 
functioned as a critical channel of reliable information to international audiences, 
testified before US Congressional committees, personally visited and lobbied church 
and congressional leaders and helped connect John Garang and Lazaro Sumbeiywo 
to key international partners.  The NSCC therefore stood behind a third efficacious 
strategy – international advocacy – that sought and engaged American involvement 
in order to provide an impetus to the IGAD peace process and secure external 
pressure on the Government of Sudan ensuring negotiation in good faith, particularly 
as related to the southern Sudanese right to self-determination.  As Head of Mission 
to the US Ezekiel Gatkuoth responded to a query regarding the importance of the 
church in the Sudanese peace process, ‘the church, I would put them on the top of the 
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list. Because they did very, very wonderful.  But also the army did very wonderful 
and the international community did very well.  I think all of them are equal.  They 
have played their role, they have played their role.’
775
   
 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement Advocacy: The NSCC and the Right to Self-
Determination 
 
As has been illustrated the NSCC and affiliated southern Sudanese churches 
stood behind international advocacy campaigns that influenced the IGAD peace 
process as well as the engagement of the United States.  Though the NSCC and 
broader elements of civil society were excluded from the negotiations of the CPA 
there is one area where NSCC’s consistent lobbying directly intersected with the 
CPA over and against the misgivings of the SPLM/A and the United States: the 
southern Sudanese right to self-determination (RSD).
776
   
Prior to 1997 the Government of Sudan had rejected all endeavours for 
southern determination insisting on a united Sudan federally governed.  In 1997 
however, in order to secure a settlement with Reik Machar with an aim of 
undermining and ending the predominance of the SPLA the Government of Sudan 
‘for the first time in history, publicly committed itself to the principle of self-
determination for Southern Sudan’ thereby also officially endorsing the Declaration 
of Principles brokered in 1994 by IGAD.
777
  Though the SPLM/A rejected the 
Khartoum Peace Agreement and the viability of the accord languished on its own 
account, ironically the short-term concession of RSD transitioned into a permanent 
arrangement as long as the government was forced to adhere to the IGAD process.
778
  
In a surprising twist throughout the IGAD negotiations it was the SPLM that 
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hesitated to adopt RSD.  As one pair of scholars noted, ‘the government delegation 
seemed at times even willing to have the South secede and form its own government.  
This was unacceptable to the SPLA, who continued to press for increased autonomy 
within a federal structure.’
779
  Though the personal disposition of John Garang 
remains unclear and disputed his public statements remained firmly attached to 
creating a new, united Sudan.   
As a general proposition the international community also harboured deep 
reservations about promoting RSD.  As Michael Ouko of the NSCC peace desk 
described, ‘the international community was not recognising the right for self-
determination… and even now they are not comfortable but in the peace agreement it 
is there.’
780
  That is even as southern RSD surfaced as a pragmatic and indispensable 
demand the United States continued to express hesitation and unease.  In his report to 
President Bush, John Danforth attempted to shift the meaning of RSD to federal 
determination within a united Sudan rather than a choice between a united or 
separated Sudan.  Danforth wrote, ‘a more feasible, and, I think, preferable view of 
self-determination would ensure the right of the people of southern Sudan to live 
under a government that respects their religion and culture.  Such a system would 
require robust internal and external guarantees.’
781
  Even this limited acceptance was 
rejected by the US State Department, which downplayed the White House’s limited 
support.
782
  However, despite the apprehension of John Garang, the SPLM and the 
United States, the Machakos Protocol signed 20 July 2002 secured for southern 
Sudanese the right to a robust and internationally monitored self-determination.  
Standing behind the inclusion of this concession was one staunch and predominant 
advocate, the New Sudan Council of Churches.   
Throughout the 1990s the NSCC publicly backed and pushed an agenda that 
mandated self-determination.  In an official statement written in 1996 and revised in 
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1999 the NSCC urged the ‘reaffirmation of the rights to self-determination of the 
marginalized groups as an inalienable right.’
783
  In 2001 the Sudan Catholic Bishops’ 
Regional Conference encouraged a delegation from the US Conference of Catholic 
Bishops to ‘defend the right to self-determination’ as a jointly pursued ‘policy 
objective.’
784
   As IGAD negotiations intensified a delegation of church officials met 
with international partners in London to press them for their acceptance and 
agreement to encourage their respective governments to adhere to southern RSD as 
already established in the Declaration of Principles.  Out of this conference Sudanese 
churches issued a widely circulated document provocatively entitled “Let My People 
Choose.”  In this statement the churches listed the documents in which the SPLM/A 
and/or the Government of Sudan had affirmed RSD requesting therefore that 
‘mediators hold the parties to bilateral or multilateral covenants they have sealed.’
785
  
The document clearly argues that these frameworks were ‘categorical about the 
options of unity on one hand and independence of south Sudan on the other’ and that 
‘at no time [has] the term RSD been used to mean internal self-determination, i.e. 
options within one united Sudan only.’
786
  Four months later the position advocated 
by the council of churches was confirmed and incorporated as official in the 
Machakos Protocol.   
As in other areas while multiple civil society voices argued for RSD the 
NSCC issued the clearest, most consistent, most read and most influential 
articulation for southern determination.
787
  Special Envoy John Danforth confirmed 
in his report to President Bush the rigidity of the council of churches position on 
incorporating RSD: 
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The hostility of Christians to the Islamic government was strongly expressed by Christian 
clergy at a meeting I had with them during my January 2002 trip.  I convened the meeting to 
explore whether they would support the creation in the near future of a system for mediating 
religious grievances, even before a peace agreement.  Their very negative response was that 
such a system would not work, and that the only way for Christians to deal with the 
government was by “self-determination.”  By including the right to self-determination in any 
peace agreement, they believed they would be protected in the event the elements of an 
agreement on religious rights were not implemented.
788
   
Even after the Machakos Protocol the NSCC continued to issue position statements 
asking that future protocols strengthen the feasibility of RSD by clarifying related 
issues such as border determination, guarantees of neutrality, voter eligibility and 
mechanisms for church and international education and monitoring procedures.
789
  
Significantly however, following Machakos the NSCC itself came under pressure 
and was forced to ‘soften’ its stance on RSD advocacy in order to reduce a perceived 
image of promoting division and separation.
790
  Nonetheless, with the SPLM, IGAD 
negotiators and the international community the NSCC lobbied persistently and 
ultimately successfully for the inclusion of southern self-determination.   
The NSCC overcame misgivings particularly in relation to John Garang and 
the SPLM because the NSCC accurately reflected widespread popular sentiment and 
effectively exerted grassroots pressure on the SPLM.  The NSCC inherently 
recognised that ‘solutions that provide democracy at local and regional levels of 
government and maintain dictatorships, feudalism and other forms of 
authoritarianism of the central government level have no chance of long-term 
survival.’
791
  The NSCC argued that ‘the SPLM/A did not see itself as merely a 
southern Sudanese movement, but a movement for the whole Sudan.  It was therefore 
left for southern Sudanese to articulate claims that were specifically southern.’ 
792
  
That is the NSCC claimed that within this arena it was the NSCC and not the 
SPLM/A that spoke and was working on behalf of southern Sudan.  In this regard 
NSCC claims were accurate.  Referring to the Machakos Protocol one southern 
Sudanese scholar noted, ‘for southerners, the agreement may not contain everything 
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they had fought for, but it includes the one issue most people have agreed upon, and 
that is the right to self-determination.’
793
  It was highly unlikely that the majority of 
southern Sudanese would have agreed to any peace arrangement that failed to 
include self-determination, and at the grassroots level the advocacy for RSD pursued 
by the churches garnered for the NSCC immense political clout and capital.  Political 
observer Stephen Tut emphasised, ‘[the] church has more influence as we are 
speaking today in southern Sudan than anybody.  If we are comparing all these 
political parties, [their] influence is not as much as the influence of the church.’
794
  
Throughout southern Sudan although the people fought on behalf of the SPLA, they 
gave their ultimate allegiance to the ideology advanced by the New Sudan Council of 
Churches.  More than any other institution it was the NSCC that stood behind a 
campaign to ensure the viability of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by 
overcoming international and SPLM opposition to include the southern Sudanese 
right to self-determination in the IGAD peace process.    
 
Analysis and Conclusion 
 
The third strategy endorsed by the New Sudan Council of Churches in their 
pursuit of negotiated peace and communal stabilisation was international advocacy.  
In this regard the NSCC stood behind church endeavours that influenced and 
substantiated the IGAD peace process, mobilised international concern and 
engagement particularly within the United States and through active promotion 
overcame hesitations regarding the inclusion of the right to self-determination in the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  The effectiveness of this strategy relied less on 
tactical decisions taken by the NSCC and more on an intentional collaboration that 
nurtured and fostered international linkages in order to ensure that peace was 
supported and pushed within southern Sudan, regionally and internationally.   
Specifically, within southern Sudan the NSCC organised various people-to-
people peace conferences that reconciled divided grassroots communities, 
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rehabilitated traditional leadership, increased the participatory role of civil society 
and pressured the SPLM/A to pursue negotiated settlement in good faith while 
adopting measures of democracy, human rights and good governance.  Regionally, 
the NSCC impacted the IGAD Forum by lobbying for ongoing participation by the 
Kenyan and Ugandan governments, fostering a more conducive peace building 
environment in southern Sudan on which IGAD negotiators capitalised, conferring 
religious validation and helping secure broader international involvement particularly 
by the United States.  Internationally the NSCC influenced the involvement of the 
US through the disbursement of reliable 
information, personally visiting and submitting 
testimony to key church and congressional 
representatives, facilitating fact finding missions 
and bilateral relationships with governmental 
and NGO institutions and helping connect US 
coalition leaders to John Garang and Lazaro 
Sumbeiywo.  Within the actual mechanisms of 
the CPA itself the thumbprint of the NSCC is 
most clearly illustrated in the official acceptance 
of southern self-determination.   
The NSCC was an interconnecting hub that linked together divergent ethnic 
groups within southern Sudan, the SPLA with other southern military factions, the 
grassroots of southern Sudan with the SPLM/A and the IGAD Forum and southern 
Sudan as a whole with international awareness campaigns, partners and engaged 
involvement.  Jacqueline Wilson, a Senior Program Officer at the US Institute of 
Peace commented that:  
The reputation of the New Sudan Council of Churches was that if you needed to get anything 
done in the south, you needed to operate in the south, if you wanted to know who was who in 
the south that the New Sudan Council of Churches was key… The SPLA and the SPLM they 
were a military movement not really a political movement… and that they had taken on this 
political role which in essence circumvented the role of the tribal leaders in many respects 
and pushed the tribal leaders to a less important role.  But the New Sudan Council of 
Churches was good [and] bridged those gaps among the societies in the south.
795
 
The NSCC therefore was at the forefront of organising and advancing partnership 
and peace building with national, mid-level leaders and with the grassroots, 
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functioned as the central conduit through which a reconciled and reunited southern 
Sudanese populace applied pressure on the SPLM/A and stood behind, directly and 
indirectly, much of the IGAD peace process and international pressure.  More than 
any other single institution or movement from a southern Sudanese perspective it 
was the influence of the church that promoted reconciliation, increased communal 
stabilisation and facilitated the Sudanese road to peace.   
Southern Sudanese churches exerted such a predominant political influence, 
particularly after the 1991 SPLA fragmentation, because the churches maintained 
close solidarity with the southern Sudanese grassroots.  Inheriting a mantle of 
southern Sudanese religious leadership churches imbibed grassroots sentiments that 
honed efforts beyond relief or development to one single embodiment: negotiated 
peace with an option for self-determination.  Closely tied to the grassroots the NSCC 
utilised its office as a means through which popular sentiment received expression in 
the development of internal, regional and international strategies that furthered 
negotiated peace.   
While the NSCC played a critical peace building role during the civil war it is 
important to note that following the signing of the CPA the NSCC has struggled to 
extend its influence throughout southern Sudan, transition into new means of 
effective engagement and experienced a significant drain of NSCC leadership to 
governmental posts.
796
  One employee of the NSCC described that: 
Maybe in some ways we concentrated [too] much on one particular region of Sudan and 
neglected the other areas… The senior [church] leadership knows what NSCC is all about but 
some people, the laity, don’t know what NSCC is all about… We concentrated much on the 




In addition, Haruun Ruun has received criticism for seeking and receiving a two year 
appointment extension in 2001 that violated an eight year limit imposed on the 
Executive Secretary by the NSCC constitution.
798
  Ruun has also been negatively 
cited by western missionaries affiliated with his church background, the Sudan 
Interior Church, for self-promotion and becoming ‘very, very greedy’ following his 
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sponsorship at Columbia Bible College in the United States.
799
  There are, 
furthermore, three other important ways in which the NSCC has failed to sustain its 
advocacy. 
First, the NSCC has ceased its people-to-people peace conferences choosing 
instead to delegate the responsibility to a newly created NGO, the Resource Centre 
for Civil Leadership (RECONCILE).  RECONCILE seeks ‘to facilitate processes for 
equipping communities in Sudan with knowledge and skills for peacebuilding, 
trauma healing, good governance and social transformation.’
800
  According to Del 
and Debbie Braaksma the NSCC initiated RECONCILE in order to ensure that the 
NSCC remained responsive to southern Sudanese needs without becoming 
‘programmatic.’
801
  Though the same board of directors governs RECONCILE and 
the NSCC thus far RECONCILE has failed to develop significant recognition or 
broad interaction.  Southern Sudan remains deeply divided and minor ethnic 
incidents have continued to flare and threaten further southern fragmentation.  
Individual church denominations have sought to respond to several of these 
occurrences but they are unable to recreate the pressure or expertise exerted by the 
NSCC.  Politically it is the upcoming referendum with the possibility of secession 
that maintains tentative southern unity and it is unfortunate that as the only institution 
inside south Sudan with the capacity to transition ethnic divisions the NSCC has 
failed to proactively engage ethnic conceptualisations or construct platforms of 
deeper and lasting unification.
802
   
Second, the New Sudan Council of Churches has failed to substantively hold 
the Government of Southern Sudan accountable particularly in relation to the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  Many of the churches in 
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Africa have struggled to maintain their prophetic task following the transition to 
democracy and in this respect the NSCC is not an exception.
803
  In particular there is 
an immediate need for the NSCC to disseminate information and raise awareness 
regarding rights guaranteed in the CPA throughout the grassroots of south Sudan
804
 
and to assist the Government of Southern Sudan in the moulding of electoral systems 
and mechanics in preparation for the referendum.
805
  The establishment of peace is a 
process, a concept articulated by the NSCC during the people-to-people peace 
endeavours but largely neglected following the signing of the CPA.
806
  As Samuel 
Ador of the SCC articulated: 
We are almost making the same mistake as in 1972 when we had done our part in bringing 
the two conflicting parties to peace agreement and relaxed.  The church relaxed.  The church 
did not follow up what was going to happen so our role became completely redundant.  We 
didn’t put much effort to see that peace was maintained and after ten years the whole thing 
got blown up.  The people went to war which concluded last year.  After ten years it was 
blown up.  And after we have initiated and we worked on it we went and slept again.  Now 
what I am not seeing here in the churches today, peace has been signed but is that enough?  
When there is no gunshot and there is complete silence of the gunshot is that sufficient? …  I 
think the church shouldn’t be feeling satisfied because even the implementation itself is at 
stake at the moment.
807
   
Third, the NSCC has failed to meaningfully engage or promote Christian-
Muslim dialogue.
808
  Though Islam remains a very sensitive issue within south Sudan 
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it is critical to the long-term sustenance and viability of peace.
809
  Reflective of the 
broader Christian community in south Sudan the NSCC’s tendency to eschew 
building relationships with the Islamic community has strong political implications.  
Coupled with its insistence on the right to self-determination the NSCC has in effect 
advocated for only one form of political peace for southern Sudan – secession.  The 
NSCC has done little to promote the attractiveness of north-south unification or to 
forge north-south links and should the referendum yield separation, by its activities it 
is clear that southern Sudanese Christians would perceive at the very minimum an 
implicit confirmation of religious validation from the NSCC.
810
  Should the south opt 
for unity it is imperative to communal stabilisation and political reconciliation that 
the NSCC actively promote at every level dialogue with the Muslim community. 
Though NSCC advocacy has not significantly extended to post-CPA southern 
ethnic reconciliation, CPA implementation or Christian-Muslim dialogue, during the 
civil war NSCC advocacy was critical to the establishment of southern peace.  In 
addition to leading from the forefront internal reunification and centrally applying 
pressure on the SPLM/A, the New Sudan Council of Churches pursued a third 
efficacious strategy – international advocacy.  Supporting the IGAD peace process, 
encouraging US involvement and securing the right to self-determination the NSCC 
stood behind the brokering of the CPA facilitating at every level the mediation of 
political peace.  Throughout the civil war the NSCC proved the primary interlocutor 
linking together behind the scenes disconnected grassroots, regional and international 
strands thereby strengthening and ultimately securing the road to Sudanese peace.   
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Chapter Seven  
 Conclusion  
 




‘Frankly speaking this peace, without the church, it would not have come because the 
church has sacrificed in so many aspects to bring this peace whether materially or 





War has devastated south Sudan.  With two million southerners dead and 
several million still displaced internally or in refugee camps in surrounding countries 
south Sudan experienced deep fragmentation and communal instability.  The second 
civil war challenged and altered traditional mechanisms of peacemaking, cohesion, 
and leadership and spanning over two decades impacted south Sudan at every level.  
In the midst of flight and disintegration one agency surfaced as a primary 
interlocutor, the southern Sudanese churches.
813
  As Christianity exponentially grew 
throughout southern Sudan, churches increased communal stability, rehabilitated 
traditional patterns of identification, navigated endeavours of southern reconciliation 
and pursued strategies of conflict resolution.  As a conclusion this chapter will 
review the impact of the churches at the grassroots and national level and will 
delineate several conflict mediatory keys that emerge from the churches’ endeavours. 
Throughout the civil war Christianity rapidly expanded throughout southern 
Sudan so that potentially as much as seventy percent of south Sudan would currently 
self-identify with Christianity.  Perceived as a counterbalancing force to the Arabic 
nationalism and Islamic predominance of northern Sudan, Christianity developed 
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close links with southern ethnicities while providing a framework in which those 
ethnicities could interact in solidarity and joint participation.  Maintaining traditional 
patterns and processes of organisation churches proffered a number of important 
communal benefits ranging from reconciliation, education and resource sharing 
networks.  By granting unmediated spiritual access to God and by capitalising on key 
Old Testament prophecies Christianity enabled a framework of hope that 
reinterpreted suffering and the civil war and empowered communities and 
individuals to retain meaning, purpose and control.  Embedded in a holistic 
cosmology with spiritual and physical dimensions, Christianity as parlayed through 
southern Sudanese churches substantively impacted grassroots and national levels by 
increasing communal stabilisation and national resolution.   
Within the grassroots, Kakuma Refugee Camp, as analysed in Chapter Two, 
demonstrated the deepest influence of southern Sudanese Christianity on community 
organisation and orientation.  Situated in arid 
northwestern Kenya, throughout the 1990s 
ethnic divisions and armed conflict beset 
Kakuma Refugee Camp resulting in loss of life, 
destruction of property and a tense and divisive 
atmosphere.  In this context the churches 
bolstered communal stability by recreating 
traditional societal patterns that emphasised 
shared identification and solidarity and stressed 
the importance of communal morality as 
conveyed by trusted elder custodians.  In 
addition, churches modelled several social initiatives and cultural developments such 
as economic sustenance, education and increased gender equality.  That is the church 
rehabilitated traditional patterns of cohesion and responding to external pressure 
helped transition those patterns into a framework more compatible with 
contemporary realities.  Furthermore the church was the predominant actor in 
responding to armed ethnic confrontations organising reconciliation and peace 
building endeavours, encouraging identification beyond tribal boundaries and 
demonstrating practical modalities of interaction especially pertinent in the midst of 
easing active conflict.  Following a visit to Kakuma, Edith Linnemeyer noted that the 
churches functioned as a reservoir of hope and that ‘the refugees in Kakuma refugee 
camp need that hope.  It gives them the feeling that their situation can be changed, 
Figure 27 – ECS Celebration, Kakuma 
Refugee Camp 
   249
that one day they will have a better life.  It also gives them the possibility to face 
their actual lives and be more active regarding their own rights.’
814
  Reflected in the 
number of adherents, claims of Christian exclusivity, political endeavours enacted by 
the churches and public incorporation of Christian symbols and leadership, the 
impact of Christianity is deep, substantial and primary in shaping ongoing 
developments.  In Kakuma Refugee Camp the churches were at the forefront of 
beneficially influencing communal stability, reconciliation and political resolution.   
Among the internally displaced of Hajj Yusuf in Khartoum, examined in 
Chapter Three, while the influence of the churches were significant they were not at 
the forefront of shaping cultural constructions.  Rather, the churches specifically, and 
southern Sudanese generally, remained discriminated secondary participants in an 
overarching northern and Islamic paradigm.  Vulnerable in such a setting displaced 
southerners increasingly turned towards churches for advice, help and divine 
sanctification.  Heavily shaped by Pentecostal emphasis on experience and practical 
life application for many, churches functioned as a stabilising factor that dispensed 
practical suggestions and guidance at key life moments and transitions.  Churches 
also served as hubs of solidarity that centralised political opposition uniting southern 
ethnicities, providing a forum for resistance and helping procure beneficial 
interaction with the dominant culture.  Though identification with Christianity was 
expansive, it was somewhat shallow.  Churches, however, beneficially strengthened 
communal stabilisation by consistently intersecting with displaced southerners who 
increasingly turned inward towards the churches as central custodians of strength, 
guidance, political resistance and divine blessing.   
In the second section of Chapter Three, Oliji Refugee Camp in Uganda was 
explored as a third grassroots community.  Subjected to intense and sustained 
violence, insecurity and resource scarcity due primarily to the LRA, refugees in Oliji 
were profoundly traumatised throughout the second civil war.  Churches in Oliji have 
encouraged general unification of the community and eased cycles of revenge killing 
on the basis of shared and joint communal suffering.  Further increasing communal 
stability, churches have helped shoulder public burdens associated with sickness, 
death and burial and helped posit within the community a secure hope of eternal 
                                                 
814
 Edith Linnemeyer, “The Religious Experience of Sudanese Refugees, Kakuma Refugee Camp,” in 
The Church In Sudan: Its Impact – Past, Present and Future, vol. 1 (Limuru: New Sudan Council of 
Churches and Nile Theological College, 1997), 17.   
   250
peace that rectifies suffering and gives meaning to experienced difficulty.  On the 
other hand, influenced by collective residual memories and as evidenced by an open 
acceptance of traditional religious practices, many within the community perceive 
that the influence of Christianity is actively diminishing.  That is, within Oliji 
Refugee Camp although the churches retain an important influence and contribute to 
communal stability and ethnic and familial reconciliation, the impact of Christianity 
was self-articulated as low or culturally behind.   
Taken as a whole each of these three grassroots communities represent a 
specific point along a spectrum of possible manifestations.  Though the overarching 
role of the churches within the community differed in each setting, in each churches 
substantively contributed to communal stabilisation, political resolution and southern 
ethnic reconciliation.  Despite important differences each context also manifested a 
growing incorporation of Christian symbols, vocabulary and leadership in the public 
forum.  Collectively the three refugee camps point to a recent establishment of 
Christian influenced civil religion that is both a partial cause and result of the 
substantive social and political impact generated by the churches throughout the civil 
war.  In the immediate future the impact of Christianity on public discourse will 
remain a prominent feature of south Sudan.  For example one recent Catholic 
pastoral letter promised: 
The Church with the dawning of peace renews her full commitment to fulfil her civil 
responsibilities and to implement the spirit and action enclosed in the agreements of peace… 
The Church intends to participate with the State in the formulation of the spirit and letter of 
the new Constitution and the renewal of the legal system to safeguard the respect due to the 
human dignity and rights of all Sudanese people.  The Church remains firmly and freely 
committed to be the “voice of the people”… Therefore the Church together with other groups 
in civil society must have access to decision making within governmental structures.
815
 
The growth of Christian identification and influenced civil religion within the 
grassroots of southern Sudan enabled the New Sudan Council of Churches, as an 
ecumenical institution representing all of the predominant denominations in Sudan, 
to increasingly engage in a political strategy of southern reconciliation and national 
resolution.  Asked to summarise the contributions of the NSCC to the securing of 
Sudanese peace Michael Ouko of the peace desk responded: 
First is advocacy.  We did that.  We are even still advocating for the stability of this peace 
agreement… We did also of course facilitate many reconciliation peace initiatives.  Three, 
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we have also been a platform for the international community to use in supporting Sudan 
peace initiatives.  Many organisations or governments they want to help Sudan but there is no 
system of delivering that help so we have also been a channel for facilitating that.
816
 
That is the NSCC conscientiously promoted a three-tiered peace fostering strategy, 
built southern reconciliation and facilitated national resolution. 
First, the NSCC pursued southern reconciliation and grassroots stabilisation 
through the people-to-people peace initiatives.  These endeavours bypassed elite 
military commanders and focused on enlisting traditional mid-level leaders in a 
process that empowered grassroots communities to broker ceasefires, implement 
practices of good governance and restore communal boundaries of moral interaction.  
Though each of the numerous people-to-people conferences differed in their exact 
influence, the process commenced at Wunlit in 1999 fundamentally impacted and 
furthered the construction of communal stability and national resolution in two ways.   
First, the various agreements rehabilitated traditional leadership and moral guidelines 
within local geographies restoring mechanisms for peace building, enhancing judicial 
accountability and promoting healthy interethnic cooperation and interaction.  Next, 
the conferences reunited a fragmented southern populace enabling military 
commanders to focus on resolving the conflict with the north from a position of 
unified strength and singularly voiced demands.  As was demonstrated the SPLM/A, 
the IGAD peace process and the international community all relied upon this 
southern reunification.  Ezekiel Gatkuoth, the Head of the Government of Southern 
Sudan’s Mission to the United States commented, ‘without the churches we would 
not be able to reconcile communities…  If you have communities fighting one 
another then definitely you will not be able to win that big war because your own 
people are fighting one another.’
817
  The NSCC, therefore, was at the forefront of 
organising southern reconciliation, internal peace mediation and a southern 
environment conducive to external peace negotiation and it was this grassroots 
reunification that functioned as the southern basis for national resolution.   
Second, the NSCC utilised its connections to the grassroots and political clout 
developed by the people-to-people process to channel criticism and popular pressure 
on the SPLM/A.  Overcoming opposition from John Garang, at the Yei Dialogue the 
NSCC initiated a process that opened the SPLM/A to greater accountability, forced 
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the SPLM to adapt its governance practices and allowed the SPLA to begin 
recouping support in western Equatoria.  Describing the relationship of the church 
with Garang, Director Taib Hag-Atia of the University of Khartoum’s Centre for 
Peace and Research expounded, ‘it came through a process, and not an easy process, 
a very difficult process of trying to refine roles and trying together to ensure the 
welfare and safety of the villagers who were threatened by the army, the government 
and the SPLA… Through this process came a sort of working relationship between 
SPLA and the Sudanese church.’
818
  This relationship allowed the NSCC to 
significantly contribute to the reunification of various military divisions with the 
SPLA, urge the SPLM to adopt measures of democracy and good governance in the 
‘liberated’ areas, further broader dialogue and participation by civil society and 
pressure the SPLM to pursue negotiated settlement with the Government of Sudan in 
good faith and with one important alteration, the inclusion of the right to self-
determination.  The southern Sudanese grassroots increasingly turned towards the 
NSCC as the trusted central conduit through which popular pressure was applied on 
the elite leadership of the SPLM/A to pursue beneficial national resolution.   
The third peace building strategy utilised by the NSCC was international 
advocacy pursued regionally and within Europe and the United States.   Lobbying 
the governments of Kenya and Uganda the NSCC helped solidify support for the 
IGAD Forum, invested the process with religious symbols of validation and enabled 
the efficaciousness of IGAD mediation.  Stephen Tut of the Centre for 
Documentation and Advocacy communicated: 
People-to-people peace was what was adapted by the politicians.  Even the IGAD benefited 
from it… because it was through people-to-people peace that the southerners themselves 
have come to tolerate each other [and] they have come to reconcile…  Before they would not 
even come together, they would not even speak together until they had the people-to-people 
peace.  And then when this idea of people-to-people peace came and was successful then the 
IGAD were able to bring the leaders of the factions together because after all they have been 
pressured by the people in their community by the people-to-people peace that you must talk, 
you must forgive each other, you must reconcile, you must seek the common interests of the 
southerners.  And this is what the IGAD picked up.
819
   
Through various focal points and organised fact finding missions the NSCC sought 
further international support for the Sudanese peace process realising in the United 
States the fullest expression of its international advocacy campaigns.  By forming 
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partnerships with key leaders, particularly with Faith McDonnell, the NSCC and 
affiliated church leaders significantly encouraged US engagement by personally 
lobbying US congressional representatives, testifying before congressional hearings, 
providing consistent, reliable information utilised by the US coalition, serving as a 
constructive soundboard for US partners and functioning as an important dynamic 
link between those partners and John Garang and Lazaro Sumbeiywo.  Importantly 
the NSCC also overcame initial SPLM and international opposition and secured in 
the final peace agreement a southern Sudanese right to self-determination.  RSD, 
regional involvement and international engagement was critical to the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and standing behind each one of these endeavours 
was one primary advocate pushing, promoting and facilitating southern Sudanese 
peace and national resolution: the New Sudan Council of Churches.   
Therefore both within the examined grassroots communities and at the 
national level it was southern Sudanese churches that functioned as the predominant 
actor facilitating and securing communal stabilisation and national resolution.  With 
its fullest expression in Kakuma Refugee Camp and in the NSCC people-to-people 
peace process, southern Sudanese churches were at the forefront of encouraging the 
development of peace and achieving interethnic southern reconciliation and 
reunification.  Responding to the efficaciousness of these endeavours, as was seen 
among the displaced southerners of Khartoum and in the churches’ relationship to 
the leadership of the SPLM/A, the southern Sudanese grassroots consistently turned 
towards the churches as the central custodian of divine blessing, trusted in times of 
difficult transition as a source for practical guidance and utilised as the central 
conduit for conveying pressure, resistance and political mobilisation.  Though it was 
not included as a negotiating partner and signatory and though its influence is 
currently somewhat diminished, as was illustrated in Oliji Refugee Camp and in 
NSCC international advocacy campaigns southern Sudanese churches stood behind a 
reorientation of hope and the construction of an externally secured peace process.  
Southern Sudanese churches remained at the forefront of southern reunification and 
reconciliation, a central component in the overarching peace process and by 
conscientiously developing a strategy that empowered other actors, stood directly 
behind the IGAD peace process, pressure on the SPLM/A and international 
engagement with Sudan.  It was the southern Sudanese churches, therefore, that 
facilitated communal stabilisation, national resolution and the road to southern 
Sudanese peace.   
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The second Sudanese civil war lasted over twenty years bridging the rhetoric 
of ‘Cold War’ politics to religiously nuanced articulations of the ‘War on Terror.’  
Leaving a wake of massive destruction and flagrant human rights abuses the war 
drew upon developments at the United Nations, multinational aid organisations, 
European and American concerns and the regional interests of Ethiopia, Kenya and 
Uganda among others to remain never wholly internal or externally imposed.  Rather 
local southern Sudanese concerns, regional politics and international interests formed 
an interlocking dynamic that mutually reinforced the other.  In the same way the 
development of peace in southern Sudan rests upon local initiatives partnered with 
regional accountability and leadership augmented further by international 
engagement.  In this context it is possible to identify several conflict mediatory keys 
with broader implications in relation to the establishment of peace in the midst of 
civil war.   
First, religious leaders and initiatives can be an important source for 
establishing peace.  Reviewing the impact of religious leaders on the people-to-
people peace conferences William Lowrey identifies six principles that have broader 
implications regarding both the impact of Christianity on the southern Sudanese 
peace process and elsewhere: 
1. Religious leaders placed their moral authority behind a process of conflict 
resolution.   
2. Religious organizations provided a network for resourcing the process. 
3. Religious beliefs formed the basic precepts that led to a settlement. 
4. Religious rituals provided the symbols for cementing or sealing the agreement. 
5. Religious people became key actors during the implementation phase as well as 
in response to violations.   
6. Religious interpretations of traditional prophecies affected current events.820   
In a war zone context where ‘there is a lot of suffering, always a lot of suffering,’ 
Christian leaders made a fundamental difference in south Sudan.
821
  Christian rituals 
provided an alternate framework of interpretation employing the symbolism of the 
cross, scriptural references of promised deliverance and divine sanctioning to 
empower southern Sudanese as primary actors with reinvigorated hope and purpose.   
Both at the grassroots level and within IGAD Christian leaders utilised local, 
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regional and international church networks to provide economic support and political 
solidarity to further the peace process.  As Douglas Johnston notes, ‘individuals 
operating on a religious or spiritual basis… are often better equipped to reach people 
at the level of the individual and the subnational group – where inequalities and 
insecurities are often most keenly felt – than are most political leaders.’
822
  As was 
demonstrated in south Sudan religious actors are especially constructive when they 
focus on building meaningful ecumenical representation, partner with other religious 
traditions in the public discourse on politics and social morality, cooperate with civil 
society and civil leadership in planning and implementing grassroots policy, build 
reconciliation among divergent groups and seek to strengthen local governing 
mechanisms that encourage open participation.  Though often neglected in 
international relations, as is clear in south Sudan, religious leaders have the potential 
to generate peace awareness, validate peace processes and implement peace 
agreements.
823
   
Second, there is a critical need to appropriate a comprehensive approach to 
conflict resolution that mobilises efforts locally, regionally and internationally with 
actors from each sphere contributing within each arena.  Locally, as there is a 
legitimate danger that international NGOs become vested conflict participants ‘when 
their workers engage in conflict resolution,’ it is essential that international 
organisations work to empower indigenous actors.
824
  International NGOs can 
however offer meaningful contributions to resolving internal conflicts when they 
work to stimulate conducive peace building environments by providing to internal 
agents needed resources and education while self-focusing on broader international 
advocacy.
825
  Indigenous actors need to also understand the nature of these 
relationships and themselves develop a comprehensive strategy that is rooted in local 
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customs, symbols and methodological paradigms.  For example when designing the 
people-to-people peace process the New Sudan Council of Churches eschewed some 
international approaches instead conscientiously building a process that resonated 
with local sentiments even when such an approach was outside of normal Christian 
incorporation.  Churches and their representative ecumenical bodies have a certain 
moral and theological obligation to engage in conflict resolution in general and 
reconciliation in specific that in Africa is particularly related to ethnic interaction.
826
  
There is a need for churches to adopt the perspective of famed southern Sudanese 
chief Deng Majok: ‘the best way to unite and protect one’s own interests and those of 
one’s close relatives is to safeguard the interests of the stranger and the more distant 
person first.’
827
  In conflict resolution and peace implementation there is furthermore 
a principle of inverse application.  When the individuals charged as ‘keepers of the 
peace’ remain relatively numerically small in proportion to the population and focus 
their efforts solely on signed agreements and constitutions, there remains a high 
likelihood of war.  Inversely, as human and legal rights and peace building 
endeavours permeate throughout the population and the primary ‘keepers of the 
peace’ shift from representatives to grassroots constituents the likelihood of war 
decreases.  The greater the ‘keepers of the peace’ the less likely is a return to war.  
Significantly the NSCC understood this principle and therefore bypassed elite 
military commanders and initiated reconciliation and peace building endeavours with 
mid-level leaders who in cooperation opened the possibility of grassroots 
reunification.  From an institutional standpoint top Christian leaders have a far 
greater potential of effectively influencing mid-level leaders and promoting 
grassroots response than on elite political and military commanders.  However, as 
was demonstrated by the NSCC in south Sudan, once mid-level leaders are 
strengthened and empowered and combined with a reunified grassroots populace 
internal and ecumenical organisations can develop immense political clout and exert 
significant and sustainable pressure on elite political and military leaders.  At the 
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local level therefore it is critical that interested international parties empower 
indigenous actors as primary agents who themselves focus on developing a 
comprehensive strategy that focuses on expanding mid-level leadership and 
grassroots reconciliation in order to exert pressure on elite leaders to pursue human 
rights, good governance and negotiated settlement.
828
    
In addition to local actors, approaches and developments, in facilitating 
resolution to an internal conflict the incorporation of regional institutions and 
involvement is a second critical component to a comprehensive approach.  As ‘the 
UN Secretariat and the Security Council are simply not well suited to coping with 
internal conflicts’
829
 and as Europe, the United States and various African 
governments have recognised their own limitations in this capacity, there has been a 
recent conceptual shift ‘open to the idea that regional organizations have a role to 
play in helping to resolve internal problems… with the proviso, of course, that 
government consent is fundamental.’
830
  Even within Africa, sub-regional 
organisations ‘have shown greater willingness than the [Organization of African 
Unity] to deal with civil conflicts.’
831
  This shift has increasingly placed the burden 
for negotiation on regional participatory governments and ‘it is in this context that 
the [IGAD] initiative on the Sudan should be viewed.’
832
  When negatively affected, 
regional organisations inherently possess strong interests in resolving conflict, levers 
for pressuring accountability and mechanisms for contributing to long-term 
sustainable economic and political partnerships important to peace implementation.  
In south Sudan the NSCC recognised the importance of this development and 
lobbied both regional governments and international observers to strengthen the 
regional IGAD peace initiative.  From a religious perspective, however, ‘churches 
                                                 
828
 ‘With governance, we no longer look only at the [democratic] question of “who gets what, when, 
and how” – that is, distributive politics – but we increasingly examine issues related to the rules of the 
game, what I call “constitutive politics.”’  Goran Hyden, “Governance and the Reconstitution of 
Political Order,” in State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, ed. Richard Joseph (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999), 186.   
829
 Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 131.   
830
 Connie Peck, Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing 
Conflict (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 209.   
831
 James Busumtwi-Sam, “Redefining “Security” after the Cold War: The OAU, the UN, and Conflict 
Management in Africa,” in Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution, eds. Taisier M. Ali and Robert 
O. Matthews (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1999), 265.   
832
 Francis M. Deng, “Anatomy of the Peace Process,” in Their Brothers’ Keepers: Regional Initiative 
for Peace in Sudan, ed. Francis M. Deng (Addis Ababa: Inter Africa Group, 1997), 29.   
   258
and Christians in Africa have to be far more conscious of their interdependence, their 
solidarity with each other across national boundaries’ in order to maximise 
awareness and lobbying campaigns.
833
  Regional organisations not only have a role 
to play in resolving internal conflict, they need to be tactically encouraged and 
strengthened by both local and international parties. 
The resolution of the civil war in Sudan demonstrates that the third 
component to comprehensive peace building relates to important developments 
within the international sphere.  As already noted, ‘the current trend in NGO 
interventions is away from entry into conflict situations by outsiders towards training 
people inside the society in conflict in the skills of conflict resolution, and combining 
those with indigenous traditions.’
834
  International NGOs, religious actors and 
governmental representatives also have an important role in generating broad 
advocacy that will shift international awareness, opinion and engagement.  For 
example, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has adopted three important 
strategic principles: ‘“the mobilization of shame’” related to monitoring and public 
reporting, precise communication with key decision makers and when available 
contributing to legal aid, education and ‘training in public 
advocacy.’
835
  Within international advocacy there is an 
ongoing need for NGOs and other actors to understand such 
endeavours as a formation of a joint collaboration with local 
indigenous partners.  As was demonstrated in the shifting of 
US policy towards constructive engagement with the 
southern Sudanese peace process, the US coalition was 
effective because of its enabling of southern Sudanese 
church actors to personally articulate their own situation 
through visits to Capitol Hill and with major denominational 
leaders.  Furthermore, Sudanese church agencies supplied 
consistent and precise information relied upon by the 
coalition and helped US partners develop working policy 
                                                 
833
 John W. de Gruchy, “Theological Reflections on the Task of the Church,” 59.   
834
 Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The 
Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 
160.   
835
 Felice D. Gaer, “Human Rights NGOs in UN Peace Operations,” in Mitigating Conflict: The Role 
of NGOs, eds. Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 73-89.   
Figure 28 – Sudanese 
Embassy, Washington 
D.C. 
   259
positions and connection to leaders of the opposition movement.  That is, 
international actors have an important role to play locally and local actors have an 
important role to play internationally.  The negotiated settlement in Sudan 
demonstrates the critical need for a comprehensive approach to peace development 
by local, regional and international actors targeting local, regional and international 
spheres.  As one group of scholars summarised: 
Conflict practitioners have usually advocated longer-term approaches, including empowering 
embedded parties, changing the regional context, building coalitions in favor of conflict 
resolution and setting up multiple tracks of dialogue and influence through which a peace 
process can be approached.
836
 
The third mediatory key demonstrated by the southern Sudanese peace 
process relates to the essential nature of establishing freedom of religion.  Religious 
freedom constitutes one of the primary building blocks of modern human rights law 
and understanding.  The oldest internationally recognised human right, individuals 
were first afforded religious freedom under international protection at the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648.
837
  Today this right continues to maintain an international 
prominence ‘expressly recognized in every major international human rights 
declaration and covenant, as well as in the overwhelming majority of the world’s 
constitutions.’
838
  However a word like ‘“indifferent” can mean “impartial,” “fair,” or 
“just,” or it can mean “unconcerned,” “unmoved,” “apathetic” or “insensible,” and 
the same is true of “neutral.”’
839
  As was seen in Sudan, despite claims to religious 
freedom religio-nationalistic impulses continue to contribute to conflict and in the 
north religious discrimination.   Freedom of religion however, is a fundamental 
freedom and is particularly relevant in the context of political instability as it 
summarises other relevant human rights.  As James Wood states, ‘religious human 
rights are integral to the advancement of all other human rights because of their 
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intimate grounding in the nature and sacredness of the human person.’
840
  
Furthermore, ‘religious values can also enhance and support liberal democratic 
institutions and ideas.’
841
  Achieving freedom of religion in its fullest sense, 
therefore, also guarantees other essential human rights: freedom of conscious and 
thought, organisation and assemblage, individual and communal change and re-
association, and unmitigated dissemination of information.  Furthermore, 
incorporating multiple religious constituencies into the public arena minimises the 
lure of extremism and militancy while creating a culture of open dialogue, respect 
and understanding.  Freedom of religion is the central axiom around which the other 
human rights encircle.
842
  From a perspective of human rights, therefore, freedom of 
religion is the fundamental human right and in many contexts, as is seen in Sudan, is 
critical to the establishment and maintenance of peace.   
In an increasingly globalised world where ongoing violence is certain and 
even predictable it is critical that attention is maintained on theoretical and practical 
approaches to encouraging conflict resolution.
843
  The peace process pursued in 
relation to south Sudan proved effective and demonstrated a melding of local, 
regional and international interests and actors.  Specifically, research undertaken in 
the thesis has clearly indicated at least seven peace building principles with broader 
implications:  
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1. Religious leaders have the potential to generate peace awareness, 
validate peace processes and implement peace agreements. 
2. Peacemaking by religious leaders significantly increases when 
those leaders build broad and interfaith coalitions, focus on 
reconciliation and strengthen secular forms of governance and 
participation. 
3. Comprehensive and multi-track approaches to conflict resolution 
that utilise local, regional and international actors are imperative.   
4. Indigenous religious and non-combative agencies can facilitate 
political peace by focusing on traditional mid-level leaders, 
reuniting grassroots communities, pressuring elite opposition 
leaders and directly engaging international advocacy.   
5. Regional organisations are central as negotiating agencies with a 
potential for sustainable accountability.   
6. International actors are critical to empowering local indigenous 
actors and in establishing broader awareness, advocacy and 
engagement. 
7. Freedom of religion is essential to peace development and 
maintenance.   
As indicated in the above principles related to conflict mediation, in south 
Sudan Christian leaders and spirituality contributed significantly to the establishment 
of communal stabilisation and national resolution.  Among the displaced in Kakuma 
Refugee Camp, Hajj Yusuf and Oliji Refugee Camp churches re-established 
traditional patterns of organisation, increased identity categorisations, encouraged 
ethnic reconciliation, resuscitated hope and in general increased communal stability.  
Nationally the New Sudan Council of Churches developed southern reunification, 
pressured the SPLM/A to adopt measures of good governance, partnered with 
international actors to encourage regional and European and American engagement 
and in general enabled national resolution.  Throughout the second civil war, 
therefore, as the thesis has clearly demonstrated it was southern Sudanese churches 
that facilitated the road to Sudanese peace.   
   262
Appendix One  
Summary of Research among the Displaced in Kakuma, Khartoum 
and Oliji  
 














































































   263
Appendix Two 




Kakuma Refugee Camp 
Mary Akop Acher, Presbyterian Church of Sudan*  
Daniel Achieng, Equatorian*  
Abraham Achuth, Deacon of Episcopal Church of Sudan* 
James Aker, Episcopal Church of Sudan* 
Daniel Aketch, Episcopal Church of Sudan* 
Wilson Adon Akong, Redeemed Church of God* 
Teresa Bul Chan, Chair Lady of Nuer community 
Reuben Culdiac, Lay Leader of Sudan Pentecostal Church* 
James Bany Daa, Presbyterian Church of Sudan, Kakuma Refugee Camp 
David Deng, Sudan Pentecostal Church Leader, Kakuma Refugee Camp* 
Marisan San Deng, Women’s Representative on the Nuer Court* 
Samuel Deng, High Deacon of Episcopal Church of Sudan* 
Jacob Dut, Presbyterian Church of Sudan* 
John Garang, Episcopal Church of Sudan* 
William Geit, Episcopal Church of Sudan* 
Hilda, Women’s Department Leader for Community Department of the Lutheran 
 World Federation, Kakuma Refugee Camp 
Father Jacobs, Priest of Catholic Parish, Director of Don Bosco Vocational Training 
 Centre 
James, School Teacher, Episcopal Church of Sudan 
Peter Jawaka, Jehovah’s Witness* 
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Alanya Joseph, Chairman of Equatorian Community   
Elizabeth Nacha Kai, Presbyterian Church of Sudan* 
Peter Panam Kok, Presbyterian Church of Sudan* 
David Athiel Kong, Equatorian* 
John Kong, Presbyterian Church of Sudan* 
Andrew Kuol, Catholic catechist of Christ the King* 
Peter Kwent, Chairman of Bentiu Community  
Peter Ngong Lam, Sunday School Director of Presbyterian Church of Sudan  
Neville Lado Lok, Presbyterian Church of Sudan* 
James Ateny Lual, Sudan Pentecostal Church* 
Peter Lual, Pastor of Presbyterian Church of Sudan, employee of Open Doors* 
Luok, Catholic Christ the King* 
Paul Madat, Episcopal Church of Sudan* 
Tut Mai, Pastor of Presbyterian Church of Sudan, Staff of Mobile Bible School 
Gabriel Majok, Episcopal Church of Sudan* 
Rachel Achoul Majok, Episcopal Church of Sudan* 
Peter Kuol Maket, secretary of Nuer Court* 
Peter Makuac, Associate Moderator of the Presbyterian Church of Sudan-Akobo 
Job Makeui, teacher 
Philip Makueol, Episcopal Church of Sudan* 
John Jok Manyout, Presbyterian Church of Sudan* 
Pili Martin, Peace, Conflict and Reconciliation Programme Officer of Lutheran 
 World Federation Peace  
Rachel Najor Moos, Presbyterian Church of Sudan* 
Kerbina Dul Myon, Head Chief of the Nuer Court, Kakuma Refugee Camp* 
Peter Kai Nyon, Pastor of Presbyterian Church of Sudan* 
Peter, Catholic Christ the King* 
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Philip, Catholic Christ the King* 
John Riak, Evangelist and Church Secretary of Presbyterian Church of Sudan 
Samuel, Catholic Christ the King* 
Barnaba Uti, Catholic Christ the King* 
James Rout Wour, Chairman of Nuer Community 
Peter Yueugu, Episcopal Church of Sudan* 
 
Lokichogio 
Paul Buol, Pastor of Presbyterian Church of Sudan  
Stephen Ter Nyuon Yier, Assistant Director Presbyterian Relief and Development 
 Agency, former Vice Chairman of New Sudan Council of Churches 
 
Nairobi 
James Bouth Cadech, Community Development Officer of PACT Kenya 
Matthew Mathiang Deang, Member of Parliament of Government of South Sudan, 
 former Director of New Sudan Council of Churches Peace Desk 
David Ibon, Pastor of Presbyterian Church of Sudan  
James Magwat, Director of Presbyterian Relief and Development Agency 
Basil Nyama, Pastor of Episcopal Church of Sudan  
Michael Ouko, New Sudan Council of Churches Peace Desk  
Stephen Tut, Acting Director of Centre for Documentation and Advocacy  




James Wani Igga, Speaker of the Parliament of the Government of South Sudan 
Justin Kongor, Lay Reader ECS, Deputy Director of Forestry Plans and Extensions, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of South Sudan 
Joseph Marona, Archbishop of Episcopal Church of Sudan 
Robert E. Whitehead, Consul General of United States, Juba 
 
Khartoum 
Sabat Aba, Presbyterian Church of Sudan, Hajj Yusuf * 
Samuel Nwaylo Ador, Director of Sudan Council of Churches Church and Society 
 Department 
Viviana Aluda, Episcopal Church of Sudan, Hajj Yusuf*   
Gordon Awetch, Pastor Trainee of Shilluk Presbyterian Church of Sudan, Hajj 
 Yusuf*  
Yohannes Benjamin, Pastor of Episcopal Church of Sudan, Hajj Yusuf*  
Eliza Botho, Presbyterian Church of Sudan, Hajj Yusuf* 
Lucia Brown, Episcopal Church of Sudan, Hajj Yusuf*  
Lucia Dak, Presbyterian Church of Sudan, Hajj Yusuf*  
Mary David, Presbyterian Church of Sudan, Hajj Yusuf*  
Daniel Deng, Bishop of Renk, Episcopal Church of Sudan and Chairman of ECS 
 Justice and Peace Commission 
Telar Deng, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs (South Sudan) and former New 
 Sudan Council of Churches Peace Mobiliser 
Paul Dimitri, Sudan Pentecostal Church Hajj Yusuf* 
Kenneth Duku, Coordinator of Emergency Relief for Sudan Council of Churches 
Paul Elianai, Manager of Episcopal Church of Sudan orphanage, Hajj Yusuf*   
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Alakaya Elikana, Episcopal Church of Sudan, Hajj Yusuf* 
John Elsir, Chairman of Executive Committee of Sudan Interior Church-North* 
Boulis Francis, Episcopal Church of Sudan, Hajj Yusuf* 
Joyce Guwo, Sudan Pentecostal Church, Hajj Yusuf* 
Dr Taib Hag-Atia, Director of the University of Khartoum Centre for Peace and 
 Research 
Mary Joshua, Episcopal Church of Sudan, Hajj Yusuf* 
Joyce, Sudan Pentecostal Church, Hajj Yusuf   
Joselyn Juan, Sudan Pentecostal Church, Hajj Yusuf* 
Isaac Cham Jwok, Pastor of Presbyterian Church of Sudan, Hajj Yusuf* 
Dr Abednego Akok Kacuol, Director of University of Juba Centre for Peace and 
 Development 
Hani Kamish, Pastor of Sudan Pentecostal Church, Hajj Yusuf 
Stanley Khamis, Church Secretary of Episcopal Church of Sudan and Director of 
 Salvation Mission Sudan, Hajj Yusuf*   
Andrew Koya, General Secretary of Sudan Interior Church-North 
Abraham Kuol, Presbyterian Church of Sudan, Hajj Yusuf*  
Jambo Laeija, Mundri Chief, Hajj Yusuf*  
Lillie, Sudan Pentecostal Church, Hajj Yusuf 
Joseph Loro, Sudan Pentecostal Church, Hajj Yusuf 
Dr Haruun Ruun Lual, Special Advisor to President Bashir, former Executive 
 Secretary of New Sudan Council of Churches 
Ipiol Luduriko, Sudan Pentecostal Church, Hajj Yusuf* 
Noah Manzult, Assistant Director of Boys Hope Centre, Hajj Yusuf  
Thomas Melut, Principal of Nile Theological College and former MP of Government 
 of Sudan 
Nyanath Michael, Presbyterian Church of Sudan, Hajj Yusuf*  
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Fermo Ogilla, former General Overseer of Sudan Pentecostal Church-North and 
 pastor of Khartoum International Centre 
Jacob Orech, Sudan Pentecostal Church, Hajj Yusuf 
Lillian Paul, Episcopal Church of Sudan, Hajj Yusuf*  
Margaret Peter, Sudan Pentecostal Church, Hajj Yusuf*  
Stephen, Deputy Director of Mission, Evangelism and Education Department of 
 Presbyterian Church of Sudan-Malakal  
Sylvester Thomas, Canon of ECS All Saints Cathedral 
Peter Kai Thon, Ruling Elder Presbyterian Church of Sudan, Hajj Yusuf* 
Francis Tombe, Director of Boys Hope Centre, Hajj Yusuf 
Yuhana Yabe, Sudan Interior Church-North* 
Willow Gbolo Yerumba, Personnel Secretary of Sudan Council of Churches 
Sandrew Yusef, Council of Equatorian chiefs, Hajj Yusuf*   
 
Yambio 
Commissioner of Yambio County 
Eliaba Bosuma, Dean of ECS All Saints Cathedral 
Father Joseph Garzi Abangi Dei, Catholic Bishop of Tambura/Yambio 
Minister of Finance, State of Western Equatoria 
Speaker of the Parliament, State of Western Equatoria  








Bulson Buli, Sudan Pentecostal Church of Adjumani* 
Father Ananias Odaga, Ugandan Catholic Parish Priest for Sudanese Refugees in 
 Adjumani District 
Andrew Onziga, Programme Manager of Education Access Africa 
Mullai Ishmael Roman, Baptist Pastor 
 
Kampala 
Del and Debbie Braaksma, missionaries of Reformed Church of America 
 missionaries with RECONCILE  
 
Oliji Refugee Camp 
Eduru Alex, husband and medicinal procurer of African Traditional Religion 
 practitioner*   
Eremugo Alfred, Catholic Church* 
Terensio Alfred, Pastor of Episcopal Church of Sudan-Torit and Community 
 Services Officer 
Gali Athanasius, Lay Reader and Leader Episcopal Church of Sudan-Kajo Keji*  
Taban Bernard, Episcopal Church of Sudan-Kajo Keji* 
Emmanuel Biaa, Catholic Church*   
Dali Dadauto, Catholic Church* 
Geri Dennis, Sudan Pentecostal Church*   
Emmanuel, Former Pastor Episcopal Church of Sudan Maaji Refugee Camp* 
Andrewgo Felix, Catechist of Catholic Church 
Lodi Francis, Pastor and Acting Overseer of Sudan Pentecostal Church Adjumani 
 District*   
   270
Ajuko Olivia George, Welfare Refugee Chairman*   
Poni Grace, Sudan Pentecostal Church*   
Eunice Kojo, Episcopal Church of Sudan-Kajo Keji*   
Fibicio Marrio, Catholic Church*   
Jerisa Meling, Women’s Leader of Sudan Pentecostal Church* 
Theopholis Mono, Elder of Sudan Pentecostal Church*   
Mojo Moses, Episcopal Church of Sudan-Kajo Keji*   
David Oleca, Catholic Church* 
Judith Onesemo, Episcopal Church of Sudan-Torit*   
Ydith Poni, Sudan Pentecostal Church*   
Suleiman, Islamic Mosque   
Timon Tela, Sudan Pentecostal Church*   
Oyuru Wilson, Episcopal Church of Sudan-Torit*   
Sequonda Wilson, Episcopal Church of Sudan-Torit*   
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United States and United Kingdom 
 
Dick Ackley, South Central Regional Director of SIM, Dallas, Texas* 
Pete Ackley, former missionary of SIM, Dallas, Texas* 
Jennifer DiMaggio, International Christian Concern, Washington D.C. 
Deborah Fikes, Midland Ministerial Alliance, Midland, Texas* 
Stan Fikes, Sudan activist, Midland, Texas* 
Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth, Head of the Government of Southern Sudan Mission to the 
 United States, Washington D.C.  
Jerry Max Hilton, former pastor of First Presbyterian and President of Midland 
 Ministerial Alliance, Midland, Texas 
Michael Horowitz, Senior Fellow of Hudson Institute, Washington D.C.  
Edwin Makola, pastor of Sudanese Community Church, Dallas, Texas 
Faith McDonnell, Director of Religious Liberty Programs and the Church Alliance 
 for a New Sudan at the Institute on Religion and Democracy, Washington 
 D.C. 
Molly Miller, Congressional Staff Member, Representative Frank R. Wolf, 
 Washington D.C.  
Zac Niringiye, Assistant Bishop of Kampala, Edinburgh 
John Stasney, pastor of Christ Church, Midland Ministerial Alliance, Midland, 
 Texas* 
Jacqueline Wilson, Senior Programme Officer, United States Institute of Peace, 




* Indicates group interview 
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